

February 14th, 2023 Regularly Scheduled Board Meeting
3:45 p.m. Via Zoom Webinar - Ophir Elementary Large Conference Room
Link: <https://us06web.zoom.us/j/89503323578>

Call to Order

Pledge of Allegiance

Revision(s) to Agenda

Public Comment – Non-Agenda Items

Approval of Minutes

Recognitions and Commendations

Superintendent Report

Middle School / High School Principal's Report

Elementary School Principal's Report

DP Coordinator Report

Activities Report

Business Manager's Report

Committee Reports

- **Personnel committee - Have met and will report in D&A #'s 2 & 3**
- **Wellness committee - No report**
- **Policy Committee - No report**
- **Strategic plan committee - Update at meeting**
- **Budget committee - No report**
- **Negotiations committee - No report - Suspended for the year**
- **Safety and Security sub-committee - D&A # 3**

Special Reports

- **Construction Update**

Discussion and Action:

- 1. School Marshal Procedures**
- 2. Global Online Academy as a distance learning provider**
- 3. International Alliance Group Teacher Recruitment**
- 4. Trustees Resolution Calling for Trustee Election**
- 5. Trustee Election Ballot Language**
- 6. Trustee Resolution Calling for Bond Election**
- 7. Bond Election Resolution**
- 8. Trustee Bond Ballot Language**
- 9. Senate Bill 307 - FY24 Projected Increase / Decrease**

Consent Agenda

- 1. Warrants and Liabilities**

2. Staff

a. Spring Sports Coaches

i. Track

- 1. James Miranda (Head LPHS / OMS)**
- 2. Brian Squillace (Assistant LPHS / OMS)**
- 3. Tina Albers (Assistant LPHS / OMS)**
- 4. Betsy Biggerstaff (OMS)**

ii. Baseball

- 1. John McGuire (Assistant)**
- 2. Matt Morris (Head)**
- 3. Ryan Rothing (volunteer)**

iii. Golf

- 1. Jenny Wilcynski (Head)**
- 2. John Hannahs (helper)**

iv. Tennis

- 1. Libby Grabow**

b. Kitchen

- 1. Tiffany Nash**

c. Tech Coordinator

- i. End of Probation contract adjustment**

d. Volunteers

- i. Mark Craig**
- ii. Barbara Craig**

3. Out of District students

a. A.V. - Madison County

Future Meeting Dates: Regular meeting March 14th, 3:45 p.m.

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DP Coordinator Report [at meeting](#)

Activities Report [at meeting](#)

Business Manager's Report [at meeting](#)

Committee Reports

- **Personnel committee - [Have met and will report in D&A #'s 2 & 3](#)**
- **Wellness committee - [No report](#)**
- **Policy Committee - [No report](#)**
- **Strategic plan committee - [Update at meeting](#)**
- **Budget committee - [No report](#)**
- **Negotiations committee - [No report - Suspended for the year](#)**
- **Safety and Security sub-committee - [D&A # 3](#)**

Special Reports

- **Construction Update - In Packet [Cristie Tate to report](#)**

Discussion and Action:

1. **School Marshal Procedures - Board approved policy 1715 in packet as well as board approved School Marshal job description in packet, I have also included the HVA assessment conducted in March of 2022. Additionally, there are a number of public comments I have received regarding this topic. At this meeting we need to discuss the procedures for this position. *Our first motion should be to open discussion of the policy and procedures. Namely, the board needs to consider if the marshal will be armed. Our policy specifies that the school marshal possess a concealed carry permit. Based on the conversation arising from the first motion, we should revise motion to address the marshal and being armed. Our policy requires that the procedures are articulated yearly. Motions = 1st Move to open the discussion of school marshal procedures. 2nd motion will revise 1st motion and be crafted following discussion.***
2. **Global Online Academy as a distance learning provider - Contract for GOA in packet. This is an expense that can be coded to HB 279 dollars. This is an additional online learning provider, we have vetted them very carefully. They generally work in private schools and we**

are one of the first public schools they have partnered with. Very high level of virtual learning. The one caveat is I am awaiting Montana Office of Public Instruction to approve GOA as an online learning provider for Montana. Not anticipating any problems.

Recommended motion = Approve agreement with Global Online Academy as presented.

3. International Alliance Group Teacher Recruitment - Information in packet. The personnel committee has discussed this. There are a number of school districts in Montana utilizing J1 teachers from around the world to fill positions. I have had meetings with the representatives from IAG as well as talked with other schools in the area who have utilized this service. Ultimately, I am wanting to have another avenue for recruitment as we start the staffing pattern for next year. *Recommended motion = Approve using International Alliance Group for Teacher Recruitment.*
4. Trustees Resolution Calling for Trustee Election - In Packet. This is the official resolution for the trustees to call for a trustee election. There are two board seats up for election. The seat currently held by Scott Hammond which is a 2 year seat and the seat currently held by Stacy Ossorio which is a 3 year seat. *Recommended motion = Approve the Trustees Resolution calling for a trustee election.*
5. Trustee Election Ballot Language - In Packet. This is the official ballot language. *Recommended motion = Approve the Trustee Election Ballot Language.*
6. Trustee Resolution Calling for Bond Election - In Packet. This is the official resolution for the trustees to call for a bond election. *Recommended motion = Approve the resolution calling for a bond election as presented.*
7. Bond Election Resolution - In Packet. This is the official bond election resolution that will reflect the actions of today's board meeting. *Recommended motion = Approve the bond election resolution as presented.*
8. Trustee Bond Ballot Language - In Packet. This is the official ballot language for the bond election. *Recommended motion = Approve the bond ballot language as presented.*
9. Senate Bill 307 - FY24 Projected Increase / Decrease - In Packet. SB 307 allows schools to increase their non voted levies according to a state specific formula. As part of taking advantage of SB 307 we need to publicize our projected increases. Keep in mind that this is the projected increases. While we are not anticipating increasing these non-voted levies, we still have the option to should the need arise prior to setting the final budget in August. *Recommended motion = Approve the SB 307 estimates for 2023-2024 school year.*

Consent Agenda

1. Warrants and Liabilities
2. Staff
 - a. Spring Sports Coaches
 - i. Track
 1. James Miranda (Head LPHS / OMS)
 2. Brian Squillace (Assistant LPHS / OMS)
 3. Tina Albers (Assistant LPHS / OMS)

- 4. Betsy Biggerstaff (OMS)
 - ii. Baseball
 - 1. John McGuire (Assistant)
 - 2. Matt Morris (Head)
 - 3. Ryan Rothing (volunteer)
 - iii. Golf
 - 1. Jenny Wilcynski (Head)
 - 2. John Hannahs (helper)
 - iv. Tennis
 - 1. Libby Grabow
 - b. Kitchen
 - 1. Tiffany Nash
 - c. Tech Coordinator
 - i. End of Probation contract adjustment
 - d. Volunteers
 - i. Mark Craig
 - ii. Barbara Craig
- 3. Out of District students
 - a. A.V. - Madison County

Future Meeting Dates: Regular meeting March 14th, 3:45 p.m.

Big Sky School District #72 School Board Meeting
Ophir ES Conference Room (3:45pm)
January 10th, 2023
MINUTES

In attendance: Loren Bough, Stacy Ossorio, Matt Jennings, Kara Edgar, Scott Hammond, Dustin Shipman, Corky Miller, Andrew Blessing, Marlo Mitchem, Brittany Shirley, Tim Sullivan, Libby Grabow, Cristie Tate, John Hannahs, Kris Corzine, Amy Hunter, Kaite Franklin, Linda Nell, Patty Hamblin

Meeting called to order at 3:45pm, by Chair Bough

Pledge of Allegiance

Revision(s) to Agenda – D&A Item #1 to be addressed right after Recognitions & Commendations, prior to Superintendent's Report

Public Comment – Non-Agenda Items – None

Approval of Minutes – Trustee Edgar made a motion to approve minutes for the Meetings held December 15th, Trustee Ossorio seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**

Recognitions and Commendations – None

Discussion and Action Item #1 – Trustee Ossorio made a motion to open Discussion, Trustee Jennings seconded the motion. Discussion: Kris Corzine, Friends of Community Library Chair, requested open discussion/dialogue regarding the future of the Library at BSSD. It was agreed that the current arrangement had been misinterpreted, both BSSD and the Community Library like the current relationship and will continue to work together to foster Library use and access by students and community members.

At this point in the Meeting, Chair Bough excused himself in order coach LPHS basketball. Vice Chair Ossorio chaired the Meeting.

Superintendent's Report – Dustin Shipman

- Enrollment: 428
- Mask lawsuit on-going: Gallatin County did not dismiss
- Monitoring Helena – no legislative update yet
 - Dr. Shipman will attend the Day of Advocacy on January 25th

OMS/LPHS Principal's Report – Marlo Mitchem

- LPHS exams next week
- OMS MAPS testing on the horizon
- OPI pilot program – 7th grade testing
- Working-on tenured and non-tenured evaluations
- Monitoring ChatGPT – AI for paper writing
- Already getting some terrific college placements
- Ski days start in two weeks

Elementary Principal's Report- Brittany Shirley

- MTSS support evaluation/meeting
- 5th grade testing upcoming
- K-12 grade – active shooting training
- Ski days: 2/3 complete, 4K and 5th next
- Continuing with tenured and non-tenured formal observations

DP Coordinator's Report – Tim Sullivan

- January 17 – IB info night for 9th and 10th grades
- 12th grade – mock exams
- 11th grade – 1st semester exams

Activities Report – Dustin Shipman

- Basketball in full swing
- Baseball coaches on next month's Board Agenda (March 24 start)

Business Manager – Corky Miller

- FY23 Budget Funds - current positions in Packet
- Spring Count Day – Monday, February 6th
- January – CY22 close-out and reporting, W2's, 1099's, etc.
- D&A Item 4 – steps/timeline associated with potential bond vote and issuance
- February Board Actions: Election Resolution(s). Ballot Language, SB307

Committee Reports

- Personnel Committee – No Report
- Wellness Committee – No Report
- Policy Committee – No Report
- Strategic Plan Committee – No Report
- Budget Committee – No Report
- Negotiation Committee – No Report – suspended for the year
- Safety and Security committee – No Report

Special Reports

- Construction Update – Cristie Tate provided a construction update.

Discussion and Action Items:

1. Big Sky Community Library Discussion - Addressed earlier in the Meeting
2. MSU Partnership - Trustee Jennings made a motion to open Discussion, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. Discussion among Trustees and Dr. Franklin. Trustee Jennings made the motion to approve the changes, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**
3. Second Step Counseling Program - Trustee Jennings made the motion to approve, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**
4. Dorsey formal engagement for legal services - Trustee Jennings made the motion to approve, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**
5. Additional Contract Certified staff - Trustee Jennings made the motion to approve, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**

Consent Agenda: Trustee Jennings made a motion to approve Consent Agenda items, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. – **Motion passed unanimously.**

1. Warrants and Liabilities
2. Staff
 - a. Classified

- i. Safety and Security Manager
 - 1. Matt Dougherty
 - b. Winter Season Coaches
 - i. OMS Girls Basketball
 - 1. Jolene Clark
 - 2. Vanessa McGuire
- 3. Out-of-District Students
 - a. none

Next BSSD #72 Future Board Meetings:

Regular Meeting, February 14th, 2023 at 3:45pm (Tuesday)

Adjourned at 4:55pm by Vice Chair Ossorio

_____, Loren Bough, Board Chair

_____, Corky Miller, Business Manager/Clerk

Big Sky School District #72 Special Board Meeting
Ophir ES Conference Room (8:45am)
January 26th, 2023
MINUTES

In attendance: Loren Bough, Stacy Ossorio, Matt Jennings, Scott Hammond, Kara Edgar, Dustin Shipman, Corky Miller, Andrew Blessing

Meeting called to order at 8:45am by Chair Bough

Pledge of Allegiance

Revision(s) to Agenda – None

Public Comment – Non-Agenda Items – None.

Discussion and Action Items:

1. First Reading Policy 1715 – Trustee Edgar made a motion to approve with changes as discussed, Trustee Jennings seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**
2. Job Description – School Marshal - Trustee Edgar made a motion to approve, Trustee Hammond seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**

Next BSSD #72 Future Board Meetings:

February 14th, 3:45pm – Regular Board Meeting

Adjourned at 9:07am by Chair Bough

_____, Loren Bough, Board Chair

_____, Corky Miller, Business Manager/Clerk

**Big Sky School District #72 Special Board Meeting
Ophir ES Conference Room (8:45am)
January 31st, 2023
MINUTES**

In attendance: Stacy Ossorio, Matt Jennings, Scott Hammond, Kara Edgar, Dustin Shipman, Corky Miller, Andrew Blessing

Meeting called to order at 8:53am by Vice Chair Ossorio

Pledge of Allegiance

Revision(s) to Agenda – None

Public Comment – Non-Agenda Items – None.

Discussion and Action Items:

1. Second Reading Policy 1715 – Trustee Edgar made a motion to approve, Trustee Jennings seconded the motion. **Motion passed unanimously.**

Next BSSD #72 Future Board Meetings:

February 14th, 3:45pm – Regular Board Meeting

Adjourned at 9:07am by Vice Chair Ossorio

_____, Loren Bough, Board Chair

_____, Corky Miller, Business Manager/Clerk

02/09/23
13:46:11

BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
Statement of Expenditure - Budget vs. Actual Report
For the Accounting Period through 09 February 2023

Page: 1 of 1
Report ID: B100F

Fund	Committed Current Month	Committed YTD	Original Appropriation	Current Appropriation	Available Appropriation	% Committed
201 K-12 GENERAL FUND	261,068.98	2,191,727.02	3,607,419.09	3,607,419.09	1,415,692.07	61 %
210 K-12 TRANSPORTATION FUND	7,598.53	119,281.97	2,141,306.61	2,141,306.61	2,022,024.64	6 %
211 K-12 BUS DEPRECIATION FUND	0.00	0.00	385,754.23	385,754.23	385,754.23	0 %
213 K-12 TUITION FUND	19,201.46	76,793.21	282,912.42	282,912.42	206,119.21	27 %
214 K-12 RETIREMENT FUND	49,158.77	291,674.07	675,000.00	675,000.00	383,325.93	43 %
217 K-12 ADULT EDUCATION FUND	830.21	12,095.44	238,717.71	238,717.71	226,622.27	5 %
228 K-12 TECHNOLOGY FUND	15,760.64	172,245.29	151,463.03	151,463.03	-20,782.26	114 %
261 K-12 BUILDING RESERVE FUND	3,590.72	388,279.12	594,764.42	594,764.42	206,485.30	65 %



Lone Peak Phase 2

February 14th, 2023

Schedule

- Three piers at the entrance to STEAM Lab were poured last week.
- Apex Steel started adjusting existing columns that were placed out of tolerance last week, these corrections should be complete by the end of this week.
- Steel Erection will start back up this week and be complete by the middle of next week.
- The roof structural insulated panel (SIPs) erection will start by the end of the month.
- Exterior walls will be installed by early March.
- The project is scheduled to be complete by the start of the Fall 2023 school year.
- The team has been reviewing the report documenting the existing conditions and recommended fixes for the existing roof. A&E will produce a plan set with the recommended design of the reroof of the existing school. This work is intended to happen this summer.
- Exterior theatre improvements are complete. The signage is partially installed. The delay is on Signage Solutions who is fabricating the signs.

Attached is the overall project schedule and six-week lookahead.

Budget

- Attached are the Project Cost Control and Project Contingency Logs.
- The winter conditions allowance included in the project is \$50,000. The big storms in November and December consumed this budget for snow removal. Additional winter conditions will be covered under the project contingency.

Risks, Opportunities, and Key Issues

- 5 columns (2 gravity columns and 3 brace frame columns) were laid out centered on a layout line, instead of being placed at the 3.5" offset shown in the plans. Morrison Maierle has designed a solution with new baseplates and additional drilled anchor bolts to rectify this problem. Jackson has all of the new material ordered and the columns should be in the correct location by the end of this week.
- Other columns on the project that were placed out of tolerance were able to be field adjusted within the tolerance of the existing baseplates, or by torching the baseplate's holes to make them larger and welding on an oversized washer to address the reduced edge distance of the hole to the edge of the plate.
- Jackson has added project team members to ensure the project succeeds and that additional quality control measures are implemented. This is reflected in the current schedule.

- Jackson has worked with their subcontractors to expedite some work scopes to make up this time in the schedule. Weekends, larger crew sizes, and longer work days are expected.
- With current market conditions, the team is tracking the procurement of critical materials over the next few months.

Photos




Columns for the new entrance to the STEAM Lab



LPHS Phase 2

Jackson
CONTRACTOR GROUP, INC.





LPHS Phase 2

Jackson
CONTRACTOR GROUP, INC.

Line	Name	Unique task ID	Duration	Start	Finish	Task.Responsibility	2023																																		
							January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September																										
							January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September																										
							30	6	13	20	27	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	3	10	17	24	31	7	14	21	28	4	11	18	25
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LPHS Phase 2

Jackson
CONTRACTOR GROUP, INC.

Line	Name	Unique task ID	Duration	Start	Finish	Task.Responsibility	2023																							
							January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September															
							30	6	13	20	27	6	13	20	27	3	10	17	24	1	8	15	22	29	5	12	19	26	3	
145	Install Roof SIPS	STR100	10d	2/27/2023	3/10/2023	Jackson																								
146	Mech Mess/Learning Stair Slab prep	STR0031	2d	3/7/2023	3/8/2023	Jackson																								
147	Mech Mezz Plumbing Rough-In	STR0041	2d	3/9/2023	3/10/2023	Williams P&H																								
148	Pre-pour Checklist and QC	STR0033	1d	3/13/2023	3/13/2023	Jackson																								
149	Column Pour Back Prep	STR0101	4d	3/13/2023	3/16/2023	Jackson																								
150	Place upper SOG	STR40	1d	3/14/2023	3/14/2023	Jackson																								
151	Place Mech Mezz slab	STR50	1d	3/14/2023	3/14/2023	Jackson																								
152	Structural Grout Packs	STR0110	3d	3/17/2023	3/21/2023	Jackson																								
153	Grout Inspections	STR0111	3d	3/17/2023	3/21/2023	MMI																								
154	Column Tar Epoxy	STR0120	3d	3/22/2023	3/24/2023	Jackson																								
155	Column Pour Back Prep	STR0121	3d	3/22/2023	3/24/2023	Jackson																								
156	Column Pour Back Place	STR0130	3d	3/27/2023	3/29/2023	Jackson																								
	Exteriors			2/27/2023	5/8/2023																									
157	Frame exterior walls	EXT30	6d	2/27/2023	3/6/2023	RDJ Brothers																								
158	Tent Exterior	5952	6d	3/3/2023	3/10/2023	Jackson																								
159	Sheath exterior walls	EXT40	7d	3/7/2023	3/15/2023	Division 7																								
160	Mechanical roof penetrations and curbs	5962	2d	3/13/2023	3/14/2023	Norpac																								
161	Plumbing roof penetrations	5972	2d	3/13/2023	3/14/2023	Williams P&H																								
162	Dens Deck	EXT0	8d	3/13/2023	3/22/2023	Summit Roofing																								
163	Install Roof Snow Retention System	EXT10	8d	3/13/2023	3/22/2023	Summit Roofing																								
164	Install Roof membrane	EXT20	10d	3/13/2023	3/24/2023	Summit Roofing																								
165	Install weather barrier	EXT50	7d	3/16/2023	3/24/2023	MT Coatings																								
166	Install exterior wall insulation & Flashing	EXT70	17d	3/21/2023	4/12/2023	Division 7																								
167	Install Masonry Veneer	EXT80	15d	3/23/2023	4/12/2023	IMS Masonry																								
168	Install storefront & Primary sealant joint	EXT60	11d	3/27/2023	4/10/2023	MT Contracting																								
169	Install metal panels & Flashing	EXT100	10d	3/31/2023	4/13/2023	Division 7																								
170	Install Cem. Panel siding	EXT0091	7d	4/4/2023	4/12/2023	Division 7																								
171	Install wood siding	EXT90	18d	4/13/2023	5/8/2023	Jackson																								
172	Install Wood Soffits	EXT0110	18d	4/13/2023	5/8/2023	Jackson																								
	Interiors			2/10/2023	8/25/2023																									



LPHS Phase 2

Jackson
CONTRACTOR GROUP, INC.

Line	Name	Unique task ID	Duration	Start	Finish	Task.Responsibility	2023																							
							January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September															
203	Install electrical trim	INT210	10d	6/28/2023	7/12/2023	Third Element Elec.																								
204	Install mechanical trim	INT220	10d	6/28/2023	7/12/2023	Norpac																								
205	Install flooring	INT240	10d	6/28/2023	7/12/2023	Fisher Com. Flooring																								
206	Learning Stair Handrail	INT0290	3d	7/7/2023	7/11/2023	American Steel Inc.																								
207	Install Base	INT0231	3d	7/10/2023	7/12/2023	Fisher Com. Flooring																								
208	Install casework	INT160	5d	7/13/2023	7/19/2023	Silver City																								
209	Doors & Hardware	INT250	6d	7/13/2023	7/20/2023	Jackson																								
210	Install Wheel Chair Lift	INT260	3d	7/13/2023	7/17/2023	Freedom Services																								
211	Install accesories	INT280	8d	7/13/2023	7/24/2023	Jackson																								
212	Start-up equipment	INT300	4d	7/13/2023	7/18/2023	Owner																								
213	Install plumbing trim	INT200	5d	7/20/2023	7/26/2023	Williams P&H																								
214	Test, adjust, and balance	INT310	10d	7/21/2023	8/3/2023	Jackson																								
215	Final Inspections	INT320	2d	8/4/2023	8/7/2023	Owner																								
216	Building CX	INT0331	12d	8/4/2023	8/21/2023	Owner																								
217	Owner Training	INT0332	12d	8/4/2023	8/21/2023	Owner																								
218	Punchlist	INT330	10d	8/8/2023	8/21/2023	Jackson																								
219	Owner Move-In	INT340	10d	8/14/2023	8/25/2023	Owner																								
	COMMONS SPACE			6/12/2023	8/25/2023																									
220	Establish barriers, protection, air-filtration, and pathways	CMNS0	2d	6/12/2023 *	6/13/2023	Jackson																								
221	Selective demo	CMNS10	3d	6/14/2023	6/16/2023	Jackson																								
222	Demo underground plumbing	CMNS20	1d	6/19/2023	6/19/2023	Williams P&H																								
223	Install new underground electrical	CMNS30	1d	6/19/2023	6/19/2023	Third Element Elec.																								
224	Replace concrete SOG	CMNS40	2d	6/20/2023	6/21/2023	Jackson																								
225	Framing modifications and additions	CMNS50	4d	6/22/2023	6/27/2023	Jackson																								
226	Mechanical rough-in	CMNS60	2d	6/28/2023	6/29/2023	Norpac																								
227	Electrical rough-in	CMNS70	2d	6/28/2023	6/29/2023	Third Element Elec.																								
228	Fire sprinkler modifications	CMNS80	1d	6/30/2023	6/30/2023	Total Fire Protection																								
229	Inspect and QC	CMNS90	2d	7/3/2023	7/5/2023	Jackson																								
230	Insulate	CMNS100	1d	7/6/2023	7/6/2023	Gallatin Insulation																								
231	Hang drywall	CMNS110	2d	7/7/2023	7/10/2023	RDJ Brothers																								

Big Sky School District STEAM Lab, Gym Expansion, Track and Field

CONSTRUCTION

Jackson Track and Field GMP #1-Includes construction contingency of \$134,952.71	\$4,029,694	
Change Order #1	\$278,162	Additional scope added by school district
Change Order #2	-\$315,711	Credit for fence, remaining allowances, and 1% GRT(paid by BSSD)
1% GRT	\$40,325	Paid by BSSD
Phase 2 STEAM Lab-Includes construction contingency of \$504,879	\$16,252,080	Bid Numbers with add alternates w/o gym
Jackson Pre-Construction Fee	\$40,000	
	\$20,324,550	

DESIGN FEES

A&E Contract		
Architecture MEP Structural	\$1,654,850	
Additional Services Include:	\$317,638	includes all sub consultants, FF&E, & Technology
Geotech Report	\$7,300	Allied Contract
A&E Reimbursable Expenses - Estimate	\$15,631	Estimate from A&E
Change Order #1	\$27,100	Additional Design Fees for Fire Tank, DEQ required well redesign, propane tank, learning stair reconfiguration, VE design
Roof Investigation and Design-Estimate	\$81,581	A&E proposal
	\$2,104,100	

OWNER EXPENSES

FF & E - Estimate	\$300,000	from A&E furniture estimate February 2021
Technology	\$0	Included in IT below. A&E estimate of \$100,00 1/24/20
Moving & Set Up Expenses	\$0	
Owner's Representative Pre-Construction	\$55,000	
Owner's Representative Construction	\$328,958	
IT Infrastructure	\$100,000	Low voltage, safety systems, switches, clocks, bells, surveillance
Technology FF&E	\$216,000	News room, CAD design work stations, AV gym, sound system gym
Data Provider	\$5,000	Estimate
NorthWest Energy	\$12,414	Contract amount
MDEQ	\$12,040	MDEQ fee, SWPP covered under Jackson
Builder's Risk	\$173,577	
Soccer Nets	\$8,397	District Ordered Direct
Tractor	\$39,100	District Ordered Direct
Track sideline protectors	\$15,000	District Ordered Direct
Press Box	\$148,551	District Ordered Direct
School Mascot Sculpture	\$59,000	District Ordered Direct
ATV for School Maintenance	\$25,000	Amount approved by School Board 9/13/22
New Roof-Estimate	\$2,000,000	
*BSSD Theatre Improvements	\$314,526	*Partially funded by community donations-see below
Owner Contingency	\$750,000	
	\$4,562,563	

PERMITS & FEES

Building Permit - Actual	\$60,864	
Plan Review- Actual	\$20,240	
Gallatin County Zoning Review Fees	\$400	
Impact Fees	\$0	
Land Use Permit Fee	\$10,090	
Gallatin County Septic Permit	\$580	Estimate
	\$92,174	

TESTING & INSPECTIONS

Commissioning	\$53,865	Elk Horn Commissioning
Testing and Inspections	\$61,411	Allied Phase 1,MMI contract for phase 2+Civil Inspections
	\$115,276	

BIDDING, ADVERTISING, PRINTING

Project Advertising	\$500	105 Lone Peak Lookout and BDC
	\$500	

USE OF CAPITAL

Building & Sitework	\$20,324,550
Design Fees	\$2,104,100
Owner Project Expenses	\$4,562,563
Permits and Fees	\$92,174
Testing & Inspections	\$115,276
Bidding, Advertising, Printing	\$500

Total	\$27,199,163
Bond Funds Available	\$27,204,928.80
*Community Donations	\$200,000.00

Big Sky School District Phase 2 Contingency Log

	Contractor	Owner
Contingency included in Phase 2	\$504,879.00	\$750,000.00

Change Orders

PCO 65 Door Hardware Change		\$1,002	Pending
PCO 65 Mech Mezz Door Height Change		\$1,519	Pending
Tattle Tale Labor		\$4,580	Required for Builder's Risk Insurance
PCO 54 Hardscape Dimensional Requirements		-\$4,260	Pending
PCO 38 Plan Clarifications-Bulletin 7		\$22,641	Pending review by Sanderson Stewart
Additional Asphalt to clean up parking lot		\$57,374	Waiting for spring to authorize work
RFI 049 - Exterior Framing Deflection Joint Design		\$7,500	Pending review
RFI 074 - Cistern Well Float Electrical		\$0	No Charge
RFI 043 - Existing Dosing Tank Pump Electrical		\$3,199	Pending
Electrical Feeder Reroute		\$0	
Additional Top Soil		\$125,000	Needs to be verified with MASS diagram
RFI 42 Electrical Feeder Reroute	\$12,745		Pending
RFI 45 - Gluelam Simpson Hanger Designs		\$41,277	Pending final costs from fabricator
RFI 48 & 55 Septic Tank Depth Issues		\$170,000	Pending-A&E and Tate Management reviewing
Bulletin 5		\$5,259	CO 4
PCO25 Fire Line		\$109,525	CO 4
PCO 32R1 Brick Veneer Clarification		-\$40,771	CO4
*Big Sky Theatre Improvements			CO5 *Billed outside of project contingency
BIM Coordination	\$29,164.00		CO6
Changing of Electrical Subcontractor	\$60,613		CO6
Electrical changes tied to Bulletin 7		\$5,739	CO6-drawing coordination w/ gym elimination
Storefront Glass		\$6,739	CO6
RFI 023 Floor Finish Plans at Learning Stair	\$6,925		CO7
Metal Panel Allowance Reconciliation		\$10,945	CO7
Window Treatment Material Escalation	\$4,632		CO7
Roof Hatch and safety rail power coating	\$1,250		CO7
Disable Football tracking lights	\$2,759		CO7 Directed by Gallatin County
Overhead Sectional Door		-\$4,686	CO7
Propane Allowance Reconciliation		\$62,500	CO7
PCO 52 RFI 76 3" Water Line into building	\$4,069		CO 8
PCO 57 Solids Interceptor finish change		-\$1,189	CO 8
Winter conditions for Dec 2022 (over allowance)		\$712	CO 8
Subtotal	\$122,157	\$584,605	
Budget	\$504,879	\$750,000	
Balance	\$382,722	\$165,396	

BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT HAZARD AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT



March 28, 2022

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Emergency and crisis incidents affect schools every day, and the value of standardized emergency planning cannot be overstated in terms of properly addressing school safety. Natural hazards such as tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes are typically thought to be the most common incidents schools need to plan for. But schools are also at risk from other hazards, such as school violence, infectious disease, terrorist threats, and student or staff deaths through suicide, intentional acts, accidental incidents, or natural causes. All of these incidents can impact safety, culture and climate, and continuity of operations at school sites.

Planning and preparations done prior to an emergency or crisis incident will help schools appropriately respond to and recover from an actual emergency event if, and when, it occurs. Effective school emergency management must be standardized and address the four phases of emergency management identified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS). These phases are:

1. Prevention/Mitigation
2. Preparedness
3. Response
4. Recovery

Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) school districts in the United States are required to have standardized emergency operations plans which effectively address all hazards pertinent to schools within the district. In order to create an *All Hazards* Emergency Operations Plan meeting these requirements, the specific hazards and likelihood of occurrence within a school district must be identified. Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD8) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Guide for High Quality School Emergency Operation Plans state planning for the hazards posing risks to school districts, and then training to the plan, are the most effective means of achieving a safe and healthy climate in a school district. A Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment (HVA) specific to the area of the school district is necessary in order to identify the risks faced by schools within the district. PPD8 and the FEMA Guide also redefine the principles of emergency management and state that Emergency Operations Plans must address these five *Mission Areas*:

1. Prevention
2. Protection
3. Mitigation
4. Response

5. Recovery

The *protection* phase is new to standardized emergency management and it is pertinent to school emergency operations. The concept of these five Mission Areas is if they are all addressed in the school district's emergency management program; the district will be prepared for all hazards posing a threat to them. Assessing the hazards pertinent to school districts and individual schools, then addressing the vulnerabilities through target hardening and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, (CPTED), is an effective way to mitigate risks.

CPTED is a multi-disciplinary approach to deterring criminal behavior through environmental design. CPTED strategies rely on the ability to influence offender decisions that precede criminal acts. The four CPTED principles of Natural Surveillance, Natural Access Control, Territorial Reinforcement, and Maintenance will be referenced throughout this HVA report. Infrastructure target hardening using these principles is a proven method to taking a proactive approach to school safety.

This Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment Report is divided into the following eight sections for ease of reference:

- Section 1.0:** Introduction.
- Section 2.0:** Purpose.
- Section 3.0:** Methodology.
- Section 4.0:** District Profile.
- Section 5.0:** Identified Hazards, Risks, and Vulnerabilities (manmade and natural).
- Section 6.0:** Facility Assessments, Observations, and Recommendations.
- Section 7.0:** Summary.
- Section 8.0:** Source References.

2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of an HVA is to ensure potential safety problems are well understood, check whether existing control measures, including emergency plans, are sufficient, and to determine what is necessary to reduce risks to a reasonable level. Hazard assessment requires application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, treating, and monitoring risks of emergency incidents. An HVA allows school districts to ensure the safety and health of students and staff in every aspect related to the school community.

The HVA report is the cornerstone upon which the school districts standardized *All Hazards* Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is built. Identification of the likelihood of occurrence, frequency, intensity, and potential impact of an emergency or crisis incident is crucial to proper planning. The higher the likelihood of occurrence of a hazard dictates a greater degree of planning, preparation, and training for the identified emergency or crisis incident.

A vulnerability assessment is an ongoing process through which school districts and individual schools identify and evaluate risks and areas of weaknesses as they relate to specific hazards. A vulnerability assessment looks at the likelihood that a characteristic or a flaw in the system will make it susceptible to damage or injury related to a specific hazard. These assessments are a vital part of school emergency planning, as once the area of vulnerability is identified and addressed the risk posed by a specific hazard is significantly decreased.

Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD8) signed into law and effective on July 1, 2013, requires a hazard and threat assessment be completed by each facility in the United States for purposes of target hardening against the worst-case incident of a terrorist attack. School districts are considered Local Authorities or Special Districts, so they fall under the guidelines of PPD8. Certain statutes in the Montana Code Annotated (MCA) and the Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM) are also pertinent to assessment of school facilities, emergency plans, and culture and climate programs. These were addressed during this Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment project and will be source referenced where applicable.

The Montana Safety and Security Guidelines rubric written by the Montana Office of Public Instruction was used as a source reference document during this assessment process. One of the stated goals and purposes of this assessment project is to ensure the Big Sky School District is either in compliance with all of these guidelines, or has plans in place moving forward to gain compliance to guidelines not currently addressed.

The Robert T. Stafford Act (42 USC 5122-5200) calls for communities to prepare Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP) to identify potential risks and mitigate the detrimental effects they may have on a particular community. School districts have the same requirements to develop an HMP in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities affecting the school community. Absent an HMP, a school district may, under certain circumstances, not be eligible for federal or state disaster mitigation funding in a post-emergency incident. Typically, up to 20% above and beyond a claim following a declared disaster is awarded for mitigation planning to address the damage claimed.

This Hazard and Vulnerability Report alone does not constitute a Hazard Mitigation Plan, but it does fulfill Section 5, (Risk Assessment), and Section 6, (Vulnerability Analysis), of the Stafford Act. BSSD can easily be included in the Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan using the information contained in this HVA report to have the school district referenced in the Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan. This would make BSSD eligible for disaster mitigation funding and is a recommendation for future efforts of BSSD.

Re-assessments should be completed within the school districts every 12-18 months in order to track forward progress of the school safety target hardening programs and identify new goals and benchmarks for future projects that will enhance school safety. Tracking program progress in order to document projects completed in a manner that addresses identified vulnerabilities is a proactive method of improving school safety. Identifying short term and long term projects to further enhance school safety assists school districts with project funding through bonds, grants, or general funds. Local law enforcement representatives also participate in the assessment process. This fulfills statutory requirements for law enforcement visiting campuses while ensuring any law enforcement safety concerns at the school are addressed.

Emergency response training programs and safe school culture and climate programs are also reviewed during the Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment process. Staff training in all areas of school emergency response is an important aspect of the school safety and emergency management program. Safe school culture and climate programs aimed at providing a safe learning environment while promoting student mental health and well-being are essential components of the school safety program. This is especially important as schools move into the post-COVID-19 era of education. Social emotional programs related to teen depression, suicide, and addiction are important steps to the return to normalcy moving out of the COVID-19 Pandemic response mode in education safety.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

Hazard assessment is the determination of qualitative and quantitative value of the risk related to a recognized threat or hazard. Quantitative hazard assessment requires calculations of two components of risk, which are the magnitude of the potential hazard and the probability that the hazard will occur. Acceptable risk is an understood and tolerated principle of emergency management, because the cost or difficulty for implementing an effective countermeasure for the associated vulnerability exceeds the expectation of damage or injury related to the hazard. The principle of hazard assessment stresses that what is predictable is often preventable, so identification of those hazards most likely to affect a school district is imperative.

A hazard as defined by FEMA is something that is potentially dangerous or harmful and often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. There are three types of hazards, which are used for assessment in emergency planning:

1. **Manmade Hazards:** A hazard that arises from deliberate and intentional human actions to threaten or harm the wellbeing of others. Examples include school violence, terroristic acts, or sabotage.
2. **Natural Hazards:** A hazard related to weather patterns and/or physical characteristics of an area. Pandemic events are included in Natural Hazards. These types of hazards often occur repeatedly in the same geographical locations, making them easier to prepare for but still having potentially devastating effects.
3. **Technological Hazards:** A hazard originating from technological or industrial accidents, infrastructure failures, or certain human activities. These hazards often come with little or no warning and may cause loss of life, injury, property damage, or environmental degradation.

For purposes of this HVA report, qualitative and quantitative data gathered from multiple sources were used to identify specific hazards faced by schools in the Big Sky School District. These sources included:

- Interviews with personnel from BSSD.
- Site surveys of BSSD schools and facilities.
- The Montana Office of Public Instruction Safety and Security Guidelines.
- The Montana Code Annotated (MCA) statutes pertinent to school safety.
- The Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM) pertinent to school safety.
- The Gallatin County Sheriff's Office website.

Interviews with Gallatin County Sheriff's Office Resident Deputy for the Canyon office.

Big Sky Fire Department web based information and staff input.

The Gallatin County, MT. Hazard Mitigation Plan, April 2019.

Region medical and health agency web based information.

The U.S. Geological Survey, (USGS), and Seismic Warning Systems.

The American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities.

The Institute of Education Science.

The FEMA Flood Zone map for the Gallatin County Area.

Once specific hazards to schools are identified, school districts should select an assessment tool to be utilized for continued vulnerability assessments in order to ensure maximum effort continues to mitigate the risks associated with these hazards. During the creation of this report, checklists and assessment tools created by the assessment team were based on recommended best practices from the American Clearinghouse on Educational Facilities (ACEF). Other source references used during the creation of this report will be footnoted in the body of the report where applicable, or included in the Reference Section 8.0 of this report.

4.0 DISTRICT PROFILE

The Big Sky School District (BSSD) is a K-12 public school district comprising two schools located at the same campus. The district offices are also located on this campus and are housed inside of the Ophir Elementary School, which is in a separate building located on the north side of the campus. Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School share a building located on the south side of the campus. The physical address of the campus is 45465 Gallatin Road in Gallatin Gateway, Montana. This is the address used for the middle school and the high school. Although Ophir Elementary School is located on the same campus, it has a physical address of 60 Windy Pass Trail, which runs adjacent to the north side of the campus.

Gallatin Gateway is a Census Designated Place (CDP) located in Gallatin County, MT. Gallatin Gateway is a rural mountain area with an estimated population of 885,¹ but the population can greatly increase during tourist seasons. The area is an International tourist destination for snow skiing in the winter and for outdoor activities twelve months out of the year.

The BSSD campus is located on Gallatin Rd. (U.S. Route 191), in the valley of the Gallatin River at an elevation of 4,950 feet. Gallatin Gateway is in the south end of Gallatin County, which is the second-most populated county in the state. The west entrance to Yellowstone National Park is located in Gallatin County approximately 60 miles from the BSSD campus. Approximately half of the yearly visitors to the park use this entrance, and U.S. 191 which passes in front of the campus is a main route of travel to get to the park.

The Big Sky Ski Resort is also located in Gallatin County in close proximity to the BSSD campus. This is one of the largest ski resorts in the U.S. The temporary population and vehicle traffic in Gallatin County and the area of the BSSD campus can greatly increase at any given time due to tourist traffic visiting these and other areas of interest in the region. The population of Big Sky is approximately 1,500 year-round residents, but that can increase to 10,000 during ski season.² Possible vulnerabilities related to a transient tourist population visiting the area of BSSD schools at any given time will be addressed in Section 5.0 of this report.

The BSSD campus is located approximately 45 miles south of Bozeman, Montana. Bozeman is the Gallatin County Seat and the largest city in the vicinity of the BSSD. Bozeman has an International airport that is used heavily by tourists coming to the area for recreational

¹ U.S. Census Service 2021 estimate.

² Gallatin County Sheriff's Office website, Patrol Division statistical data.

activities. Bozeman has its own K-12 Public School District servicing the north areas of Gallatin County, so students in that area do not attend BSSD schools. Although students living in Bozeman do not attend BSSD schools, some staff members working at BSSD schools commute from Bozeman. U.S. 191 is the connecting route between Bozeman and the BSSD campus. This is a winding two-lane road in places where it runs through the Gallatin Canyon, and travel can be affected by weather and tourist traffic at times. This is a factor that can possibly impact operations at BSSD in the winter or during high tourist seasons. Weather related areas of vulnerability will be addressed in Section 5.0 of this report.

Law enforcement, fire, and hospital services are available to the BSSD schools through Gallatin County. These services will be further outlined in Section 5.0 of this report.

BSSD provides educational services to all residents of the south areas of Gallatin County and the Gallatin Gateway area. The majority of BSSD students are dropped off and picked up by parents in private vehicles. Some students of driving age also drive their own vehicles to and from school. Additionally, there are five bus routes within the district. BSSD provides their own bus transportation and owns a fleet of seven buses. Bus transportation will be addressed in Section 6.3 this report.

The Gallatin County area is experiencing growth in housing and population. Some of the housing growth is related to vacation rentals and second homes, but there has also been significant growth in residency within the County. According to U.S. Census statistics, the number of full time residents has increased from 89,500 to 118,980, and the number of households has increased from 36,500 to 46,990 between 2010 and 2020.³ The upward growth trend is expected to continue. This growth in residential population will contribute to increased student population at the BSSD schools. There is some new construction planned at the BSSD campus to address the possible student population growth.

BSSD also has housing facilities on campus for use by staff. The housing complexes have separate driveway entrances from Windy Pass Trail. These are privately rented residences and there are no student activities or school functions occurring there. As such, the housing facilities were not included in this assessment process.

³ U.S. Census twenty-fourth decennial report, April 1, 2020.

5.0 IDENTIFIED HAZARDS, RISKS, AND VULNERABILITIES

Manmade and natural hazards posing risks to BSSD schools were assessed and ranked for purposes of this HVA report. Specific hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities addressed in the HVA process are:

A) Weather Related Events: High Risk

Severe weather has an overall high risk rating in the Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan. This pertains mostly to severe winter storms. Although weather is rated as a high risk, the overall community impact is considered low to medium. The County maintains roads during snowstorms and residents of the area are considered well prepared to deal with any winter storms. BSSD also has a procedure in place to not run buses when the temperature drops below -30°F, so bus travel is also not an area of vulnerability.

Severe thunderstorms that can produce high winds, hail, and localized flooding are also experienced seasonally in Gallatin County. These are typically predicted in advance, so pre-planning is the best method of mitigating weather related areas of risk. BSSD staff monitor air quality on a daily basis, so this type of weather threat monitoring is already being done at the schools.

B) Wildland Fire: Seasonal High Risk

The Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan rates the threat of Wildland Fire high in probability and impact on the population and economy of the area. There is Historical data of Wildland Fires in areas close to the BSSD campus. One such fire reportedly burned down to U.S. 191 across from the campus in 2021. The BSSD campus is located in an area considered Urban Interface with the wildland areas. Any area such as this, especially in drought years, is considered at high risk for Wildland Fire.

The BSSD campus has excellent defensible space surrounding it. The buildings themselves are also constructed to fire codes pertinent to schools, so they would be difficult to burn during a fire. Since U.S. 191 is the only egress route from the school, it should be anticipated the road could possibly be gridlocked with traffic if the area is evacuated due to a wildland fire. In that case, it could be more prudent for students and to go into a Shelter-In-Place response if roads are gridlocked or closed to traffic.

Since the majority of students use either personal or parent vehicles for transport to and from school, evacuation of the school could be problematic if U.S. 191 were closed due to fire. The roads, parking lots, and open fields surrounding the BSSD campus would provide natural fire breaks. Since the buildings are constructed of flame retardant materials, they would be safe for sheltering. Parking lots at the campus could also be used for fire

department staging areas, which would make any equipment needed to quickly extinguish a fire immediately available.

Source reference for Sheltering-In-Place in a school during a wildland fire is the 2018 Woolsey Fire in Los Angeles County, CA. Pepperdine University in Malibu, CA. was in the center of the evacuation zone for that fire. The University had a pre-established Wildland Fire Response Plan that included Shelter-In-Place if it was unsafe to evacuate due to traffic gridlock and fire threats on the roads adjacent to the campus.⁴ This plan was created pre-incident in response to the high threat of wildland fires in the area of the campus and historical data of fire related evacuations in the area. The plan was created in a cooperative effort between the University and the Los Angeles County Fire Department. It was implemented and factored into training prior to the Woolsey Fire, so it was in place when needed. There were fire related fatalities on evacuation routes during that fire, so the University's decision to Shelter-In-Place was found to be the proper response.

BSSD administration can enter into discussion with local fire agencies to see if a similar Shelter-In-Place plan might work as an available tool for use during Wildland Fires. Evacuation is always the preferred response if it can be done safely. This might include use of buses to move students to a secondary location further away from the fire if necessary, so the use of buses should be factored into planning. The Shelter-In-Place plan would give BSSD another response option should evacuation routes become dangerous or gridlocked. Any such plan should include storage of emergency supplies at the school and staging buses to move students as soon as it is safe to do so.

C) Fire in Schools: Low Risk

The schools are equipped with both fire alarms and interior fire sprinkler systems. Buildings on the BSSD campus are built with fire retardant materials per fire codes, so they would be difficult to burn if a fire was started inside the buildings. Some mitigation recommendations related to fire response within the schools will be included in Section 6.0 of this report.

D) Criminal Activity: Low Risk

The FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system tracks seven categories of criminal activity. Murder, Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Property Crime, Burglary, Larceny, Motor Vehicle Theft, and Arson are considered the seven FBI UCR Crimes. Gallatin County is rated below the national average for all seven UCR crimes, which indicates it is generally a safe area.⁵ The majority of the reported crimes occurred in the more populated Bozeman area. Since the Gallatin Gateway and Big Sky areas are Census Dedicated Places as opposed to towns or cities, they are not specifically referenced in the FBI UCR reports. Analysis of available data shows these areas to be low for FBI UCR Crimes occurring in Gallatin County.

Interviews with law enforcement familiar with the area of the BSSD campus confirm the Low Risk assessment of criminal activity in the area of the campus. A mandatory law

⁴ Pepperdine Emergency Information: www.emergency.pepperdine.edu/brush/fires

⁵ FBI Montana UCR Statistical Report, 2017.

enforcement reporting procedure within the BSSD schools will be recommended in Section 6.0 of this report in order to properly track possible criminal or at-risk student behavior in the schools. This statistical analysis can be used to identify possible trends that might lead to violent or criminal behavior so early intervention can be done.

E) Law Enforcement Services: High Risk

The Gallatin County Sheriff's Office is the primary law enforcement agency within the county and responds to calls for service related to BSSD schools and facilities. The main Sheriff's station and dispatch center is located in the City of Bozeman, approximately 55 miles from the BSSD campus. There is a Sheriff's substation located at 650 Trout Run in the town of Big Sky. This is approximately 5 miles from the BSSD campus. There are five resident deputies and a sergeant living in the area, but not all are on duty at any given time. During any high profile criminal incident, law enforcement response times to one of the BSSD schools could be impacted and delayed depending upon the availability and location of the on-duty deputy. For this reason, law enforcement response is rated as a high area of risk for the schools to factor into their emergency planning.

The Sheriff's Office has one deputy designated as a School Resource Officer, but this is an ancillary duty. The deputy also has patrol and emergency response duties he is responsible for, so he is not assigned strictly to the schools. Recommendations to address this will be made in Section 6.0 of this report. Mutual aid plans for assistance from other area agencies will be referenced in the Active Assailant Section "K" of this section of the report.

F) Fire Services: Low Risk

Fire services to the BSSD schools are supplied by the Big Sky Fire Department (BSFD). The main fire station is in the same facility as the Sheriff's substation at 650 Trout Run in Big Sky. There is a second BSFD station located at 9091 Lone Mountain Trail in Big Sky. In addition to fire and rescue services, BSFD also handles paramedic response and ambulance transport to the area. BSFD staff met with the assessment team during this project and advised there was sufficient staffing and equipment available to assist with any needs BSSD schools might have. This includes tactical paramedic support to law enforcement during a school Active Assailant Mass Casualty Incident.

G) Hazardous Materials (inside and outside the schools): Moderate Risk

The area surrounding the BSSD campus is rated as a low risk for commercial vehicle HAZMAT incidents. HAZMAT transport through Yellowstone National Park is prohibited, so roads leading to the park such as Route 191 adjacent to the campus have little commercial transport of hazardous materials. There is still some localized transport of hazardous materials such as fuel and oil, so HAZMAT incidents must be part of emergency management planning and training within BSSD.

Additionally, since the seasonal threat of wildland is rated high in the area of the campus, there is also a high risk of smoke in the air during times where there are fires. Heavy smoke has the same response as a HAZMAT incident. BSSD has a system in place to monitor air

quality and has a visible flag system to address related risks. The Green-Yellow-Red Flag system addresses risks related to air quality. During any Red Flag incidents, outdoor activities are canceled and students remain inside. HEPA filters on HVAC systems can generally filter smoke to keep the air inside the schools to a safe level. The BSSD air quality monitoring system is an excellent and proactive method of addressing vulnerabilities related to air quality issues.

Some chemicals and flammables are stored in the chemistry lab at Lone Peak H.S. The chemical storage was checked during this assessment and found to be excellent in terms of safety. Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) are kept by the chemistry teacher and updated as needed. Schools can be considered HAZMAT generators in any case where there is a chemical spill. Any such spill should immediately be reported to the proper agency.

The Big Sky Fire Department (BSFD) handles HAZMAT incidents for the area of BSSD schools, so they would be the proper reporting agency. BSSD administration would also need to set up communications with BSFD for any HAZMAT incident occurring in the area that might affect operations at the schools. During a larger event, BSSD would receive assistance from the Bozeman Fire Department's Hazardous Materials Team. Communications from the school would still go through BSFD even in a larger event.

The Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan rates HAZMAT as a moderate risk. This is mainly due to areas of vulnerability in the north part of the county, specifically in the Bozeman area. The Yellowstone Pipeline is a major fuel pipeline running east-west through the north part of the county. The Montana Rail Link also has a railway that runs east-west through the county. Neither of these are close enough to the BSSD schools to pose a threat, so HAZMAT is rated as a low threat in the area of the schools.

H) Earthquake: High Risk

Montana is ranked fourth in the U.S. for seismic activity, and has many earthquake faults in the mountainous parts of the state.⁶ Yellowstone National Park in the south area of Gallatin County is an active geothermal area with approximately 2,000 earthquakes each year. Most of these are small enough that they are not detectable to humans, but they are tracked by instrumentation through the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).

The most significant earthquake in the Gallatin County area was the Hebgen Lake Quake on August 18, 1959. This was a magnitude 7.5 earthquake followed by aftershocks followed by five aftershocks with magnitudes ranging from 5.6 to 6.3 on the same day. The Hebgen Lake Quake resulted in twenty-eight fatalities and an estimated \$11 million in damages to the area infrastructure (1959 dollar amount estimates).⁷ The Hebgen Lake Earthquake was triggered by seismic activity from the Madison Fault zone. Hebgen Lake is approximately 45 miles south of the BSSD campus.

⁶ U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): www.usgs.gov

⁷ USGS 2017 report on Magnitude 5.5 earthquakes in Gallatin County, MT.

USGS estimates the recurrence rate of another quake of this magnitude in the area at 133 years, so there is a low probability rate associated with this. The recurrence rate of a magnitude 5 or greater is 3.84 years, and 22.6 years for a magnitude 6 or greater. The Gallatin County Hazard Mitigation Plan rates the risk of earthquakes as high in the area of the BSSD campus. Due to this, planning and training for earthquake response should be a priority.

Pre-incident planning and training for earthquake response will assist in mitigating this high risk area of possible vulnerability. This would include pre-incident hazard assessment, the actual response, Student-Family Reunification, and Continuity of Operations Planning. Even though the magnitude 7.5 quake is considered a low probability, it is what should be used for planning and training in the schools. The concept is if the schools are prepared for that worst case scenario, they will also be prepared for lesser magnitude earthquakes. Estimates on the impact to critical facilities in Gallatin County and the area of the BSSD campus are listed in the FEMA Hazards United States (HAZUS) chart located in the Gallatin County Hazard and Mitigation Plan for informational and planning purposes.⁸

I) Utility Losses: High Risk

Utility losses are rated as a high risk in all schools in the U.S., but the threat of severe weather heightens these risks. Utility losses often happen without warning. Planning for them is the best way to mitigate the risk of losing any utility. Knowing the duration of the utility loss and if operations can continue without the affected utility is information needed for pre-planning operations. Having a point of contact that can advise duration of any utility loss will assist in response decisions.

Heat and loss of natural gas during cold winter weather is a utility that would detrimentally affect BSSD operations if natural gas services were lost. BSSD is self-contained with underground propane tanks that are filled weakly. Barring an internal malfunction, gas services and heat would not be lost at the schools during any utility service loss. This is an important aspect of operations due to possible cold temperatures at the schools.

Some drinking water is stored at the schools, so loss of water utilities can be planned for. The schools do not have backup power generators, so loss of electric power could detrimentally affect school operations.

J) Pandemic Response: High Risk

This area of risk increased in all schools throughout the U.S. with the onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic in March of 2020. The BSSD Pandemic Response Plan and Continuity of Operations Plan should be updated to address this new threat level. Pandemic Response and Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP) will continue to be rated as a high risk to schools for the foreseeable future. BSSD responded to both Pandemic and Continuity Planning related to COVID-19 since the onset of the pandemic. Remote learning and business operations were done during this response. Additionally, medical hygiene response

⁸ Gallatin County HMP, 2018: Section 4.10 Table 4.8

actions such as masking, social distancing, monitoring of student and staff symptoms, and cleaning of facilities were taken throughout BSSD during this pandemic response. BSSD should be prepared to implement response actions with little to no advanced warning for the foreseeable future based on the evolving trends related to the COVID-19 Pandemic. Medical experts estimate we will be in some state of pandemic response mode for the next five years at a minimum. This does not mean schools will be in a full response mode for that period of time, but the planning and preparation response for the threat of pandemic should be in place until the threat level returns to where it was prior to the onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic.

K) Active Assailant Incidents and Lockdowns: High Risk

The threat of an Active Assailant attack is rated high in all schools throughout the U.S. There is no indication BSSD schools are at a higher threat level than any other school in the U.S. Preparedness for a response to an Active Assailant incident at a school is something that needs to be done at every school in order to maximize student and staff safety.

BSSD has taken steps to target-harden their schools against the threat of an outside Active Assailant attack. The current baseline of preparedness is at a higher level than most schools, which is an excellent and proactive approach to school safety. Secure single points of entry and other existing safety measures at the BSSD schools will be referenced in Section 6.0 of this report. BSSD provides staff training in a system called Run-Lock-Fight, which is strictly geared at the response to an Active Assailant attack. Additional planning and training recommendations will also be made in Section 6.0 of this report.

The Gallatin County Sheriff's Office has plans in place for other law enforcement agencies with a presence in the area of BSSD schools to respond to a violent incident or Mass Casualty Incident Active Assailant Attack if assistance is needed. BSSD administration does not need to be concerned with how these inter-jurisdictional agreements work, they just need to know they are in place. As such, it should be considered an absolute during school emergency response planning and training that members of law enforcement agencies who might not be familiar with the campus or staff will be responding to any mutual aid request from the Sheriff's Office. Multiple recommendations in this report are designed to assist emergency responders not familiar with this campus and staff in effective response to proper locations in order to minimize response times.

Most Lockdown incidents in schools across the U.S. are done in response to law enforcement activity in the area of a school that poses a direct or indirect threat to safety at the school. For this reason, training should not focus solely on the threat of an Active Assailant attack. Lockdown and lockout training must be done. This will be further addressed in Section 6.0 of this report.

L) Weapons on Campus: High Risk

This is considered a high risk area in all schools throughout the U.S. Statistical analysis in schools throughout the U.S. show a 30% increase in students bringing guns to school since

the onset of COVID-19. Not all these incidents result in shootings. Guns and other weapons are frequently being discovered in backpacks, lockers, and concealed on students.

Oftentimes students will bring real or imitation firearms to school prior to committing an actual attack. This is referred to as “Rehearsal Behavior” and can be a pre-attack indicator. In addition to actual or imitation weapons, any drawings of weapons or internet fascination with weapons can also be a pre-attack indicator. This is referred to as “Leakage” and can be behavior identified in schools. Rehearsal Behavior and Leakage both are types of at-risk behavior that should immediately be reported to law enforcement so behavioral threat assessment can be conducted to determine if these are pre-attack indicators.⁹

The most recent example of a school Active Assailant attack where both Rehearsal Behavior and Leakage were overlooked was the November 30, 2021, attack at Oxford H.S. in Michigan. In that attack, the suspect was found by a teacher drawing disturbing graphic images in class depicting guns and bloody school shooting scenes on two occasions. One incident was the day before the killings and the other was the morning of the killings. He was also found by a teacher doing internet research on ammunition on his phone in a classroom. It was later determined he was carrying the murder weapon, a 9mm semi-auto pistol, with him the entire day of the school killings.¹⁰ Had the Leakage associated with the drawings and the phone research been reported to the School Resource Officer who was on scene the day of the killings, a backpack search would have discovered the firearm inside the backpack prior to the actual killings. This type of search is standard for law enforcement handling any type of investigation into a school threat.

This student had been brought to the school office regarding the disturbing drawings at 10:30 AM the day of the killings. The killings did not occur until 1:30 that same day. The counselors handling the student interview that morning did not include the SRO in the interview process, and did not conduct their own backpack search. They had every right to search the backpack under the Reasonable Suspicion Search and Seizure standards for school administrators set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court Case *N.J. v. TLO*,¹¹ but they neglected to do so.

The Oxford H.S. case will now become the standard for schools when it comes to investigating incidents of weapons in schools, or at-risk behavior involving possible student involvement with weapons. This case will set both civil and criminal liability standards. It is imperative schools have policies and procedures in place to address this type of behavior, especially in our current state of increased incidents involving weapons in schools. The Oxford H.S. case and recommendations for both mandatory law enforcement notification and Behavioral Threat Assessment will be addressed in Section 6.0 of this report.

M) Cyber Threats: High Risk

⁹ The School Shooter: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE, FBI Quantico, 2019

¹⁰ Multiple News accounts confirmed by statements from Oakland County MI. Sheriff Michael Bouchard, Dec. 4, 2021

¹¹ *New Jersey v. TLO*, 469 US 325, 1985 U.S. Supreme Court

Cyber Threats are relatively new to schools and have increased since the post-COVID return to operations. Cyber Threats must be taken seriously, but planning and training in this area is essential to school operations. Closing a school due to a random cyber threat is not the proper course of action and may actually be the intent of persons making the threats. Many of the recent cyber threats to schools have been generated by random social media threats, which are often posted by Bots and reposted locally by students in geographic areas. Once reposted, the threats can go viral and create a panic response in the school or community. The viral social media and related panic response is typically what causes schools to close.

There is a concept called SWATTING that is an intended consequence of persons posting these types of Cyber Threats. The intent is to generate a law enforcement response to a school, thereby impacting operations on both the schools and the law enforcement agencies in the area of the schools. Most often, these types of Cyber Threats are made in different areas of the Country at the same time in order to maximize the detrimental effect on school operations.

In assessing these types of threats, it is important to remember there has never been a confirmed event or attack based on an unauthored threat. A person who is planning an attack on a school, whether it as an Active Assailant attack or a bomb attack, would not give advance notice. The intended goal of an actual attack would be to cause as much devastation as possible, so a suspect giving advance notice through a threat would not be reasonable.

The most effective mitigation strategy for addressing Cyber Threats is through use of a Digital Threat Assessment Program. This is something that typically must be done through a private vendor experienced in the field. These assessments are above the capabilities of a school district I.T. Department, and law enforcement cannot perform them due to 4th Amendment constraints and lack of trained personnel. Each threat must be taken seriously and investigated. Law enforcement notification at the first indication of a Cyber Threat is essential.

These should not be considered “false alarms” or “pranks.” Each Cyber Threat is designed to impact operations at schools and within the community. They are also designed to create fear and panic, so they are a form of Cyber Terrorism and tracked by law enforcement. Some of these threats have been tracked to foreign actors attempting to disrupt operations in the U.S. They are typically routed through multiple IP addresses throughout the County so they cannot be tracked. Law enforcement agencies would know if a similar Cyber Threat is surfacing in different areas of the Country. This is why involvement of law enforcement is crucial to information sharing.

N) Transportation: Low Risk

Montana Rail Link (MRL) operates a railroad that crosses the state of Montana in an east-west direction. Several of the cities and towns in Gallatin County are rated at a higher risk for accidents and derailments on the railroad, but the Gallatin Gateway and Big Sky

areas are not among them. This is the reason risk related to railway incidents is rated low for BSSD schools.

As mentioned in the District Profile section of this report, U.S. 191 runs north-south adjacent to the east side of the BSSD campus. Some light commercial traffic uses this road, but it is mainly used for passenger vehicle transportation. There is a restricted school speed limit of 25 mph in the area of the BSSD campus, so risks related to the location of the highway are rated low.

O) Hospitals and Medical Transport: Moderate Risk

Big Sky Medical Center is an eight-bed critical access hospital providing emergency and primary care services to the area of the BSSD schools. The facility is located approximately 5 miles from the BSSD campus, and is the closest hospital to the schools. Big Sky Medical Center has an Emergency Room, and is a Level III Trauma Center. As such, they are set up for some surgery, intensive care, and stabilization of injured patients. They are not set up for mass trauma care or multiple victims from a Mass Casualty Incident. They are set up to triage these types of injuries and work with surrounding area hospitals to get further patient care if needed. Big Sky Medical Center has a heliport, and helicopter medical transport is available.

Bozeman Health Deaconess Hospital in the City of Bozeman is the nearest larger medical facility. This hospital also has a Level III Trauma Center, but it is larger than the one in Big Sky. In any case where a student or staff member was critically injured, or in a case where there was a Mass Casualty Incident at a BSSD school, on scene paramedics in consult with medical staff at the Big Sky Medical Center or Bozeman Health Deaconess Hospital would make the determination where the victim(s) would be transported and what method of transport would be used. School administration would not be part of that decision making process, but should be included in the information flow so proper information can be passed on to families.

The Big Sky Fire Department is staffed with paramedics and handles medical ground transport. The BSFD paramedics are also tactically trained to assist with medical needs during and Active Assailant or Mass Casualty Incident at a school. There is sufficient and competent medical transport and hospital needs locally to assist with normal medical needs. This is rated Moderate Risk due to the possibility that multiple critical injuries might not be able to be handled locally. Training between the school district, emergency response agencies, and hospital staff will mitigate this possible area of vulnerability. All agencies should understand each other's roles, responsibilities, and procedures pre-incident.

P) Infrastructure Target Hardening of BSSD Facilities:

This is a high risk in all schools throughout the U.S. Specific projects and recommendations are referenced in Section 6.0 this HVA report. As referenced elsewhere in this report, the current baseline of target hardening and infrastructure security at BSSD schools is much higher than most schools starting out on a Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment project.

Q) Specific Threats Related to Terrorist Activities: Low Risk

Terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR, Section 0.85) as the “Unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” Schools are considered soft targets for terrorist attacks and subject to target hardening to protect against them under the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD8) which set national preparedness goals. Terrorist threats to schools are considered a high impact-low frequency event, much like the threat of a school Active Assailant attack. Protecting schools against the threat of a terrorist attack makes sense, as the same areas of vulnerability that would be used in a terrorist attack would also be used in a school Active Assailant attack.

The most serious terrorist attack at a school was the 2004 Beslan School Massacre in Beslan, Russia. 314 hostages, including 186 children died in that attack which was perpetrated by Chechnya terrorists. Although this did not occur in the United States, the attack is considered by terrorism experts to be a method of attack considered for use by terrorist groups or lone wolf terrorists involving schools in the U.S.¹²

There is Historical data of a lone wolf terrorist attack at Ohio State University on November 28, 2016. During that attack, the suspect drove his vehicle into a crowd of students injuring several of them. He then got out of the vehicle with a knife and began attacking students. Thirteen people were injured, but none of them were killed. The lack of fatalities is attributed to the fact there was a Campus Police Office on scene who quickly used deadly force to stop the attack. The FBI identified the suspect as an American citizen who was radicalized into the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL) and categorized this as a lone wolf terrorist attack. Use of vehicles as weapons is something that is advocated by terrorist groups such as ISIS, as they are easy to obtain and can cause devastating casualties in an attack.¹³

Ohio State attack is used as source reference for recommendations related to vehicle barriers to prevent access to student areas and use of School Resource Officers for quick reaction to immediate threats at schools.

R) Cyber-Security Threats: Moderate Risk

Threats to school districts such as ransomware and identity theft are relatively new to schools and businesses. They have become more prevalent within the last five years, and some cyber-attacks are extremely sophisticated. Cyber-security is an area where specific expertise is needed to ensure systems are effectively protected from attacks and any attack that might occur is properly addressed.

BSSD has its own Internet Technology (I.T.) department responsible for handling the district's systems. Consultants from the Surefox assessment team interviewed the BSSD Technology Director during this assessment, and it appears all cyber-security defenses and

¹² Terror at Beslan. John Giduck: Archangel Group Publishing, 2005

¹³ Rumiya Online ISIS Magazine, November 2017.

firewalls are in place. A formal assessment of the BSSD cyber-security systems, policies, and procedures was not part of this assessment.

Cyber-security is an important aspect of infrastructure target hardening for a school district. A ransomware attack can cripple a school district, and a data breach could put the district in a non-compliance issue with the Federal Education Rights to Privacy Act (FERPA). The BSSD Technology Director appears aware of these threats, but consultation with a Subject Matter Expert familiar with current cyber threats to work with the district I.T. department is an effective method of mitigating this area of possible vulnerability, while ensuring current safeguards are sufficient to address current threat levels. Cyber threat levels change rapidly, so it is important to remain aware of current trends posing a threat to technology and Internet systems.

6.0 FACILITY ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following table is a list of BSSD schools and facilities referred to in this HVA report. Assessments and recommendations specific to each school are included in Sections 6.1 and 6.3 of this HVA report. The numbers of students and staff were provided by BSSD and based on 2021 enrollment statistics.

Table 6-1. Gallatin County Schools

School	Address	Students	Staff	Year Built
Ophir Elementary School	60 Windy Pass Trail Gallatin Gateway, Mt. 59730	200	25	2015
Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School	45465 Gallatin Rd. Gallatin Gateway, MT. 59730	340		2007

Hazard and Vulnerability Assessments were performed by the Surefox and School Safety Operations Inc. assessment team on all BSSD schools and district facilities February 28, 2022, through March 3, 2022. These are safety and security related assessments. No structural or engineering type assessments were performed. Assessment tools created by School Safety Inc. were used during this assessment process. Qualitative data gathered through questionnaires and in-person interviews with the BSSD Superintendent, Principals, and school staff was used to supplement the quantitative data gathered through the assessment process. Recommendations are source-referenced through footnotes throughout this report, or in Section 8.0 “References” where applicable.

The following are common observations and recommendations are pertinent to all BSSD schools and the district in general:

A) Emergency Management Planning Programs: High Priority

School districts are required to have an All-Hazards Standardized Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) in place. This is required at the federal level by the U.S. Department of Education and FEMA. It is required locally by statute in the Montana Code Annotated Section (MCA) 10.55.802 and in the Administrative Rules of Montana under Section 20-1-401. It is also a requirement under Section 1.1(c) of the Montana Office of Public Instruction School Safety and Security Guide. Non-compliance with these statutes could result in civil or criminal liability post-incident if injuries occur during an emergency response. It could also result in

lack of state or federal funding after any declared natural or manmade disaster incident resulting in damages to a BSSD school or facility.

Homeland Security Presidential 5 (HSPD5) mandates all Emergency Operations Plans must be compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS).¹⁴ HSPD5 took effect July 1, 2005, and school districts are included for compliance to this directive. The U.S. Department of Education and FEMA Guide for Creating High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans was created for use in school districts to ensure compliance with HSPD5 and other recommended best practices in school emergency response planning. This is the guide used to check compliance and to create school Emergency Operations Plans.

MCA Section 20-9-236 also states a school district must be compliant with Safety and Emergency Operations Plans to transfer state or local funding for improvements, maintenance, and some other services. This statute specifically states use of funding for School Resource Officers (SRO's). Hiring of an SRO for BSSD will be a recommendation made elsewhere in this section of the HVA report.

BSSD does not currently have a compliant All-Hazards Standardized Emergency Operations Plan in place for its schools. The recommendation to address this is to have a compliant EOP created. Once the EOP is promulgated by the Superintendent, it should be the only emergency plan used within the district. The EOP should be written by persons with an emergency management and response background. Part of that background should be in school emergency management, as the school EOP is different than an emergency response agency EOP. The EOP can be written in-house if there are persons within the district with the background and time required to write it. This is typically not the case, so it is more effective and efficient to have an outside consultant with subject matter expertise write the EOP. It then can be updated yearly. The yearly updates can sometimes be completed in-house, but it is recommended the yearly updates also be done by a subject matter expert to ensure compliance with any changes in statutes or recommended best practices.

A compliant EOP should address all hazards, both manmade and natural, that could face a school district. The EOP should also contain check lists for staff roles in each area of response. In addition to the All-Hazards EOP, the following functional annexes and procedures should be included in the emergency plans:

- Functional Annex for School Active Assailant Response.
- Functional Annex for Earthquake Response.
- Functional Annex for Pandemic Response.
- Functional Annex for Student/Family Reunification.
- Functional Annex for Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP).

¹⁴ Homeland Security Presidential 5: Management of Domestic Incidents. President George W. Bush, Feb. 23, 2003

Policy and Procedure for Suicide, to include Intervention, Prevention, and Post-vention.

Policy and procedure for student and staff accountability during an emergency response.

Policy and procedure for Emergency Communications Planning.

Current mapping of the schools to show classroom locations, evacuation routes, and utility shut offs.

Functional Annexes are included in an EOP to address high threat or high impacts present in the area of the school. The annexes break down response roles into an easier to read format for staff reference.

Creation of the new EOP is considered a high priority project for BSSD. The Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment process and report is the foundation for an effective EOP, and BSSD has completed that process.

B) Emergency Response Training: High Priority

Training in the proper staff response roles to a school emergency was a stated concern of the BSSD Superintendent and both Principals. Training is the most important aspect of a School Emergency Management program. Regardless of how good or compliant the Emergency Operations Plans are for a school district, they are not effective without the proper training. The emergency plans are used for pre-incident references and post-incident debriefings. There is no time to look at plans or checklists during an actual emergency response. The staff response must be second nature and immediate. The only way to effectively achieve that is through training.

There are three Incident Objectives in emergency response for any agency, including schools. They are:

- 1) Life Safety
- 2) Incident Stabilization
- 3) Property Preservation

The emergency plans are used in Priority #2 once the incident is stabilized to ensure all proper response actions have been taken. They are again used in Priority #3 to ensure recovery and continuity actions are being properly addressed. Priority #1 is the most important during an emergency response. All three priorities must be factored into a school emergency response training program, but staff must understand their roles in the Life Safety priority response pre-incident in order to maximize student and staff safety. Once Life Safety has been achieved, the clock slows down and the other Incident Priorities can be achieved.

In school emergency response training, school staff members are considered “Immediate Responders.” They are responsible for maintaining safety during the time spent waiting for Emergency Responders to arrive and take care of the threat generating the emergency response. This can entail evacuation due to fire or earthquake, securing the school during a

lockdown or Active Assailant attack, or providing immediate care first aid, to include applying a tourniquet, stopping bleeding, or use of an AED. What to do during the time spent waiting for emergency response, how to effectively accept emergency response, how to interact with emergency responders arrive, what the school staff roles are when emergency responders arrive, and what to do after emergency responders leave are the areas school emergency response training needs to address.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) referenced in Section 6.0 (A) requires the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) to be incorporated into emergency response training programs. School districts are included in the directive. Understanding these concepts in school emergency response is important because it shows how to break down an incident response into manageable components and maintain an effective Span of Control to maximize available staffing. ICS is also the system used by all emergency response agencies, so it is important all agencies are sharing the same response activities.

Any effective school emergency response training programs must incorporate both NIMS and ICS into them. It is important to use the components of both NIMS and ICS as they relate to the school emergency response actions. FEMA offers on-line training courses in both NIMS and ICS for free. Although these courses are excellent, they are written for emergency responders and can become confusing for school staff unless the training demonstrates how the principles are realistically worked into the school emergency response.

BSSD utilizes a training called Run-Lock-Fight for staff training. The is a program put on for law enforcement by the Safariland Company out of Los Angeles, CA. Law enforcement and trainers then bring the program to schools. This program was reviewed during this assessment process. There are some excellent training components in the program, which is largely based on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Run-Hide-Fight program. It is specific to training for an Active Assailant attack, and does not incorporate the other school emergency response actions into it. NIMS and ICS were also not found to be components in this training program.

Training programs such as these are at times found to be detrimental to staff preparedness in schools. The program uses realistic role players to act as victims. This can include use of fake blood for a visual. The program also teaches techniques for fighting and disarming a suspect. Although this could be excellent for persons with some type of emergency response background, it could be detrimental to persons without that background. For example, law enforcement requires 40 hours minimum in the academy to teach recruits Weaponless Defense tactics, as most recruits do not have a prior background. This training includes both weaponless control techniques and weapons takeaways. There is then an 8-hour yearly recertification, since these are diminishing skills. Even with that level of training, law enforcement is trained to create distance from an offender and not use weapons takeaways or weaponless defense unless it is a last resort.

The option of fighting back in an Active Assailant incident at a school is a topic that must be addressed, as it is a distinct possibility. If training in how to fight back is to be done, there must be sufficient time dedicated to that training, and participation should be voluntary. The assessors were advised the Run-Lock-Fight training provided to BSSD staff is a 2-hour block, and only a portion of that is dedicated to self-defense or fighting tactics. The concern here is the district is taking on a liability if a person with inadequate training uses a technique and then injury occurs. The other concern is possible mental traumatization that can occur from the training. There are documented cases throughout the U.S. of this type of training causing symptoms similar to PTSD in participants.

The recommendation for the Run-Lock-Fight training is for BSSD Administration to conduct an anonymous staff survey to solicit input on the usefulness of the training and the mental effects it has on participants. Active Assailant response is an important aspect of school emergency response training, but it must prove effective to staff. If the Run-Lock-Fight training is something staff finds useful, then by all means it should be included in the BSSD school emergency response training. If there is some staff concern with the training, there are other programs available that incorporate Active Assailant response into other response areas in order to create a holistic and robust training program.

Active Assailant attacks are considered a high impact-low probability event for schools. This is by no means meant to diminish the threat or the need to train for it, but if training programs focus solely on this response the other response actions required for school safety are ignored. Recommendations for school emergency response training programs that include all areas of response, to include NIMS and ICS principles, will be made to BSSD upon request.

C) Door Locks: High Priority

Classroom door locks at all BSSD schools were checked during this assessment. The majority of the classroom doors required a key to lock them from the inside, or had no means to lock them from the inside and had to be locked with a key from the outside. Some classroom doors had push bar hardware mounted on the inside. These also require use of keys to lock them. Using keys requires fine motor skills that can become diminished during a stress response due to release of adrenaline and cortisol from the brain. Shaking of the hands is one of the effects from a stress response, and it is difficult to insert a key into a door when the hand is shaking. This could result in classrooms not being locked down properly during an incident where there was a threat to safety. Source reference here is the Sandy Hook Elementary School Massacre in Newtown CT. on December 14, 2012. During that attack, a teacher had keys in hand but was unable to lock the classroom door due to loss of fine motor skills. The teacher and all students in that first grade class were killed after the assailant entered the classroom through the unlocked door.¹⁵

Any door that has to be opened in order to be locked from the outside also poses a risk to staff, since they have to expose themselves to possible danger when opening the door.

¹⁵ Sandy Hook Commission Final Report, February 2015.

Source reference here is the Marjory Stoneman-Douglas School Massacre in Parkland, FL. February 14, 2018. During that attack, a teacher opened the classroom door to lock it. This exposed his head to the assailant in the hallway, and the teacher was fatally shot.¹⁶

These case studies are taken into consideration when making recommendations on effectively securing classroom door locks. Classroom doors should be able to be locked from the inside without the use of keys. Pushbutton locks on the inside are the most efficient method. This enables staff to easily lock the door without use of fine motor skills. They can also visually check to see the door is locked since the button is depressed when in the locked position. In cases where doors require a key to lock them, staff often have to open the door and try the lock to make sure it is locked since fire codes require they door to open from the inside when in the locked position.

The **long term** recommendation for classroom door locks is to retrofit them with locks that can be engaged using a pushbutton on the interior. If retrofit is not possible, replacing the entire lock is recommended. The reason this is offered as a long term recommendation is funding will be required. Retrofit typically is in the range of \$150 per door and replacement is typically in the \$450 range per door. These are only estimates based on current market pricing. Consultation with a local lock company should be done to obtain exact funding amounts.

The **short term** recommendation is to keep classroom doors locked at all times. This can be intrusive to student ingress to classrooms during teaching time, so there are options available to enable the door to still be opened from the outside while in the locked position. Magnets placed in door frames are available for use. These keep the door lock from engaging so the door can be opened from the outside. The magnet can be pulled free from inside the classroom without opening the door and the door latch then engages. There are also products available that mount on the door frame and keep the door ajar when in the locked position. The device can be disengaged from the interior without opening the door. The door then fully closes into the locked position. The most commonly used device used in schools is called the "Lock Blok."¹⁷ These devices are relatively inexpensive and offer a good immediate solution to door security. They are offered as short term recommendations as they should not be used to replace an effective code compliant door lock. There is also a wear issue, so replacement at some point might be needed.

The aforementioned magnets and products used to keep the doors ajar might work with doors equipped with push bar hardware, but they should be tested prior to use. These doors can also be retrofitted with thumbscrew hardware to replace the key lock on the interior. This eliminates the need for a key to lock them. Devices are also on the market for short term solutions to allow them to remain locked but available for ingress. These devices include pins that can be inserted into the push bar so it can remain locked but in the open

¹⁶ Recovering and Moving Forward: Lessons Learned and Recommendations Following the Shootings at Marjory Stoneman Douglas, National Police Foundation, August 2019.

¹⁷ www.newmanagement.com/products/lock-blok. (Assessors are not affiliated with this or any other products).

position. When the pin is removed from the interior, the push bar pops out and the door is locked. There are also devices using Velcro straps mounted on the push bar that achieve the same function without having to drill a hole in the hardware for the pin. Retrofit with the thumb screw is optimal, but the other devices will achieve the desired outcome of keeping doors locked.

This is considered a high priority recommendation for consideration.

D) Formation of a Collaborative Emergency Planning Team: High Priority

The Montana Safety and Security Guidelines require school districts to form a collaborative emergency operations planning team. This is also source-referenced in the Administrative Rules Montana Section 10.55.802. Team membership should consist of district staff involved in school emergency management and all community partners who might be involved in emergency response to a BSSD school. The committee should be responsible for discussions of all safety and emergency information related to school operations, creation of policies and procedures related to school emergency management and response, approval of the All Hazard Emergency Management Plan if written by an outside consultant, and creation of district specific emergency plans such as the Suicide Prevention Plan, Communications Plan, and Accountability Plan.

Recommended team membership is:

- At least one BSSD Principal.
- At least one BSSD classroom teacher.
- One BSSD staff member involved in student discipline or counseling.
- The BSSD I.T. Manager or representative.
- The BSSD Facilities Manager or representative.
- The BSSD Food Services Manager or representative.
- At least one BSSD Board of Trustees member.
- One non-staff member parent of a BSSD student.
- One BSSD high school student, (optional, but good for student views on culture and climate).
- A representative of local law enforcement.
- A representative of local fire/EMS services.
- A representative of the local hospital.
- A representative working local mental health agencies if possible.
- Any other person(s) deemed appropriate by the Superintendent.

The Superintendent may certainly attend meetings for informational purposes, but it is recommended they do not participate in creation of plans, policies, or procedures. The Superintendent has the responsibility for promulgating any plans, policies, and procedures created and approved for review by the committee. Having the approving authority participate in the planning procedure could be a conflict when it comes time for approval.

The Montana Safety and Security Guidelines also recommends the committee meets monthly or quarterly. Minutes of meetings should be kept as quantitative data for compliance to AMR and the Office of Public Information Guide. Membership should be formalized and standard decorum should be followed. This would include a Committee Chair, a formalized agenda, and hard stop times to ensure effectiveness. The committee meetings are not subject to Public Meeting Laws, as sensitive information regarding student safety is discussed. Minutes are also not subject to Public Information Laws, since they are part of the district safety and emergency plans. Emergency Plans, to include the All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan are not subject to release to the public absent a subpoena to show cause signed by a judge.

BSSD has begun forming this collaborative team, and that is commendable. The recommendation is to formalize the team based on the aforementioned guidelines and ensure continuity of operations in order to remain compliant with state codes. Formation of a Collaborative Team is Step 1 of the Six-Step Planning Process outlined by the U.S. Department of Education Readiness and Emergency Management Planning for Schools (REMS) section, so there are also compliance issues at the federal level to be addressed.

In addition to the district committee, Montana Code Annotated section 52-2-211 required formation of a County Interdisciplinary Child Information and School Safety Team. This team would not be formed at the school district level, but Subsection (g) the statute requires participation by any Board of Trustees of any school district operating in the County. This is typically a person designated by the Board, unless a Board Member wishes to participate. Review of BSSD participation in this County Committee was not done during this assessment, but participation in it by BSSD is recommended in order to ensure statutory compliance and effective information exchange. Any information discussed at the County Committee pertinent to school safety should be brought back to the District Committee for discussion and informational purposes. This is particularly important in areas related to teen mental health, as County mental health officials are required to participate in the County School Safety Team.

These are considered High Priority Recommendations.

E) School Resource Officer Program: High Priority

As referenced in section 5.0- "C" of this report, law enforcement response times to an emergency incident at a BSSD school could be problematic depending upon staffing. This could include responding to a violent incident at a school. There is one Gallatin County Sheriff's Deputy assigned to cover the schools, but this is as an ancillary duty to other patrol related duties. If needed elsewhere, the deputy would not be at the schools while handling other assignments or calls for service.

The recommended best practice in school safety is to have a full time School Resource Officer (SRO) assigned to the schools. This is a recommendation for consideration for BSSD schools, as it would give a law enforcement presence and immediate response to any emergency arising at one of the schools. This is especially important for schools located in

rural areas where a delayed law enforcement response might occur. If the Resident Deputy assigned to the Gallatin Canyon Station is unavailable to respond to a school or is out of the area when needed, law enforcement response might be coming from Bozeman. This is a 40-50 minute drive, so there is a time delay. A designated SRO would not be pulled off campus unless it was for an extreme emergency. They would then most likely be able to return to the campus without becoming involved in an off-site investigation.

A recent case used to source reference the effective response of an SRO is the March 4, 2022, shooting at Olathe East High School in Kansas. In that incident, a student called to the office for discipline purposes immediately pulled a handgun out of his backpack and shot the Assistant Principal he was supposed to meet with. The SRO was in the office and got into a deadly force encounter with the suspect student. Although the SRO was also shot, he was able to shoot and incapacitate the suspect before there were any further injuries or victims. The SRO was then able to summon additional law enforcement and paramedics using his police radio. Use of a police radio is the most effective method of summoning law enforcement and medical assistance, as it eliminates any delays found in other methods of communication such as 9-1-1. Had the SRO not been on scene, there certainly would have been additional victims, as the suspect was armed with a semi-automatic pistol and had additional ammunition. Based on the SRO's quick actions, there were no fatalities in this incident.

In addition to providing physical security, the SRO's also interact with students in a positive manner and assist in culture and climate related programs. The SRO is often the only positive adult role model some students deal with, and that is important. The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) is the premier SRO training organization in the U.S.¹⁸ Their SRO certification and training programs focus more on culture and climate issues than they do on dealing with the Active Assailant, although safety and security will always be the primary goal of the SRO program.

Hiring a full time SRO for BSSD is offered as a long term recommendation for consideration, as it takes funding and a cooperative effort between the school district and the Sheriff's Office. The SRO remains an employee of the Sheriff's Office, so there has to be interest from the Sheriff to explore the possibility of following up with this recommendation. The cost of the SRO is typically shared between the school district and the law enforcement agency. The long term effect is having the SRO actually saves work for the law enforcement Patrol Division, as the SRO handles patrolling the schools and all calls for service at the schools.

A short term recommendation for consideration is to supply the patrol deputies working out of the Canyon Substation with an office at one of the schools for them to use for writing up reports etc. This would give the schools a law enforcement presence while giving the deputies a place to work in case they are needed for calls for service in the area of the

¹⁸ www.NASRO.org.

campus. Designating a law enforcement parking space in the front of the school where the car is plainly visible also serves as a deterrent.

F) Digital and Behavioral Threat Assessment Program: High Priority

There are some programs in effect at BSSD schools to address at-risk student behavior. This is excellent, but the recommendation here is to create formal assessment teams and bring in a higher level of training for them. The team should include law enforcement, as they are crucial to the success of the program. Any Behavioral Threat Assessment program should also include a Digital Threat Assessment aspect. Social media is where most information on threat analysis comes from. In almost every incident of school violence, there has been “Leakage” on social media that might have prevented the attack if it was discovered pre-incident.

Threat assessment programs are recommended in Section 1.4.b of the Montana Safety and Security Guide. They are also source-referenced in the Administrative Regulations Montana Section 10.16.3346. Both Behavioral and Digital Threat Assessment in schools is also a recommended best practice from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.¹⁹

G) Anonymous Reporting Tool: High Priority

Having a system in place where students can anonymously report issues like bullying, suicidal ideation, or threats to safety is a recommended best practice in school safety. An effective system should be web based and also available through social media. Reports should go directly to designated persons at the district, preferably through email. The system must also function 24-7, as most teen suicides or suicidal ideation occur after-hours or on weekends. An anonymous reporting tool would fit into Sections 1.4(a) through (f) of the Montana Safety and Security Guidelines. There are multiple source references in both the Administrative Regulations Montana and the Montana Code Annotated where a system such as this would fit in. Recommendations for systems proved effective in schools will be made upon request.

H) Shatterproof Window Laminate: High Priority

Shatterproof window laminate will be recommended on certain glass windows and panels at both schools. Specific areas will be referenced in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 in this report. Shatterproof laminates became recommended best practice for schools following the Sandy Hook School Massacre, (report footnote reference 14, p.23). In that case, the assailant shot out the front window adjacent to the secure single point of entry to gain entry into the school. A more recent case now used for additional source reference occurred in Houston, TX. on October 1, 2021, at the Yes Prep Charter School. In that case, the Assailant used the same tactics used in Sandy Hook. He used a rifle to shoot out the glass in the front entry door, entered the school, and shot a school administrator.²⁰

¹⁹ Enhancing School Safety: Using A Threat Assessment Model. U.S. Secret Service and Dept. of Homeland Security National Threat Assessment Center. July 2018.

²⁰ Multiple news sources confirmed by law enforcement. Yes Prep, 4411 Anderson Rd. Houston TX.

This repetition of methods of entry during a similar crime is referred to as a concept called the “Innovator and the Imitator.” Information related to these crimes is available on the Internet and suspects often research them when formulating plans to commit similar crimes. Similar Modus Operandi is often seen in similar crimes in different areas. This is the reason we use information taken from debriefings and After Action Reports for target hardening. The shatterproof laminates do not make the windows bulletproof, but they do keep the windows intact and in their frames so entry cannot be made. Eventually the glass might give in to repetitive gunshots, but the premise is to delay entry while law enforcement is responding so the suspect remains outside the school.

Shatterproof laminates will also be recommended on the glass panels on all classroom doors. These panels are close enough to the door handles to allow someone to reach through and unlock the door if forced entry were made. Source reference for this is the Marjory Stoneman-Douglas school killings on February 14, 2018, in Parkland, FL., (report footnote reference 15, p.23). In that case, the Assailant shot through the glass pane on a classroom door window into a room full of students. He did not reach through and unlock the door, but there were two fatalities in the classroom from the gunshots through the glass pane. Although the shatterproof laminate would not have made the glass bulletproof, tests have shown the velocity of a bullet is slowed by the laminate. This might prevent a bullet wound from being fatal. This same case will be used to source reference providing coverings for the glass panes in all classrooms. Covering the glass panes and windows prevents suspects from acquisition of targets of opportunity by eliminating a visual into the rooms.

I) Door Security Devices: High Priority

Door security devices will be recommended on common area doors in some classrooms at Ophir Elementary School. Some classrooms have a common work area, or pod, shared by adjacent classrooms. Due to fire codes, these common doors cannot be locked during normal school operations as they are considered secondary evacuation egress doors. Because of this, the doors do not lock and have no means of locking them. The problem is they cannot be locked during a lockdown or Active Assailant incident. If a suspect gained access to one classroom, they would have access to students and staff in the adjacent classroom.

Door security devices to be used only in lockdowns, or the worst case scenario of an Active Assailant attack, will be recommended for these doors. Specific doors for these devices will be recommended for will be referenced in Section 6.1 of this report. Any door security device used in a school should have the ability to be unlocked from the outside by law enforcement or school administration if needed. This is essential, because if help is needed inside a classroom or if law enforcement needs to clear a classroom, they need access to the room. Any device such as a barrel bolt or door barricade would prevent that access. The assessment team has done market research on door security devices and will make recommendations for a device proved effective for securing doors such as these upon request. The assessment team members are not affiliated with these or any other products.

If this recommendation is considered, a policy and procedure for use of the door security devices will be needed. They should also be factored into lockdown drills and training. The door security devices should only be used during a lockdown when the school becomes a place of confinement due to threats to safety. It should be noted these doors were areas of staff concern identified to the assessment team.

J) Stop-The-Bleed Equipment: High Priority

BSSD does store some bleeding control kits in the schools, and this is excellent. The current bleeding control kits used in the school are basic and not designed for use in a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI). They also do not contain some of the recommended equipment and supplies needed for tactical immediate care first aid. During any incident of violence at a school, including the worst case scenario of an Active Assailant attack, there is a time delay before paramedics arrive at a scene. This could be anywhere from three minutes to fifteen minutes from the time of the first 9-1-1 call. School staff are responsible for immediate first aid during that waiting period. An arterial bleed, especially in a smaller child, would most probably result in death during that waiting period if action was not taken. There are multiple cases throughout the U.S. and Canada where arterial bleeding caused death in children after an Active Assailant attack at a school, but the Sandy Hook school massacre will be used as source reference since the After Action Report from that attack is source-referenced elsewhere in this report.

The existing bleed control kits at BSSD schools contain a tourniquet, but they are a type of tourniquet called the SWAT-T. These are a rubberized stretch wrap type of tourniquet that work well if applied properly. They can also be used as a pressure wrapping and are excellent for use in younger children whose limbs might be damaged through use of a traditional tourniquet due to the circumference of their limbs. Many tactical operators also carry the SWAT-T tourniquet due to its compact size and versatility of use. The problem with the SWAT-T tourniquet is that it is difficult to apply to one's self and requires a good deal of training to use it properly.

The Combat Application Tourniquet (CAT) is the one most commonly carried by law enforcement, paramedics, and military. The Special Operations Force Tactical Tourniquet (SOFT-T) is similar to the CAT tourniquet. Both use a strap with a windless system for regulating pressure. Both are equally effective and are designed so an injured person can apply the tourniquet to themselves over the injured extremity. The only difference between the two is the SOFT-T has a metal clasp on the strap that makes it easier for self-application on the leg for a femoral artery wound. The purchase of either type of tourniquet to enhance the existing bleed control kits at BSSD schools is recommended. The typical price range for each tourniquet is approximately \$30.

The current bleed control kits at BSSD schools also do not contain wound packing material. The wound packing material contains a clotting agent that slows bleeding in a knife or gun wound. It can be used with a tourniquet to assist in stopping the bleeding, or by itself to stop bleeding in an area of the body where a tourniquet cannot be used. The most commonly

used wound packing material is called Quick Clot. It uses a hemostatic agent called Kaolin to control bleeding and has proved effective in combat situations. Stocking Quick Clot to supplement the bleed control kits at BSSD schools is also recommended. A package of Quick Clot is approximately \$50.

The most effective and cost efficient way for schools to stock these types of Stop-The-Bleed equipment is to purchase a Mass Casualty Kit that contains multiple tourniquets, multiple QuikClot kits, and other first aid supplies that can be used for tactical immediate care first aid. In addition to being more cost effective than purchasing single items, these kits are mobile so they can be stored in a centralized location and moved to the area where they are needed when safe to do so. Individual classroom kits should be used to supplement the Mass Casualty Kits. An injured student or staff member might be in a classroom or other area of a school where it might not be safe to move supplies to. The individual classroom kits would allow staff to provide immediate first aid at the location to the injured person.

Staff training in both use of tourniquets and wound packing material is essential. The training should be continuous as these are diminishing skills if not practiced. The actual Stop-The-Bleed equipment in the kits should not be used for training purposes. Training supplies that are much less expensive can be used. A CAT or SOFT-T tourniquet that will be used for actual first aid should be one-use only. If used in the field, it should be thrown away and replaced as the material can stretch and there could be contamination from blood. A training tourniquet can be used multiple times. Likewise, the QuikClot training materials are not treated with the hemostatic agent, so they typically cost about \$10. They can also be multi-use. The packaging and actual material is the same as the QuikClot kits treated with the hemostatic agent. Training equipment is colored blue so it is not confused with the actual equipment.

A Hemorrhage Control Training Kit can be purchased by the district for approximately \$400. The kit contains a lifelike replica of a limb with different size bullet and knife wounds. This allows for training on wound packing and actual use of the tourniquets. Placing the tourniquets on a real person or on oneself is essential to training as it practices proper placement. Proper pressure required to stop bleeding cannot always be done due to pain or possible injury. Using the replica limb allows for factual training in the proper pressure required to stop bleeding. Likewise, it is not possible to practice wound packing on another person. There is a technique required for wound packing that must be practiced if it is to be effective. Purchase of the training kit would allow sustainability of training within the district at no cost. It is easy to have the training kit available, after staff meetings for example, to give staff an opportunity to practice. In-house trainers can receive training from the local fire department or paramedics to create an in-house training staff.

There are grants offered for Stop-The-Bleed equipment and supplies such as this. Local hospitals typically have grant information available. Private donations are also allowed for these purposes and organizations will often assist school districts with these programs. There are multiple on-line dealers for these supplies. It is recommended to not use Amazon

for the actual supplies, as they use multiple retailers for these supplies and quality can become an issue.

K) Secure Single Point of Entry: High Priority

All perimeter doors at BSSD schools remain locked during the school day. Front entrances and exterior doors used for ingress are equipped with code locks for staff ingress. The schools have secure single points of entry to prohibit unauthorized entry during the school day. This is excellent, and establishes a high baseline of perimeter security already present at BSSD schools.

Some recommendations will be made in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of this report. These recommendations will enhance the already secure main and perimeter points of entry. Recommendations will include consideration of installation of electric locks with RFID card readers on some perimeter doors. These could be used by staff, but the primary use would be to give law enforcement and emergency responder quick access to the main and secondary points of entry to a school during an emergency response.

L) Fencing: High Priority

Some of the existing perimeter fencing will be replaced after new construction projects are completed. This is already planned for and is excellent, as the existing fencing in some areas can be easily defeated due to mounting poles that do not provide adequate support. Six-foot chain link fencing is recommended as it is a more effective deterrent than five-foot fencing. The cost difference is typically not significant, as labor is the same. There are some added material costs, so budgeting could be a factor.

Some additional fencing recommendations will be referenced in Section 6.1 of this report. These are recommendations for immediate consideration as they will enclose open areas of the Ophir Elementary School where there is access to student areas.

M) Signage: Medium Priority

Recommendations for additional signage at the approach to the Ophir Elementary School's Windy Pass Trail entrance and the Lone Peak H.S. entrance from U.S. 191 are offered for consideration. It is difficult to identify the entrance to the elementary school from U.S. 191 and a person can pass it before they realize it is there. This could include emergency responders who are not familiar with the location of the schools. A marquis sign visible from both north and south U.S. 191 is recommended. Similar signage for the middle school and high school at the Beaver Creek Rd. entrance at the south end of the campus leading to the main office entrance is also recommended. Building signage and numbering of buildings and doors will be referenced in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 of this report.

These recommendations are consistent with the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts related to visitor guidance.

N) Video System Enhancements: High and Medium Priority

The BSSD schools have an existing video system that is in good repair and provides good coverage. Recommendations for monitoring capacities from the school offices for some or all of the cameras will be made in Sections 6.1. and 6.2. This is considered high priority in order to better monitor access points to the schools.

Some recommendations for additional cameras will also be made. This is considered medium priority, as the campus is already being monitored by video and is also monitored by staff.

O) New Construction Security Consultation: High Priority

Some new construction at the high school and middle school is planned, but the actual construction has not begun. It is often easier and more cost effective to review plans prior to the start of construction to look for enhanced security measures that can be built into the project. The assessment will review any existing plans upon request.

P) Re-assessments: High Priority

Reassessments of safety and security projects should be done every 12-18 months. This tracks the forward momentum of the projects, identifies new goals, and reviews planning and training for purposes of compliance.

Q) Staff Identification: High Priority

A policy to have all staff wear visible identification during the school day is recommended. This will assist visitors and emergency responders not familiar with the schools to quickly identify staff members. This is an important area to address when preparing to accept emergency response at the schools.

R) Visitor Monitoring System: High Priority

Both schools currently have a visitor sign in system, which is excellent. Visitors sign in by pen and paper at the school office and are given a visitor I.D. badge prior to entering the main area of the schools. The recommendation is to purchase a computerized visitor management system to be installed in the office at each school. The systems can be installed at the reception counter in the office. An effective system scans the visitors I.D., prints out a photo badge, logs the visitor into the campus, runs them through the sex offender data base, and then logs them off the campus when they leave. This gives the Principal a print out of who is on the campus at any given time during an emergency incident while assisting in monitoring who is entering the school.

S) Delayed Fire Alarm Evacuation: High Priority

The recommended best practice for fire alarm activation in schools is delayed evacuation. This is permissible per the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) under certain circumstances.²¹ As long as a school is built to fire codes and has a sprinkler system installed, delayed evacuation is permissible. The concept here is to give school administration time to do a situational assessment to see if evacuation is actually needed. Some school Active Assailants have activated fire alarms as a ruse to get students and staff out of classrooms and into open areas in order to maximize casualties. This was the case in the Stoneman-Douglas school killings source referenced elsewhere in this report. If delayed evacuations are to be done, a formalized policy and procedure promulgated by the Superintendent must be in place. This procedure must state that evacuation should be immediate if there is smoke or any indication of fire upon an alarm activation. The policy and procedure must also be approved by the local fire chief.

The following recommendations in Sections 6.1 through 6.3 are made to address identified areas of vulnerabilities at individual BSSD school sites and facilities:

²¹ NFPA Report, 2014.

6.1 Ophir Elementary School

Ophir Elementary School (OES) is a K-5 school located at 60 Windy Trail in Gallatin Gateway, MT. This is the physical address of the school. The main driveway entrance to the front parking lot is off of Windy Trail. OES shares a campus with the combined Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School. OES is located at the north end of the campus and the middle school/high school building is located at the south end of the campus. The Big Sky School District Superintendent and Administrative offices are located in the OES building. The address of the entire campus is 45465 Gallatin Rd., which is also U.S. Hwy 191. The address on the district website for both the offices and OES is listed as 45465 Gallatin Rd., so when using GPS apps to locate the school the entrance off Windy Pass Trail is not identified. This could be confusing to persons visiting the campus who are unfamiliar with the setup and location of the schools.

When looking for OES, GPS directs to the furthest south entrance to the campus in the area of the middle school and high school building. This entrance is off Beaver Creek Rd. which is approximately 0.3 miles from the Windy Trail Entrance to OES. The schools are connected by an interior road that runs through the parking lot, but this could add time to emergency responders looking for OES. It might also direct visitors to the wrong areas of the campus if they were looking for OES. There is no signage visible from Gallatin Rd., which is the main access route to the school. The only signage visible from Gallatin Rd. is signage for the Big Sky Valley School District, and that is not visible until a person approaching the school from the north has already passed Windy Pass Trail and the entrance to OES. The recommendation here is to place a marquee sign identifying OES on the west side of Gallatin Rd. just north of Windy Pass Trail. The sign should be visible to both southbound and northbound traffic. This would assist in identification of the proper entrance and eliminate any confusion that this is just the district office complex.



Photo 6-1. Existing signage on Gallatin Rd.

Once the proper driveway entrance is located there is good signage in front of the school identifying it. This signage is not visible from the south entrance to the campus, so placing signage in the parking lot in front of the middle and high school directing visitors to the elementary school in the north area of the campus is recommended. The main front entrance is visible from the front parking lot, but it is not marked as such. Placing the name of the school or the word 'Office' on the wood façade above the main entrance doors is recommended in order to clearly identify it as the main entrance. These concepts are within the parameters of the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles related to visitor guidance. The concept here is to ensure visitors know where they are going in order to keep them from going to unauthorized areas of the campus. This signage will also assist emergency responders not familiar with the school. As noted in Section 5.0 (K), a multi-agency law enforcement response to the campus is possible during a critical incident. This means there is a possibility of emergency responders coming to the school who have never been there before. Guiding to proper locations will save response time.

**Photo 6-2. Front signage and main entrance doors**

The main front entrance, (photo above), consists of a set of double glass doors with glass panels adjacent to both sides. The door on the right is equipped with a code lock, as are all other perimeter doors used for ingress at this school. Code access is restricted to the doors that staff members use, and the codes can be tracked to the staff members using them. This exterior door is left unlocked during the school day for ingress. Once inside this door, there is a secure lobby with a second set of doors prohibiting entry into the main areas of the school. This second set of doors is kept locked at all times. The door to the office is to the right of the lobby. It is also equipped with a code lock and kept locked at all times. There is a doorbell on this door used to contact office staff if entry to the office is needed. The door is equipped with an electric lock so office staff could buzz a person into the office if they are approved to enter. Office staff have a line of sight visual through the windows to the

left of the door, but they cannot see who is at the door if they are standing to the right of the door. There is a door to the left of the lobby leading into a conference room. This is also equipped with a code lock and kept locked at all times. This is considered a secure point of entry.



Photo 6-3. Interior lobby doors



Photo 6-4. Lobby office door

Although this is a secure single point of entry, the following recommendations are offered for consideration to enhance the existing security measures:

Equip the right exterior entry door with an electric lock that can be controlled from the office. Leave the left door locked at all times. This will allow office staff to lock the exterior door remotely from a position of safety if necessary. Currently staff has to go out to the door and lock it with a key if a lockdown occurs. Having the exterior doors locked during a lockdown would add another layer of protection.

Install an intercom with a buzzer and video to the right of the lobby office door. This system would be similar to a Ring Camera sold commercially and would not need to be integrated with the district video system. This would allow office staff to talk to visitors without allowing them into the office. It would also allow them to see the visitor if they were not in view from the window. Hearing and seeing a visitor could help office staff detect a threat, such as an angry parent. They would then have the option of not allowing them entry into the office.

Install shatterproof laminate on the exterior doors and adjacent glass panels, the interior lobby doors and adjacent glass panels, and the windows to the left of the office door, and the window to the left of the lobby conference room entry door. This would protect against forced entry.

Install a video camera covering the front parking lot and walkway approach and provide office staff with the ability to view this camera.

It is important the door to the left of the lobby leading into the conference room is kept locked at all times. There is an interior conference room door that leads into the teacher lounge and provides access to all interior areas of the school. Due to fire codes, this door cannot lock from the conference room side so anyone entering the conference room would have access to the interior of the school. Office staff was observed to be diligent about keeping this door secure during the assessment process. Office staff have a line of sight visual of this door, but installing a sensor with a light that can be seen from the front office desk to alert staff when the door is open would assist in monitoring this door. If this door is left open, the secure single point of entry is defeated.

There is a temporary video camera in the front lobby that was installed during the COVID response. This is a thermal camera that shows the person entering the school and also takes their temperature. Office staff have the ability to view this camera from the main front reception counter. This is good, but the camera can be moved since it is on a temporary tripod. As mentioned above, installation of a permanent video camera showing the approach to the main door and the doors themselves is recommended. It is also recommended office staff have the ability to view exterior and some interior video cameras through a standalone monitor. Having a view of cameras covering perimeter doors at a minimum would be helpful.

Once a person is allowed entry through the office door from the lobby there is an office reception area with a counter to the left where visitors sign in. The counter is high enough to present a physical barrier. There is an open area to the right of the reception counter that would allow access to the workstations behind the counter. This is not considered an area of vulnerability to be addressed by closing this access off, as by the time a person enters the office it should have been determined they have legitimate business there. The aforementioned intercom and video outside the office lobby door will assist in this monitoring of visitors.



Photo 6-5. Office reception area

Once a visitor signs in at the reception desk, they are issued a plastic visitor badge that is clearly visible to staff when clipped properly to an outer garment. This is excellent, as it allows staff to identify visitors to the school visually from a distance. Installation of a computerized visitor monitoring system at some point is recommended for consideration. An effective system swipes a visitor's I.D., prints out a badge with the photo and name of the visitor, logs them into the campus, and runs them through the sex offender data base. The visitor is then logged out of the campus when they leave. This allows the Principal to know who is on the campus at any given time should an emergency response occur where accountability is required.

There are two offices to the right of the office reception area that are accessible from this reception lobby. The Superintendent office is located to the left and the Psychologist Office is located to the right, (facing the offices). A person in the reception area would have direct access to either of these offices. Staff at the reception counter would be in a reactive mode if a person with seemingly legitimate business in the office suddenly decided to attempt access to either of these offices. In today's culture and climate as it relates to public opinion of schools across the U.S., Superintendents are considered at-risk targets for public backlash for societal issues that have surfaced during the post-COVID 19 response era. For this reason, it is important to limit public access to the Superintendent in order to provide a level of security.

Design changes to the office are not recommended due to limited space in the reception area. There are solid core doors to both the Superintendent and Psychologist offices. It is recommended both these doors remain closed and locked when the offices are occupied. There is a small glass window to the left of the Superintendent's office and a large glass window to the right of the Psychologist's office. Installation of shatterproof laminate and window coverings are recommended for both of these windows. Installation of shatterproof laminate on the exterior front facing windows of both these offices is also recommended to better secure the office area during a lockdown. Both front facing windows already have blinds on them that can be closed during a lockdown.

There is a second reception counter and office door located in the interior lobby just inside and to the right of the second set of entrance doors. The reception counter is low enough where a person can easily jump over it and the window is very large. The office door is also left unlocked for ingress. Although a visitor must pass through the office to sign-in before they would ever reach this area, this is still considered an area of vulnerability for a threat that was already inside the school such as a student with a firearm. There are multiple source reference cases of school shootings throughout the U.S. where students were already inside the school with firearms when attacks occurred. The most recent of these is the Olathe East High School Shooting in Kansas that occurred on March 4, 2022. In that incident, the student entered the office from the interior of the school in possession of a gun and began shooting. This case is source-referenced elsewhere in this report.



Photo 6-6. Interior office reception window



Photo 6-7. Interior office entry door

The office should remain secure from the interior as well as from the exterior of the school, but still needs to be accessible to students and staff in order to conduct normal operations. Most of the student activity observed during this assessment took place at the interior reception counter, (photo above left), and did not require students to enter the office. There are times when students need to enter the office, especially since the nurse's office is located inside the office area. Staff were also observed entering the office through the interior door, (photo above right), so access is needed to the offices during the school day. The following recommendations are offered for consideration in order to better secure the office while keeping it accessible for normal school business:

Installation of plexiglass at the opening on the reception counter is recommended in order to close off the window. This would not need to be a full enclosure. A plexiglass enclosure running the length of the counter with a three-foot height and pass-through openings for paperwork at the bottom would protect against an immediate threat entering the office by jumping over the counter. The reception counter window does have a roll-up metal door that encloses it, but there is a time delay for activation and closure. The plexiglass shield would add another level of security that would delay a possible threat from inside the school while staff closed the roll up door. The new plexiglass shield would also provide office staff protection from airborne pathogens during COVID response or during a normal flu season. As such, this project could possibly be funded through federal COVID relief funding.

Install an electric lock on the office door, (photo above right), in order to keep the door locked at all times. If a student needed access to the office, staff could buzz them in. There is line-of-sight from the office to the interior reception counter, so no intercom or video would be needed. The new lock could be similar to the lock on the exterior lobby door to the office. It could be fitted with a code lock for staff use

when they need access to the office. This door can still be used for egress in the locked position.

There is a secondary office door that exits into the interior corridor near the library. This door should remain locked at all times and only the office door in the interior lobby should be used for office ingress. This door can also be used for egress in the locked position.

The aforementioned recommendations would secure the office area from both the exterior and interior of the school while still allowing for normal school operations to continue unobstructed.

The Principal's office is not located inside of the main office area. It is located to the left of the interior lobby directly across from the interior office reception counter. This office is not optimal for running a lockdown or emergency response, as the Principal is not in direct communication with office staff and does not have the ability to move staff into the office to assist during an emergency response if needed. The Principal also does not have a line-of-site visual of the front of the school from this office, and that can be important during an emergency response. This office is also difficult to secure since it is readily accessible from the interior of the school. The short term recommendation is to have the Principal run emergency operations from the Superintendent's office if it is safe to move there. The longer term recommendation is to move the Principal's office to the current location of the Psychologist's office, and to move the Psychologist's office to the current location of the Principal's office. The door to the Psychologist's office should then remain closed and locked, and window coverings should be installed for privacy during student meetings. This would put all administrative operations into the main office. The Principal and Superintendent would then have direct communications during an emergency incident response.



Photo 6-8. Current interior location of Principal's office

During an emergency incident response that would affect the BSSD campus, operations at the elementary school, the middle school, the high school, and the district offices would be impacted. Since all facilities are located on the same campus, a coordinated response would be needed. In this type of incident, each Principal would be running the emergency response at their schools and the Superintendent would be supporting operations from a centralized location. This is the Incident Command System of Area Command, where multiple Incident Command Posts are supported from a central location. This is especially important for emergency communications, release of information, and resource allocation within the district. Should this type of response be required, using the conference room at the elementary school as the district Emergency Operations Center is recommended. This is a large room with communications capabilities and access to other facilities located in the adjacent staff lounge. Access to restrooms, food, water, and breakout rooms without leaving the secure Emergency Operations Center are necessary. All these can be provided through use of the conference room and adjoining staff lounge. Other offices can be accessed from the staff lounge for use as breakout rooms. The entire area can be secured by locking the door from the staff lounge to the corridor and the conference room door leading from the front lobby.



Photo 6-9. Conference room



Photo 6-10. Adjacent lounge and offices

There are three modes a designated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is kept in. In school districts, it is recommended a designated EOC is a multi-use room, as the frequency of emergency use other than for training purposes is considered low. The three EOC modes are:

- 1) Hot Mode:** The EOC is designated for use specifically for running emergency operations and training for emergency response. It is set up and equipped to go live during an emergency with minimal start up time. It is configured and equipped for emergency operations at all times, to include stations for all five ICS positions.

(Command, Planning, Finance, Operations, and Logistics). Staff access is limited only to EOC operations.

- 2) Warm Mode:** The EOC is housed in a dedicated room, but is also used for other purposes such as training or meetings. Equipment and forms required to run emergency operations are kept securely stored in the room, but not set up for emergency operations. Furniture can be quickly moved for configuration to allow for the five ICS positions to function independently and equipment can be quickly set up for operations. Equipment would include at a minimum:

Access to laptop computers.

Hardwired phone for each ICS position if possible. Pre-installation of phone lines is required for this, but it should be factored into planning that cell phone service might be impacted during an emergency.

All ICS and FEMA forms needed for each position in the EOC.

Video monitoring capabilities of the entire campus from a stand-alone monitor.

Enough tables and chairs to facilitate set up of the five ICS positions.

ICS EOC vest kits with position checklists.

Access to the district Emergency Operations Plans, to include communications plans with emergency responders and staff.

Any other equipment deemed helpful during emergency operation, such as a white board, papers, pens, etc.

- 3) Cold Mode:** The EOC is housed in a dedicated room and also used for other purposes, but no equipment or supplies are kept in the room. All equipment and supplies have to be brought to the room if the EOC is activated.

The recommendation for BSSD is to move toward dedicating the conference room for use as the district EOC and keep it in the Warm Mode. This will require equipping it, identifying EOC staff, and most importantly training staff in the ICS and National Incident Management System (NIMS) concepts related to activation and use of an EOC during response to a multiple school incident. This is a process that takes time, but compliance to these areas of NIMS and ICS are emergency response and management requirements mandated under FEMA guidelines set by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) which is source-referenced elsewhere in this report. If the conference room is to be used as the district EOC, installation of shatterproof laminate on the front facing windows is recommended. An example of when EOC operations would be beneficial to BSSD would be a wildland fire near the campus affecting operations. This a high-threat event with Historical data for the campus, and EOC operations will assist with any future events such as this.

All classrooms are connected by interior corridors, so students do not have to leave the building once school has started other than to participate in supervised P.E. activities.

Classroom doors are solid wood with small glass inserts. Doors require keys to lock them. Some classroom doors are equipped with push bar hardware on the interior instead of handle locks. Recommendations for retrofit of locks and securing doors can be found in Section 6.0- (C) p. 23 of this report. Classroom windows all have blinds that can be closed during lockdowns. Classrooms all have secondary exits in case self-evacuation is needed. Classrooms are considered suitable for use during lockdowns.



Photo 6-11. Typical classroom door



Photo 6-12. Classroom interior

Some classrooms have an adjoining workroom pod area connecting them. The doors to the pod area do not lock as they are considered secondary emergency egress routes. Each pod area has a door exiting into the hallway for use during emergency egress if the primary door is unavailable for use. The area of possible vulnerability related to this setup is if an intruder accesses one of the classrooms, they would then have access to the other classroom through the unlocked doors to the common pod room. There is also another adjoining door connecting the classrooms that remains unlocked. Per fire codes, these doors cannot be locked during normal school operations as they are designated secondary egress. They can be secured during lockdowns when the school becomes a place of confinement due to threats to safety from outside the school or classroom.

In those cases, door security devices can be used to secure these common doors. A door security device can be mounted on the interior side of each pod door, and on both sides of the common door in order to secure them during lockdown. No door security device should be used unless the device can be opened from the outside by emergency responders or school administration. Specifications and recommendations for policy and procedure related to door security devices can be found in Section 6.0-I p.28 of this report. An example of these pods and adjoining doors can be found in room 109 and 113. Until these doors can be secured, keeping all perimeter doors locked on both classrooms and treating the rooms as one large room is recommended to ensure they are secured during a lockdown. Teachers should ensure the hallway door to the pod area is kept locked at all times.



Photo 6-13. Door leading from common area




Photo 6-14. Adjacent door between rooms 109-113

The Public Address (P.A.) system is used as the primary method of emergency announcement. There is a system in place for use of an alarm to announce a lockdown. The recommended best practice for lockdown is a plain talk announcement to avoid confusion of staff during response. An alarm could be confused with a fire alarm and result in evacuation instead of lockdown. A prerecorded message with the Principal's voice announcing the lockdown is an effective method of communicating the response. According to the OES Principle, lockdown drills are not done but drills in lock out are done. This is reportedly at the direction of the Sheriff's Office and could have something to do with the Run-Lock-Fight training they provide. It is essential that lockdown drills are conducted in schools in order to respond to direct threats to school safety from outside the school. This is separate from Active Assailant response. If lockdown drills are not being conducted, this is not in compliance with recommended best practices and guidance from the U.S. Department of Education, (Dept. of Ed. and FEMA Guide source referenced elsewhere in this report). This could be a training that can be clarified through discussion between the school district and the Sheriff's Office, but it should be addressed.

OES uses Motorola handheld radios for staff supervising outdoor activities. This is excellent and ensures staff outside the school have emergency communications capabilities. A recommendation for consideration is to purchase additional radios for use during emergencies. It would be optimal if a radio were installed in each classroom. The radios would only be used during emergencies, but would ensure effective and real time emergency information is shared between staff and the office during emergencies. There are often grant opportunities through the U.S. Department of Justice for funding of emergency communications systems.

There is a policy in place at OES to keep all perimeter doors closed and locked during the school day. All doors were found secured during this assessment. The staff parking lot is

located to the rear, (northwest) side of the school. There is a separate door leading from this lot used as the staff entrance. The door is kept locked and is equipped with a code lock so staff can use it for ingress. This is excellent and provides staff with a secure entry that is in close proximity to their parking. Installation of shatterproof laminate on this door and the adjacent glass panels is recommended. There are also low front facing windows on this school. The height of the windows would make them easy to breach for forced entry. Installation of shatterproof laminate on these windows is also recommended for consideration.



Photo 6-15. Staff parking lot entrance



Photo 6-16. Low front facing classroom windows

The exterior of OES is not considered secure, as there are two areas that currently have open access to the playground and blacktop courts in the center quad of the school. The recommendation here is to fence off both areas of access with 6ft. chain link fencing.

The first open area faces the bus loop on the east side of the school. There is direct open access to the playground areas from here. Running fencing from the corner of the existing chain link fence on the north side of the sports field to the west corner of the building adjacent to the playground would close off this area of access. A pedestrian gate with push bar hardware for emergency egress would be needed at the walkway. Approximately 280 ft. of fencing would be needed for this project.



Photo 6-17. Open playground access



Photo 6-18. Recommended area for fencing

The second open area is at the front southeast walkway leading into the blacktop play area from the parking lots. This gives direct and unmonitored access to student areas and rear doors to the school. Running 6ft chain link fencing from the corner of the existing sports field fence to the building will close off this area. A pedestrian gate with push bar hardware on the interior will be needed at the walkway for emergency egress. Approximately 100ft. of fencing would be needed for this project. There is an area of high ground on the west side of the bus loop adjacent to this proposed section giving a direct view into the playground.



Photo 6-19 Open access to playground



Photo 6-20. Existing fence and location of gate

Anytime there is an opportunity for direct public access to children it is considered a possible area of vulnerability. Children from all K-5 grades were observed in the playground areas during this assessment. The two aforementioned fencing projects would enclose this area and mitigate the vulnerabilities related to public access. Additional exterior video coverage of the playground and access areas is also recommended.

An additional recommendation for perimeter security is at the walkway to the front entrance, (photo below). This area is open and wide enough to allow for vehicle access to the front doors and the walkway areas in front of the entrance. Students and parents were observed congregating in the walkway area outside the office doors before and after school. There was heavy student ingress on this walkway during morning ingress and students were at times congregated in groups as they walked to the doors. The recommendation here is to place bollards at the walkway adjacent to the front driveway. This would prevent a vehicle from being able to drive up the walkway. In addition to the threat of a vehicle being used as a weapon as referenced in Section 5.0 (Q) of this report, there exists a chance of a vehicle accidentally losing control in snow or ice and driving up onto this walkway. The bollards can be removable so they can be taken out for snow removal when needed. They can also be decorative so they do not detract from the aesthetics of the front entrance to the school. The BSSD campus and buildings are very well kept and aesthetically pleasing. This contributes to safe school culture and climate, so any security enhancements should add to that and not detract from it.



Photo 6-21. Front walkway leading from parking lot

There are multiple exterior doors on the perimeter of the school. Numbering the doors on the building and on the campus site map is recommended in order to assist with emergency response. It is easier during a tactical response for emergency responders to identify a door or area of the school by number or letter than it is by direction. This is particularly true when the building is not situated where the main entrance faces a true compass point direction and is not shaped in a square or rectangular configuration. Tactical numbering would have the main front entrance numbered “1” or alpha designated with the letter “A”. The numbering or lettering would progress sequentially in a clockwise direction around the school. Each doorway would be clearly marked for identification. In the photo above, this would be door “1” or door “A”. Either method is acceptable.

Additional marking of interior hallways is also recommended. The same sequential type numbering or lettering system should be used. Signage mounted from the ceiling identifying the hallways is most effective. It is also recommended that each hallway have signage directing to the office, as that is an important point of reference. This information should also be included in site mapping.

Site maps of schools should be supplied to all emergency agencies for inclusion in their response plans. The site maps provided to the assessment team would not be useful during an emergency response. These maps are good for internal use at the schools, but they contain information that is not needed for emergency response so they become cluttered and difficult to read. For example, on the OES site map, the front entrance faces true north and is difficult to locate. True north should always be at the top of a map, but the actual front entrance of the school faces northeast, so the map does not accurately reflect the set-up of the school. Room numbers cannot be seen on the site map. Rooms on the site map are identified by the name of the teacher, but not the room number. For example, the furthest southwest classroom on the map is identified as “Zimmerman.” The room number is not identifiable on the map. This would be of no use during a tactical response if the site map was needed for reference.

The recommendation here is to create a clear map showing room numbers and other pertinent information. Perimeter door numbers and hallway numbers should also be visible on the map. Map orientation should be as is with the factual orientation of the facility. Utility shut offs and other pertinent information should be on the map, as well as evacuation routes and evacuation staging areas. If these site maps already exist, they should be supplied to emergency response agencies. If they need to be created, law enforcement and the fire department should be included to ensure all information pertinent to their agency response is included in the mapping. For example, the fire riser room is located on the northwest side of the school adjacent to the maintenance entrance. This is not visible on the map, but would be useful information for the fire department.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, a multiple agency response to the BSSD campus should be expected during any large incident, so some emergency responders might not be familiar with this campus. Mapping should be written as though the person reading the map has never been to the school before.

Traffic was observed during afternoon pick up at OES. Traffic did not seem problematic and staff were in the parking lot supervising activities. Staff who were supervising the front parking lot crosswalk were wearing reflective vests, which is excellent. One area of possible vulnerability was parents parking on the access road in front of the school that leads to the turnaround. This road is meant for two-way traffic, but parents who were parked along the curb were blocking one of the lanes. This would restrict emergency vehicle traffic if a response were needed. Parents were parking their cars and leaving them unoccupied while they waited by the front door for children to exit. This means they would not be able to move their cars if an immediate emergency occurred. The recommendation here is to paint the existing curb south of the red fire zone in front of the school yellow and designate it a

loading zone. This way parents would still be able to use this space for drop off and pick up, but they would not be able to leave cars unattended. Signage stating this is a loading one and no unattended vehicles are permitted would also assist. There was ample open parking in the front lot for parents wishing to wait for their children at the door. Traffic cleared with ten minutes of dismissal and there was no back up on surface streets. This is excellent.



Photo 6-22. Restricted traffic flow at pick up

Nighttime lighting is good at the school. Exterior lights time out and shut off at 8:00 PM. Once the lighting goes out. The area is dark. This is understandable, as part of the benefits to areas such as this is the view of the night sky and stars. Neighbors complain about excess lighting, so having the lights time out is a good solution. The assessors were advised that there is no Historical data involving after-hours vandalism or theft, so lighting does not appear to be an area of vulnerability. If problems occur, there are options for motion lighting or direct lighting on buildings that will not affect the neighbors.

Priority Recommendations for Ophir Elementary School

Additional signage as referenced in this report. This includes signage on U.S. 191, office signage, numbering of doors, and numbering of hallways.

Enhancements to the front secure single point of entry as referenced in this report.

Security enhancements to the office, to include a plexiglass shield at the interior lobby reception counter, an electric lock on the interior office door, and an intercom system at the main lobby office door.

Shatterproof laminate on certain windows as referenced in this report.

Retrofit of classroom door locks as referenced in this report.

Fencing projects in the playground area as referenced in this report.

Door security enhancement for common classroom work areas and adjoining doors.

Consideration to a computerized visitor monitoring system.

Consider moving the Principal's office inside the main office area to where the Psychologist's office is currently located.

Video recommendations as referenced in this report, to include office staff monitoring of the front entrance, walkways, and perimeter areas with a stand-alone monitor in the office.

Additional exterior video cameras in the playground area.

Consider placing bollards at the front walkway from the parking lot.

Designate the conference room as a district Emergency Operations Center and bring in related training for staff.

Institute a policy for all staff to wear visible school identification.

Institute a policy to keep classroom doors locked per recommendations made in section 5.0-C p.23 of this report.

Increased staff training in school emergency response is a recommendation at the district level and all school sites, and should include Incident Command System training.

6.2 Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School

The Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School are combined in one building located at the south end of the Big Sky School District (BSSD) campus complex. Since this is a combined school, it will be referred to as the middle/high school in this report for purposes of identification. The school has students from grades six through twelve and is under the supervision of one Principal. At the time of this assessment, the enrollment was 340 students with an even split of 170 middle school and 170 high school students.

The main driveway entrance to the school is off of Beaver Creek Rd., which runs westbound off of Gallatin Rd. or U.S. 191. Gallatin Rd. is a two-lane rural highway with a designated right turn lane for southbound traffic and a designated left turn lane for northbound traffic onto Beaver Creek Rd. for entrance into the school's parking lot. Traffic was observed at the school during both morning and afternoon. No noticeable traffic backup was observed at this intersection. As mentioned in the Ophir Elementary School section of this report, the Beaver Creek Rd. driveway entrance to the middle/high school is approximately .3 of a mile south of the Ophir Elementary School entrance on Windy Creek Rd. Additional signage on the west side of Gallatin Rd. just north of the intersection with Beaver Creek Rd. identifying this entrance is recommended. The signage should be visible to both northbound and southbound traffic on Gallatin Rd. This will assist with visitor and emergency responder traffic, which is consistent with the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, (CPTED).

The main front office entrance to the school is not visible upon entering the driveway entrance from Beaver Creek Rd. There is a circular driveway to the left of the main school driveway entrance that appears to lead to the front entrance to the school. The Bough-Dolan Sports Complex entrance and the entrance to the Warren Miller Performing Arts Center are located at the furthest south area of the school off of this circular driveway. Both are clearly identified with signage, but since the sports complex doors are the first ones seen upon entering the campus, this could be confused with the main entrance. This might appear to be the main entrance to the school to a person unfamiliar with the campus, but the doors remain locked during the school day so there is no access to the school through these doors.

As mentioned in Section 5.0 (K) in this report, a response to a Mass Casualty Incident, Active Assailant Incident, or any other large scale emergency will generate a multi-agency response. It should be factored into emergency planning that some emergency responders will not be familiar with this campus. Any confusion with access points or other areas of the campus can cause a time delay that would be detrimental to an effective emergency

response. The following signage recommendations are offered for consideration in order to mitigate this area of possible vulnerability:

Signage at the driveway entrance to the parking lot from Beaver Creek Rd. identifying this as the campus entrance.

Signage just prior to the circular driveway on the left directing visitors to the main office entrance.

Signage on the doors to both the sports complex and the Performing Arts Center stating No Entrance During School Hours and directing visitors to the main office entrance. Both of these entrances are used during some afterhours events, so it is important the signage specifies During School Hours in order to avoid confusion.

Signage designating some visitor parking in spaces directly in front of the main office entrance.



Photo 6-23. Sports complex entrance from circular driveway

The main front entrance to the school is clearly marked with signage that can be seen from the parking lot once a person gets past the circular drive and enters the main parking area. There is ample parking for visitors, staff, and students in front of the main office entrance and in the parking lots located between the middle/high school building and the Ophir Elementary School building. The main front doors consist of a set of double glass doors with adjacent glass panels. There is a code lock on the right door, but it remains unlocked for ingress during the school day. The left door remains locked. Placing signage above this entrance identifying it as the office entrance is recommended so it is not confused with the Library entrance doors located further north of this entrance. The Library will be referenced elsewhere in this report.



Photo 6-24. Signage at front entrance



Photo 6-25. Main front entry doors

Once inside the main doors, there is a small foyer area and a second set of double glass doors preventing access to the main area of the school. These doors remain locked at all times. There is a code lock on the right door to allow for staff access. There is also a buzzer mounted adjacent to the right door so visitors can contact office staff if they need to enter the school. The door is equipped with an electric lock so staff can unlock it from the office. Staff at the office desk do not have a line-of-sight visual of the front door. Since free access to the school is restricted, this is considered a secure single point of entry. This is excellent and consistent with recommended best practices in school safety. The following recommendations are offered for consideration to enhance the security of the existing single point of entry:

Install an electric lock on the right exterior door that can be controlled from the office. This will allow office staff to quickly secure the door from a position of safety if a lockdown occurs, and also allow for the door to be unlocked for emergency responders without staff leaving the office. Currently, staff have to open the door to physically lock or unlock it with a key. This could expose the staff member to a potential threat to safety depending upon the incident.

Install an intercom system with video to the right of the interior entry door. This will allow office staff to visually identify a visitor and talk to them over the intercom prior to allowing them entry into the school. Visual and verbal cues indicating potentially violent behavior of a visitor to the school can be an indicator that would cause office staff to deny entry and notify administration or law enforcement of the problem.

Install shatterproof laminate on the exterior and interior doors, and the glass panels adjacent to them to protect against forced entry.

Install an exterior video camera to cover the front parking lot and the walkway leading to the office.

Install a video camera to monitor the parking lots north of the office and the walkway leading to the Library entrance north of the office.

Give office staff the ability to monitor the new exterior video cameras on a stand-alone monitor that can be seen by office staff at the reception desk.

Upon entering the second set of entrance doors, there is an open lobby area. The door to the office is located immediately to the right of the doors. The office door is solid wood with a handle lock requiring a key to lock it. The door was standing open during this assessment to allow for ingress to the office. There is a reception counter and window on the right of the lobby just past the office door. This reception counter and window is the same design as the reception counter displayed in the photo in the Ophir Elementary School section of this report, (p.36). Since most business with students or visitors can be done from the reception counter, it is recommended the office door remain closed and locked at all times. The door could be equipped with a code lock for staff use. It could also be equipped with an electric lock so office staff can buzz a visitor into the office to sign-in or to wait in the office waiting area for appointments if needed. This would help secure the office from any type of threat already inside the school. The March 4, 2022, school shooting at the Olathe East High School in Kansas which is also referenced on p.34 of this report is an example of a threat already inside the school. In that case, a student who had brought a gun to school entered the school's office and shot a school administrator and the School Resource Officer. Securing the offices is a high priority goal of target hardening the school.²²

The reception counter and window is another area of possible vulnerability needing to be addressed. As with the reception counter window at the elementary school, the recommendation here is to install a plexiglass partition at least three feet high that extends the width of the window and has pass-through spaces on the bottom. This would protect staff from a threat inside the school where there is a possibility of a person with ill intent jumping over the counter to cause harm to office staff before they had a chance to close the roll down door covering the window. A recent source reference for this type of threat is the March 12, 2022, stabbing incident at the New York City Museum of Art.²³ In that case, a visitor to the facility who had legitimate access became involved in a verbal altercation with staff. He then jumped over the reception counter and stabbed two staff members. Although this incident did not occur in a school, it is source-referenced here to show a person already inside of a facility can pose a threat to safety even if they did not appear to be a danger at the time of entry. In this case, the suspect was a 60-year-old male who did not appear to be a threat until the disturbance started. This incident can easily be equated to an angry parent or visitor to a school, so target hardening to address this per-incident is recommended.

There is a small waiting area inside the school's office. As with the elementary school, there are two offices located to the right of this waiting area. Both doors were closed and locked during this assessment, which is excellent in order to prohibit unauthorized access. There is an opening to the right of the office reception counter that gives access to the workstation behind the counter and the hallway leading to interior offices. The Principal's office is

²² Reports from multiple news outlets confirmed by the Johnson County, Kansas Sheriff's Office.

²³ Multiple news sources confirmed by statements from the New York City Police Department.

located at the end of this hallway. Closing this opening off with a gate is recommended. Although a person can jump over a gate, it is still considered a visual barrier that adds an additional layer of security to prevent unauthorized access. The gate can have a code lock or an electric buzzer lock installed for staff entry if needed so as not to be intrusive to staff operations. There is a secondary door at the end of the office hallway that should remain locked from the outside to limit access to the office. All doors can be used for egress in the locked position as they are equipped with code compliant locks.



Photo 6-26. Access point at reception desk



Photo 6-27. Hallway leading to Principal office

Directly behind the interior office reception area is a Nurse's office that can easily be turned into a Safe Room for use during a lockdown without interfering with normal school operations taking place in that office. This room has first aid supplies, to include the bleeding control kit, a bathroom, and communications capabilities. It also has a window with a line-of-sight visual of the main entry doors and the lobby just outside the office. It has a solid core wood door with a glass pane, but the door currently does not have a lock on it. The following recommendations are made for consideration if this office is to be used as a safe room:

- Install a door handle lock that can be locked from the inside without using a key. A push button lock would be optimal.

- Install shatterproof laminate on the office window that overlooks the reception area and the glass pane in the wood door to the Nurse's office.

- Install blinds that can be closed during a lockdown.

- Install a hardwired button that can unlock the interior electric door lock and the exterior electric door lock once that is installed.

- Ensure there are communications in place between this office and the Principal's office.

- Mark this as a designated Safe Room on the school site map and supply that information to local law enforcement.

- Set up video monitoring capabilities for use during lockdowns only. Students inside the Nurse's office for routine use should not have access to the video monitoring, so it should only be used during lockdowns.

- It would be optimal to be able to access the P.A. system from this office if needed during a lockdown.

- Store some drinking water and light snack foods in the office.

- Factor use of this office into all lockdown and emergency drills conducted at this site.

If the Nurse's office is to be designated as a lockdown Safe Room, all office staff and students in the office at the time of the lockdown should be moved inside of it and remain there until the All Clear is given.



Photo 6-28. Nurse's office proposed Safe Room



Photo 6-29. View from Nurse's office window

The Principal's office is a secure area where a lockdown or emergency incident response can be run from. This can be designated as the Incident Command Post for the school during an incident where it can be safely used. This office is large enough to allow room for the Principal's support staff if needed. There are phone and communications systems in place, and the P.A. system can be accessed from this office. The exterior hallway door is solid wood with no glass in it. There is also a secondary rear door that is solid wood. This door enters into a conference room that has hallway access if needed. Both office doors have locks with interior push buttons so they can be locked from the interior without using a key. The front facing windows have a view of the front parking areas at the front of the school. The windows to both the conference room and the front facing windows all have blinds on them that can be closed during a lockdown. Installation of shatterproof window laminate on the front facing windows and the conference room windows is recommended in order to protect against forced entry.



Photo 6-30. Interior of Principal's office



Photo 6-31. Secondary egress door

The Public Address (P.A.) system reportedly works well throughout the school and is used for both daily and emergency announcements. All classrooms have phones in them so there can be communications between classroom teachers and the office during an emergency.

One area of possible vulnerability where school staff expressed concern is the current alarm system used to announce a lockdown. The alarm is reportedly very loud and can hinder emergency response inside of the school. The concept of alarms such as these is twofold. The loud alarm gets the attention of staff, and it also is meant to disorient an intruder. The unintended consequence is it also disorients staff and emergency responders who are inside of the building. In addition to the alarm being distracting to operations inside the school, the only staff member interviewed during this assessment who could quickly turn off the alarm was the I.T. manager.

The recommended best practice for lockdowns is to use an announcement over the P.A. system. This is consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) concepts related to plain talk and clearly identifying a response action. This announcement can be pre-recorded by the Principal using their own voice in a calm situation in order to avoid any type of panic response that might occur during an actual incident. One of the vulnerabilities related to use of alarms or codes during an emergency is they can become confusing to people who are not trained or familiar with them. That is why plain talk is important. The recommendation here is to discontinue the use of the loud and disorientating alarm for lockdowns. If the Principal and staff are more comfortable using some type of alarm notification for lockdown, the alarm used should not be disorientating and all staff should be trained in usage. Any alarm should also time out and turn off after a brief period of time so it is not disorientating. Multiple staff members, including the Principal and administrative staff at a minimum, should be trained in how to turn off the alarm if activated.

There is a hallway activation device mounted on the wall in the interior hallway area outside the cafeteria and Performing Arts Center. This device activates the lockdown alarm and has open access with no locking device. The concept here is it can be easily accessed for a

lockdown alert, but there is a vulnerability to having open access to it. The device can be used for false alarm activation which would then generate an unnecessary response. This could include a law enforcement response to the school. The recommendation is to remove this device. If administrative staff want this device to remain, the recommendation is to secure it in glass as is done with some fire alarms so the glass has to be broken for activation. Security cases for these purposes are available and they have tools mounted on them for use in breaking the glass.



Photo 6-32. Hallway emergency activation button

The Performing Arts Center (PAC) has both interior and exterior access doors. This is a large capacity room that can hold most students from the schools. It is recommended the PAC be designated for use as a Reunification Center post-incident if Student/Family Reunification becomes necessary. Most incidents requiring Reunification are localized to a specific area of a school or campus. Depending upon the incident, the PAC and adjacent areas of the campus might be available for use during a Reunification. The multiple exits and staging area inside of the PAC would facilitate the “Three-Gate” Reunification System. In this system, students are staged in a secure centralized location. Parents check in at one location and then move to a secondary location to pick up the students they are responsible for. This ensures accountability and student safety. The current plan for the elementary school is to move students to a resort that is one-mile north of the school for a secondary reunification site. That would be difficult logistically. It is recommended the Principals of both schools formulate a plan for use of the PAC as the reunification site if safe to do so. Reunification is always easier and safer when it can be done on-site without moving students. If an incident occurred at the middle/high school that required Reunification and the PAC could not be used, the elementary school gym would be a good place to move students if necessary. If these actions are considered for use in BSSD they should be factored into planning and training.



Photo 6-33. Interior Performing Arts Center

A primary area of concern for staff at this school was the Public Library located at the north end of the building. The library has a separate front exterior entrance, but also has an interior set of doors that exits into the northwest hallway of the school in the area of rooms 4 and 6. From there a person would have access to all student areas of the school. The doors leading from the library into the school are a set of double metal doors with glass inserts and push bar hardware mounted on the interior. These are considered a fire exit from the library, so they cannot be locked from the inside.

The area of vulnerability with the library is members of the public inside would have access to the interior of the school during school hours if the library were opened to the public. When the library is open to the public, the main entry doors to it are left unlocked. This defeats the secure single point of access to the school as it provides a secondary unmonitored access to the interior of the schools. At the time of this assessment the library was open to the public 2-hours a day three days per week. District administration was considering keeping the library closed to the public during school hours and only open to the public after school hours. The assessors agree with that decision in order to limit any vulnerabilities related to public access to student areas. The library is monitored by non-district staff when used by the public, so after hours entry into the school is not a concern. There are restrooms inside the library and the doors are posted No Entry.



Photo 6-34. Exterior library entrance doors



Photo 6-35. Interior doors leading to school

Another area of staff concern was the set of double doors leading from the gym storage room to the field areas on the west side of the school. Students reportedly sometimes use these doors to exit to the fields and then re-enter the school. The doors are sometimes left ajar or propped open for ingress. This is an area of vulnerability for unmonitored and unauthorized access that would bypass the secure single point of entry. The recommendation here is to post signage on the doors that they are to remain closed and locked. Installation of a video camera on the interior side of these doors would also assist in monitoring them. If the P.E. coach wishes to use these doors for student egress and ingress, a code lock can be installed at the door to facilitate this use.



Photo 6-36. Exterior view of gym storage room doors




Photo 6-37. Interior view for proposed camera

As with the elementary school, classroom doors at the middle/high school are solid wood with small glass inserts. Doors with handle locks require keys to lock them from the interior. Doors with push bars also require keys to lock them. The recommendation here is the same

as at the elementary school. The short term recommendation is to keep classroom doors locked at all times and keep them propped open using either magnets or devices designed for this purpose. This will allow the doors to be used for egress in the locked position while enabling staff to lock them from the interior without using keys. Shatterproof laminate and window coverings for the glass panes in the doors is also recommended.



Photo 6-38. Typical classroom door

Classrooms at this school are considered good for use in lockdowns. Once the doors are locked and the blinds are closed, they are secure. Secondary exits are available for use if self-evacuation is needed. If a lockdown Safe Room were needed in order to move students and staff away from windows. The doors are solid wood with no windows and they can be locked from the inside without using keys. The existing staff lounge would work well. There is a bathroom and running water inside as well as a refrigerator for food. There are also communications and a secondary exit. He secondary exit is currently blocked. Clearing this exit is recommended even if the room is not designated a Safe Room. Blocking of the exit could be considered a code violation.



Photo 6-39. Staff lounge**Photo 6-40. Blocked secondary exit**

Afterhours use of the school's gym by members of the public was also a stated staff concern. Certain members of the community can use the gym with permission. They are given an access code that works only with the exterior perimeter doors leading to the gym. The concern is that once inside, there is access to the entire school. Even though no students are on scene, unlimited access could still be considered an area of possible vulnerability. The recommendation here is to close and lock the hallway fire doors outside the gym door lobby. These doors lock from the gym side and can be opened from the hallway side with a key. This would limit access to just the gym and restroom facility areas.

**Photo 6-41. Gym doors and west hallway access****Photo 6-42. North hallway access from gym lobby**

As with the elementary school, numbering of exterior perimeter doors and labeling of interior hallways is recommended in order to better guide both visitors and emergency responders. The site map for the middle/high school is also not conducive for use by emergency responders. Review of the existing site mapping with emergency response agencies and creating new maps if needed is recommended.

There is a stand-alone building in the center of the circular driveway outside of the gym entrance. Fire pump control systems are installed in the lower floor of this two-story building. Maintenance equipment and supplies are located on the upper floor. This is where the two underground propane tanks are located. The natural gas equipment and shut off valves are located above ground outside of this building. The building was closed and locked during this assessment. The assessors were advised that multiple persons in the school administration know where gas shut off valves are located and how to turn them off in case of emergency. Inclusion of this facility and related emergency shut offs on site mapping is recommended.



Photo 6-43. Stand-alone maintenance building



Photo 6-44. Gas equipment and shutoff

An emergency communications plan between the elementary and the middle/high school is needed. An emergency incident in the area of the campus will affect both schools. The I.T. department is located in the middle/high school and the manager was consulted on this. There exists the possibility of creating a chat room using existing technology that all staff at both schools can log into during an emergency if safe to do so. This is an excellent communications option that can be explored at the schools. This would be an effective method of information sharing that would address emergency communications and accountability at no cost to the district. The chat room could also be used for non-emergency purposes so staff can remain trained in usage.

The Science Lab located in room 19 was checked during this assessment. Chemicals are stored in the lab's storage room. Chemicals and flammables were stored in the proper containers. Non-flammable and non-corrosive chemicals were also stored properly. The MSDS information regarding chemicals is maintained in a computer based program by the science teacher. This is excellent practice.



Photo 6-45. Flammable and corrosive storage



Photo 6-46. Chemical storage

This site uses Motorola handheld radios to assist in communications. There is one radio stored in the office and some site administration also have radios, but additional handheld radios are recommended. Every staff member supervising outdoor activities should have a radio for use in emergency communications. Having one radio in each classroom for use in emergencies is optimal, but there is a cost associated with that. As mentioned in the elementary school section of this report, there is possible grant funding available for purchase of emergency communications equipment.

The middle/high school does have perimeter fencing, but there are some open areas to the rear of the school in the area of the football field. All perimeter doors are kept locked, so that lessens vulnerabilities related to fencing. New fencing will be installed around the perimeter of the campus after completion of the new construction project adjacent to the middle/high school facility. New fencing should be designed to enhance the secure perimeter of the campus. A post-completion assessment is recommended.

As with the elementary school, removable decorative bollards are recommended at the parking lot walkways to the main front entrance and the walkway leading to the gym entrance. Students congregate in both these areas. This will protect against the possibility of a vehicle attack or a vehicle entering these areas by accident.

The school's designated evacuation staging area is in the front parking lot. This is understandable due to the fact the field areas inside the school fencing are covered in snow during the winter so they are inaccessible. Having the evacuation area in the parking lots exposes students to vehicle traffic and contact with members of the general public. The recommendation here is to use the fenced field area as the primary evacuation staging area when weather conditions permit. The parking lots can then be used as secondary evacuation staging areas when the fields are inaccessible due to snow or other weather related conditions. If the parking lots are used for the evacuation staging areas, it is recommended staff wearing reflective vests monitor student and vehicle traffic. Staff in the

staging areas should also be equipped with handheld radios in order to remain in contact with the Principal or designee in charge of the evacuation operations.

Priority Recommendations for Ophir M.S. and Lone Peak H.S.

Signage as recommended in this report.

Numbering of exterior doors and labeling of hallways.

Address issues with the lockdown alarm referenced in this report. This includes removing or securing the lockdown button in the PAC hallway.

Retrofit of classroom door locks and installation of shatterproof laminate on glass panes in classroom doors.

Recommendations to enhance the secure single point of entry, to include electric lock on exterior door, video intercom system on the interior entry door. And shatterproof laminate on glass.

Security enhancements to the office, to include plexiglass at the reception counter and electric lock on the office door.

Video coverage of the front parking lot and walkway to the office.

Video monitoring capabilities for office staff.

Shatterproof laminates on the Principal's office.

Creation of lockdown Safe Rooms in the Nurse's office and staff lounge as referenced in this report.

Creation of new site mapping for use by emergency responders.

Consider installation of removable bollards on walkways outside the main office and gym to prohibit vehicle access.

Limit after hours public access near gym doors as referenced in this report.

Limit public access to the library during school hours.

Continued staff training in school emergency response is a recommendation at the district level and all school sites, and should include Incident Command System training.

6.3 Transportation

Buses are currently stored in the bus loop to the rear of the Ophir Elementary School. Buses were found secure during this assessment and no problems were noted. The assessors were advised the district is in the process of building a new transportation facility about 1.5 miles from the elementary school and the buses will then be moved there. New policies and procedures for bus routes will be put into place at that time. An additional assessment of the transportation facility is recommended upon completion.

Buses have radios installed in them and the radio system is monitored when buses are in use. There is some problem with cellular service in the area with coverage provided by Verizon. Communications systems on the buses should be checked periodically and any problems should be addressed.

7.0 SUMMARY

The recommendations offered in this report to address hazards and vulnerabilities are based on Montana Codes, Regulations, recommended best practices in school safety throughout the U.S. and Canada. These include securing the perimeter and moving to a secure single point of entry during the school day at each school site if possible. The planning and training recommendations addressed in this report should be geared specifically to BSSD schools and staff. This training and planning should include addressing areas of vulnerability included in this report. The result of the new planning and training programs will be reduced risk in all identified areas of vulnerability. It is recommended that community partners from law enforcement and fire service agencies are invited to participate in any training if possible.

Continued assessment of hazards and vulnerabilities affecting BSSD facilities is recommended. Assessments performed by independent Subject Matter Experts in school safety and related recommendations can be used for budget request justification for grants, bonds, or general funding in school districts. As with any school emergency management program, a continuity of operations training plan for sustainability of effective emergency operations should be developed.

Some recommendations contained in this report will require planning, construction or remodel, and possible funding source identification. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, recommendations requiring funding are listed as longer term projects due to the realistic time frame possibly needed to identify those funding sources. The assessment team involved in this project is available to assist in project planning consultation as part of project support should the administration of BSSD be interested. Pre-incident planning, training, and target hardening is in keeping with recommended best practices in school safety, and the BSSD administration should be commended for taking on this proactive project.

Yearly follow-up assessments to track progress of the BSSD Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment program, track and document training, and identify new short and long term goals is recommended. This will enhance the continuity of operations portion of the BSSD Emergency Management Program and is the recommended best practice.

The assessment team remains available to assist BSSD upon request with staff training, EOP updates, follow-up Hazard and Vulnerability Assessments, pre-construction consultation, advisory assistance to the district development committee, or any other assistance with the BSSD emergency management program.

8.0 SOURCE REFERENCES

The following are summaries of emergency crisis related State of Montana laws and codes that pertain to schools. Federal codes are also referenced here. These codes are used for source reference for all assessments and recommendations referred to throughout this HVA report. Refer to the entire citation for specific requirements.

Montana Code Annotated

The Montana Code Annotated (MCA) is a compilation of the State of Montana Constitution and all state laws, also called statutes. The MCA is updated after each legislative session. Non-compliance to or violations of the MCA could result in criminal penalties. Multiple MCA statutes related to school safety were used as reference when creating this report in order to ensure statutory compliance with recommendations contained in the report. Please see the Montana Safety and Security Guidelines School Safety Rubric for individual MCA statutory reference.

Administrative Rules of Montana

The Montana Secretary of State's Administrative Rules Services publishes administrative rules promulgated by state agencies. The Administrative Rules of Montana (ARM) pertinent to school safety were used as reference when creating this report and related recommendations. These rules were created by the Montana Office of Public Instruction. Non-compliance can result in civil sanctions, or in cases of gross negligence, possible criminal sanctions.

Montana Office of Public Instruction Safety and Security Guideline Safety Rubric

This document was created by the Montana Office of Public Instruction and distributed by the Montana Secretary of State Office. The purpose of this document is to give school districts a quick-reference guide that can be used for compliance to all MCA and ARM statutes, as well as recommended best practices in school safety. The guide lists statutory compliance as "Must Have" items and recommended best practices as "Should Have" items. Compliance to statutes as well as recommended best practices in school safety is recommended.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) National Incident Management System

On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System and a National Response Framework. HSPD-5 requires Federal departments and agencies to make the adoption of NIMS by state and local

organizations a condition for Federal preparedness assistance grants, contracts, and other activities by July 1, 2005. HSPD-5 states in part:

“All K-12 schools receiving Federal preparedness monies through the U.S. Department of Education, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and/or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services are required to support the implementation of NIMS. Award recipients of the Department of Education’s Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) funding are required to implement, in conjunction with community partners, identified NIMS compliance activities.”

The NIMS components schools need to implement are:

Command and Management; the use of the Incident Command System (ICS), Multi-Agency Coordination Systems (MACS), and Public Information Systems. Preparedness actions to establish and sustain prescribed levels of capability necessary to execute a full range of incident management operations. Resource Management to coordinate the application of tools, processes and systems which provide incident managers with timely and appropriate resources during an incident. Resources include personnel, equipment, and supplies. Communication and information Management; the means to develop a common operating picture for communications and system interoperability.

The National Incident Management System places requirements for standardized training in courses on NIMS and ICS. School staff should be trained according to their responsibilities during an emergency or disaster. Staff members who may be considered emergency personnel should complete training that incorporates the principles of ICS100, ICS200, and IS700 courses at a minimum.

Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD8)

PPD8 is a National Preparedness document that describes the Nation’s approach to preparing for threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk. PPD8 states National preparedness is the shared responsibility of our whole community, including individuals, private and non-profit sectors, faith based organizations, and Federal, state, and local governments. The requirements for Emergency Operations Plans to address preventing, protecting, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from emergency and disaster incidents are covered in PPD8.

Homeland Security Act of 2002

This act defines school districts as “Local Agencies” which requires schools in the district to be compliant with HSPD-5 and PPD8. It also requires school districts to have emergency operations plans per the U.S. Government Accountability Office.

The U.S. Dept. of Ed and FEMA Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans

This guide was updated in March of 2013 and replaces all existing school emergency operations planning guides. The FEMA guide lists criteria for school emergency operations plans to be considered in compliance with PPD8. The guide also addresses the creation and usage of school emergency planning committees. Hazard and Vulnerability Assessments for infrastructure target hardening are also recommended best practices referenced in the FEMA Guide.

U.S. Dept. of Ed Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS)

The REMS Technical Assistance (T/A) program provides guidelines based on recommended best practices for use in assessing hazards and vulnerabilities of infrastructure target hardening of schools.

The Sandy Hook Commission Final Report

The After Action Report (AAR) completed by the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission and released in February of 2015 after the debriefing of and the investigation into the Sandy Hook school killings on December 14, 2012.

The Marjory Stoneman Douglas Commission Report

The After Action Report (AAR) completed by the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission and released in December of 2018 after the debriefing of and the investigation into the Stoneman Douglas school killings on February 14, 2017.

The Robert T. Stafford Act (42 USC 5122-5200)

This federal act calls for communities to prepare Hazard Mitigation Plans (HMP) in order to identify potential risks and mitigate the detrimental effects they may have on a particular community. School districts are considered “special districts,” and as such have the same requirements to develop an HMP in order to identify risks and vulnerabilities affecting the school community.

Family Education Rights to Privacy Act (FERPA)

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 99 as it applies to vital records storage and release of student information.

Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) 42USC

Codes as they relate to individualized emergency plans and procedures for persons with disabilities.

The State of Montana Enhanced Hazard Mitigation Plan

The official statement of statewide hazard mitigation goals, strategies, and priorities for Montana.

The Gallatin County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan

Referred to as the 2018 HMP, this document assesses risks posed by natural and human-caused hazards and develops mitigation strategies for reducing those risks in Gallatin County.

Additional References Used In Creation Of This Report:

FBI and DHS Active Shooter Guides and recommended best practices.
The U.S. DOJ and FBI study of “Pre-Attach Behaviors of Active Shooters,” June 2018.
U.S. Secret Service report on “Mass Attacks in Public Spaces,” 2019.
U.S. Secret Service report “Analysis of Targeted School Violence,” 2019.
U.S. Secret Service report “Averting Targeted School Violence,” 2021.
FEMA HAZUS reports for Montana and Gallatin County.
The American Clearing House For Educational Facilities.
The U.S. Department of Education Readiness and Emergency Management For Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Program.
“SCHOOL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, A Practical Approach To Implementation,”
Jeff Kaye, Polimedia Publications, July 1, 2013.

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**Big Sky School District
School Marshal
Job Description**

Reports To:
Superintendent

Summary of Assignment:

The essential function of the position within the organization is to provide coordination and leadership in the development, implementation and evaluation of a variety of services for the Big Sky School District, with an emphasis on ensuring the safety and security of the students and staff of the District. The position is responsible for directing assigned programs and services, ensuring District compliance with all applicable state and federal laws, and performing related work as assigned. The position develops and implements programs within organizational policies; reports major activities to District administrators through conferences, meetings and reports.

Required Position Qualifications

- Have a permit to carry a concealed weapon pursuant to MCA 45-8-321
- Meet the qualifications required for a peace officer pursuant to MCA 7-32-303
- Be an active or retired peace officer as defined in 46-1-202.
- Successful completion of all hiring standards including a name and fingerprint based background check consistent with Board Policies 5120 and 5122.

Preferred Position Qualifications:

- Previous experience in security or law enforcement.
- Previous experience in emergency preparedness and management
- Experience working with administrative responsibilities including policy management
- Ability and experience in working as part of a team.
- Licensed to carry a firearm in the state of Montana.

Desired Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes:

- Bachelor's degree or equivalent experience, training or certificate
- Ensure that all activities conform to District guidelines
- Communicate effectively with members of the school District and community
- React to change productively and handle other tasks as assigned
- Appropriately operate all equipment as required
- Support the philosophy and mission of the Big Sky School District
- Possess a valid Montana driver's license

Responsibilities:

- Coordinates a comprehensive security/school safety program, policies and procedures by studying organization operations and schedules; establishing internal controls; conducting inspections as appropriate; reporting potential hazards to appropriate departments; creating and updating BSSD School Board policies and Standard Operating Procedures, safety and security manuals

- Coordinates school safety compliance with federal, state and local regulations by studying existing and new requirements and overseeing and enforcing school-wide adherence to requirements.
- Coordinates safety planning and practice to support academic processes of each school by creatively implementing best practices in safety, security and emergency preparedness with proper adaptation to the environment, creativity and innovation so the process of education can be enhanced rather than impeded by safety efforts.
- Conducts and coordinates safety, security and emergency preparedness training by developing, scheduling and/or facilitating training for staff, students and public safety officials relating to school safety, security and emergency preparedness.
- Coordinates SAVE Act (sexual assault & violence education) planning and reporting
- Secures facilities, equipment, students and personnel by working in conjunction with the appropriate departments in recommending safety and security equipment purchases and upgrades; maintaining records of fire and other emergency drills and conducting drills when appropriate.
- Serves as a liaison with local law enforcement agencies. Working directly with local law enforcement agencies during critical incident situations and follow-up.
- Works with appropriate departments to meet operational security needs within budget; works with Finance, Facilities and Maintenance departments for capital improvements as needed; schedules expenditures.
- Assists in the development and implementation of security plans for special events.
- Advises and assists site-based administrators in matters involving criminal activities on school campus.
- Coordinates with site-based administrators, Maintenance and Facilities Departments to address and correct safety/security issues on school campus.
- Prepares memos, reports, drawings, etc. related to safety and traffic issues on school campus.
- Receives all reports of school crime from site-based administrators and maintains statistics regarding this information.
- Communicates with media on involving school safety.
- Communicates with other schools on matters related to school safety.
- Security Director participates in annual trainings to stay current on laws, policies and procedures regarding school safety.
- Attends school board meetings as necessary.
- Performs other related work as required.
- Complete other duties as assigned by the Principal and/or the Superintendent

Physical Demands:

The physical requirements indicated below are examples of the physical aspects that this position must perform in carrying out essential job functions:

- Persons performing service in this position will exert up to 75 pounds of force frequently to lift up to 50 pounds, carry push, pull, or other wise move objects
- This type of work involves walking and standing for extended period of time

- Perceiving the nature of sound, near and far vision, depth perception, providing oral and written information, the manual dexterity to move related objects, and the skills necessary to handle and work with various material and objects are important aspects of this job.

Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable a person with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job.

Terms of Employment:

School year working days are set by the Board of Trustees. Salary, benefits and other working conditions as negotiated prior to employment with the District.

Evaluation:

Performance of said duties will be evaluated annually in accordance with provisions of the Board's Policy on Evaluation of Non-Administrative employees, Board Policy 5222.

I have read and understand the responsibilities and qualifications of this job description.

School Safety and Security manager

Date

Superintendent

Date

6.16.15

1 _____ **School District**

2
3 **THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES**

1715

4
5 School Marshal

6
7 In accordance with Section 20-7-1336(3), MCA, the Board of Trustees adopts this school
8 marshal policy.

9
10 Definitions

11
12 The Board may appoint an independent contractor or a school district employee to be certified as
13 school marshal.

14
15 “School marshal” means a person who is appointed by the board of trustees and employed or
16 retained by a school district to protect the health and safety of persons and to maintain order on
17 public school property. A school marshal may act only as necessary to prevent or stop the
18 commission of an offense that threatens serious bodily injury or death of persons on public
19 school property. If a district employee is appointed to serve as school marshal, the employee
20 must be a full-time employee of the district. A school marshal may be employed full-time as a
21 school marshal or retained or employed on a full-time or part-time basis and may have other
22 assigned duties in the discretion of the board of trustees.

23
24 "Public school building" or "public school property" means public land, fixtures, buildings, or
25 other property owned or occupied by an institution for the teaching of minor children that is
26 established and maintained under the laws of the state of Montana at public expense; and
27 includes school playgrounds, school steps, parking lots, administration buildings, athletic
28 facilities, gymnasiums, locker rooms, and school buses.

29
30 A “weapon” as defined in Section 45-8-361(5)(b), MCA, means any type of firearm and
31 possess/carry” means the state of having, controlling and keeping on one’s person and “store”
32 means to securely put away for future access in a manner that will prevent unauthorized use.

33
34 The term “firearm” means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to
35 or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or
36 receiver of any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive
37 device pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 921(4). Such term does not include an antique firearm pursuant to
38 18 U.S.C. 921(16).

39
40 Eligibility

41
42 To be eligible to serve as a school marshal, the independent contractor or school district
43 employee must hold the qualifications that include but are not limited to:

- (a) permit to carry a concealed weapon pursuant to Section 45-8-321, MCA;
- (b) meet the qualifications required for peace officers pursuant to Section 7-32-303, MCA;
- (c) be an active or retired peace officer as defined in Section 46-1-202, MCA, or, if an applicant for a school marshal position is an active or retired public safety officer from another state, the applicant must be certified by the Montana public safety officer standards and training council as set forth in Section 2-15-2029, MCA; and
- (d) successful completion of all hiring standards including a name and fingerprint based background check consistent with Policies 5120 and 5122.

The Board may set additional qualifications when adopting the school marshal position description, contract, or District policy. The school marshal shall be subject to all District policies as stated in Policy 5121.

The Board shall submit the school marshal's name, date of birth, and address of the school marshal's place of employment to the Montana public safety officer standards and training council and all applicable law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction and emergency response authority in the school district, including:

- (a) the chief law enforcement officer of the local municipal law enforcement agency, if the school district is located within a municipality;
- (b) the sheriff of a county where a school district is located; and
- (c) in the case of a district located within the boundaries of a reservation, the chief tribal law enforcement officer and area federal law enforcement authorities.

A retained, hired, or appointed individual's status as a school marshal in the District ends if:

- (a) the individual's license to carry a concealed weapon is suspended or revoked;
- (b) the school marshal is an employee of the school district and the employee's employment with the school district ends; or
- (c) the board of trustees sends written notice to the individual that the individual's services as a school marshal are no longer required.

The Board shall review the status of a retained, hired, or appointed school marshal's certifications, training, and professional development on an annual basis. At the discretion of the Board, a school marshal shall be required to complete additional professional development and training to learn and implement techniques necessary to meet the requirements of the school marshal position in coordination with local first responders and District staff.

Firearm Possession, Carrying, and Storage on District Property

~~The Board authorizes the individual or individuals retained, hired, or appointed to serve as school marshal under this policy to possess, carry, or store a weapon, including a firearm as defined in this policy, in or on school buildings or property, in accordance with Section 45-8-361(3), MCA~~

As part of the District safety and emergency plan and protocols adopted in accordance with Policy 8301, the Board has set forth procedures specifying the types of firearms, ammunition, and other related equipment that a school marshal is authorized to possess, carry, and store on public school property. These procedures will be reviewed and approved or adjusted annually at the regularly scheduled June meeting of BSSD Board of trustees. When developing procedures for storage of the firearm, the District shall consider the guidance available from 18 USC 921(a)(34). These procedures are specifically exempt from public disclosure in accordance with Policy 4340 and Section 2-6-1003(2), MCA, to avoid jeopardizing the safety of students, staff, and the public in school building or on district property.

The Board authorizes the District administrator to adopt and implement procedures regarding the possession, carrying, and storage of a firearm by a school marshal based on the amount of time the school marshal has regular, direct contact with students in accordance with the requirements of Policy 1310 and compliant with District insurance policies as stated in Policy 8300 and Policy 8320.

Cross Reference:	Policy 4332	Conduct on School Property
	Policy 4340	Public Access to Records
	Policy 5120	Hiring Process and Criteria
	Policy 5121	Applicability of Personnel Policies
	Policy 5122	Fingerprints and Criminal Background Investigation
	Policy 5223	Personal Conduct
	Policy 8300	Risk Management
	Policy 8301	District Safety
	Policy 8320	Property Damage

Legal Reference:	§ 20-7-1335-1338, MCA	School Marshal Program
	§ 20-6-501, MCA	Definition of various schools
	§ 20-6-501, MCA	Definition of various schools
	§ 45-8-351 (2), MCA	Restriction on local government regulation of firearms
	§ 45-8-361 (3)(b), MCA	Possession or allowing possession of a weapon in school building
	§ 45-8-361 (5)(b), MCA	Definitions
	§ 2-6-1003, MCA	Access to Public Information
	Article X, section 8	Montana Constitution
	18 U.S.C. § 921-922	Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990

Policy History:

Adopted on:

Reviewed on:

Revised on:

Jolene Romney
PO Box 160344
Big Sky, MT 59716
4069953930
joleneolive@hotmail.com

February 12, 2023

Big Sky School District
45465 Gallatin Rd
Gallatin Gateway, MT 59730

Dear Big Sky School District 72 School Board;

As a long time parent of Big Sky School District 72, I have recently learned of the recruitment and hiring of a full-time, potentially armed School Marshall for our school district. As a result, I have taken the time to read through the school board minutes and packets posted over the past year pertaining to this subject including the seventy page BSSD Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment done in March of 2022. Further, I have met with and discussed the issue with 2 school board members to try to understand the need for this level of security at our school. From what I could ascertain, as a concerned parent that is not privy to all the details of school incidents, there was nothing in particular to raise the threat level in our community. And while every parent in the country is terrified by the mass casualties that have occurred at US schools, I do not think the answer to the problem is have an employee with a gun in our schools.

Statistically it is much more likely as a school community that we will need to deal with an emergency such as an earthquake, wildfire, or tractor trailer emergency on Highway 191 that prevents us from being able safely evacuate our children than an active shooter situation. While I agree with the idea of preparedness and having an Emergency Operations Plan, trainings that help staff to know how to act in the case of an emergency, and reasonable school building safety physical upgrades, I am not in favor of having an armed full time staff member at the school. I believe this sends the message to young people that we need to deal with the proliferation of guns by having more guns. I'm also concerned that we are adding a gun onto our school grounds that would not otherwise be present.

Since it seems I am late to the discussion about the hiring of a School Marshall, I'd like to voice my concerns regarding the role this person will have in our school district on a day to day basis. I would hope that this person has specific job description deliverables that relate to the extensive Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment. This could include the drafting of an Emergency Operations Plan (together with local law enforcement, fire

department and hospitals), developing and organizing trainings for teachers and staff, and providing project management for physical school upgrades. My understanding is that we do not currently have an Emergency Operations Plan as a school district but that we must have one to potentially secure state funding for a School Resource Officer in the future. In addition it seems obvious that the School Marshall should also have specific training on *how* to work in this role in schools and what their job is with regards to discipline on school grounds and mental health counseling (the Assessment mentions a training through The National Association of School Resource Officers). Of course, none of these deliverables require that the person be armed with a gun.

Lastly, I am concerned about the sustainability of this position. I have been told this position will not be funded through the General Fund that the school district uses to fund teacher and staff salaries but rather by private donations. I'm concerned about the pay scale of this person as compared to our hard working teachers and staff. Is this a position that will only be available upon the whim of private donors? The cost of security upgrades to the school will be substantial, will there be private funds for this too?

This is a difficult topic to discuss but an important conversation school communities are having around the country. Although I have discussed this topic with several other parents, many didn't know this hire was happening at our school district. They are as concerned as I am about having an armed school employee on campus. I'm hoping the school board will chose to engage the school community in a meaningful way as they move forward with this new hire. It is important for the entire community to be engaged in a transparent discussion about how to move forward with regards to safety and security at BSSD.

Sincerely yours,

Jolene Romney



Dustin Shipman <dshipman@bssd72.org>

Support BSSD72 Resource Officer

1 message

Dan Potocki <dan@potocki.co>
To: Dustin Shipman <dshipman@bssd72.org>
Cc: "Kimberly Ann (Kennedy) Potocki" <potocki.mailbox@gmail.com>

Thu, Feb 9, 2023 at 11:49 AM

Dr. Shipman,

Kimberly and I have three (of our four children) in OPHIR: Cora in Kindergarten (Ash), Jackson in 5th Grade (Ballard), and McKenna in 7th. Brennan, who is at Morningstar, will be in OPHIR in two years, so long-term solutions are very important for us as well as other families.

My father was a police officer for 30 years in New York, and I was always taught and always experienced that our police force is a force for good in our schools, with our businesses, of course our family residences, and in the broader community. Kim and I fully support having a Resource Officer on campus to protect our children, teachers, families, and visitors.

Please do not hesitate to reach out to us with any questions, or do not hesitate to use our statement as a form of public comment.

Cheers.

.
Dan Potocki
Potocki Co.

s: @danpotocki
c: 914.512.4479

Play Up A Level

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: All information provided is deemed reliable but is not guaranteed and should be independently verified. Information and depictions are subject to errors, omissions, prior sales, price changes or withdrawal without notice. No governmental agency has judged the merits or value, if any, of the information contained in this email or any real estate described or depicted herein. This material shall not constitute an offer to sell in any state or other jurisdiction where prior registration is required or where such an offer would be prohibited, and this shall not constitute a solicitation if you are working with another real estate agent. Nothing herein shall be construed as legal, tax, accounting, or other professional advice.



Dustin Shipman <dshipman@bssd72.org>

School marshal

1 message

jennie cohen <jennielcohen@gmail.com>
To: Dustin Shipman <dshipman@bssd72.org>

Wed, Feb 8, 2023 at 2:47 PM

Hi Dr. Shipman,

I hear the school is hiring a School Marshal. Thank you for continuing to make the safety of our students and the school staff a priority. It is reassuring knowing that a qualified, well trained, prepared individual will be present at the school in the unlikely event that we should need him. While we would like to hope that nothing would ever happen at our school, we would be naive to think our school is immune from tragedy. My husband and I have had many conversations with you over the past 7 years about the safety measures (or lack thereof) in place. This is a long overdue step in creating a safer environment for our students and staff.

Thank you again,

Jennie



SERVICES AGREEMENT

OVERVIEW

Big Sky School District (“**Client**”) wishes to partner with Global Online Academy, a Washington state not for profit corporation (“**Contractor**”), to offer a student program with a wide array of interest-based courses and learning pathways that engage students in rigorous, competency-based learning that builds skills that matter in school and life. Partnership will also offer professional development experiences that empower teachers and school leaders to shift their practice to support students’ competency-based learning and improve student learning outcomes.

This Services Agreement (“**Agreement**”) is entered into as of February 14, 2023 by and between Client and Contractor and continues until June 30, 2024 and will be renewed upon mutual agreement.

PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT

1. To promote and facilitate teacher and student enrollment and success in services provided by Contractor outlined in Exhibit A
2. To learn from each other during this pilot partnership, with the hope of extending partnership beyond the initial terms

RECITALS

WHEREAS Client wishes to engage Contractor to provide certain educational services, and Contractor agrees to provide such services consistent with both parties’ nonprofit and tax exempt educational mission,

NOW, THEREFORE, Contractor and Client agree as follows:

SERVICES

Contractor agrees to provide the services as set forth in Exhibit A (the “Services”).

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES

It is the express intention of the parties that Contractor (including its principals and employees) shall be an independent contractor and not an employee of Client. Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as creating or establishing an employment relationship, partnership, agency or joint venture between Client and Contractor.

As an independent contractor, Contractor has sole discretion and ultimate control over the time, manner and methods necessary to perform the Services covered by this Agreement.

Contractor shall perform Services under this Agreement at such locations selected by Contractor, except for onsite services which shall be conducted at the Client's location.

Contractor shall supply all programs, tools and equipment necessary for Contractor's employees to perform the Services covered by this Agreement, and Contractor shall be solely responsible for the cost, insurance and maintenance of same. The Client shall supply the tools and equipment (including computers, internet, and phone services) for its employees to receive the training, either online or in person. The Client shall also provide a physical location for any in-person trainings.

Each party shall maintain the confidentiality of all confidential and proprietary information disclosed by the other party.

FEES

Contractor shall be paid the fees set forth in Exhibit A (attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference) and on the dates set forth in Exhibit A, and shall be reimbursed for all travel expenses incurred in the performance of the Services. Client shall pay all invoices within 30 days of receipt. All travel expense reimbursements will be invoiced separately and paid within 30 days of receipt.

PAYMENT OF TAXES AND WITHHOLDINGS

Contractor is solely responsible for all taxes and withholdings, including but not limited to all payroll, federal income taxes, state income taxes, state disability insurance, and unemployment insurance compensation contributions and other similar statutory obligations with respect to the Services performed under this Agreement.

TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement may be terminated by either party for any reason by giving not less than thirty (30) days advance written notice. Upon termination of this Agreement, Contractor shall be entitled to payment for Services performed prior to the termination date. Thereafter, Client shall owe Contractor no further amounts or obligations.

OWNERSHIP

(a) As between Client and Contractor, Client owns all right, title, and interest in and to all work product created by educators from Client's school/organization in connection with this Agreement.

(b) Contractor retains and owns all right, title and interest in and to all of Contractor's content, deliverables, frameworks, coursework, protocols, plans, curriculum materials, exercises, lessons, resources, processes, and know-how (collectively, the "Contractor Materials"). Contractor grants to Client a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable, non-sublicensable, revocable license to use the Contractor Materials that are incorporated

or delivered to Client in connection with the Services, solely for Client's own internal purposes, to enable Client and its teachers and students to make full use of the Services. The Contractor Materials are the confidential information of Contractor, and Client agrees to maintain them in confidence and not disclose them to third parties without Contractor's prior written consent. Without limiting the foregoing, Client agrees: not to distribute the Contractor Materials to anyone other than its staff and students, not to post the Contractor Materials on any websites, and not to make any commercial use of the Contractor Materials. Contractor reserves all rights to the Contractor Materials other than the limited license granted herein. Client agrees to maintain and reproduce (and shall not delete or alter) any legends on the Contractor Materials indicating ownership of such materials by Contractor.

DISPUTES

Contractor and Client agree that any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, shall be resolved in a court of law in Washington State.

LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

Other than as explicitly set forth herein, Contractor disclaims all representations and warranties, including, without limitation, any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Contractor be liable for any consequential, incidental, exemplary, special or punitive damages, whether arising out of breach of contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise. Contractor's aggregate liability arising out of or related to this agreement shall not exceed the total of the amounts actually paid to Contractor under this agreement.

SEVERABILITY; ENTIRE AGREEMENT

If any provision of this Agreement should be held to be illegal, invalid, or unenforceable by a court of law or arbitrator, the legality, validity, and enforceability of the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected or impaired thereby. This Agreement, together with the exhibits attached hereto, constitutes the sole and entire agreement of the Parties with respect to the subject matter contained herein and supersedes all prior agreements, both written and oral, with respect to such subject matter.

GOVERNING LAW

The validity, interpretation, enforceability and performance of this Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Washington.

Entered into as of the date set forth above.

CLIENT

By: _____

Name:

Title:

Date:

CONTRACTOR

By: _____

Name:

Title:

Date:

EXHIBIT A

<p>Bundled Offering:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Student Program<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Ten total enrollments in Fall 2023 and/or Spring 2024○ Students who drop before the start of a course will not be counted as an enrollment○ Additional enrollments will be at a rate of \$700 per enrollment above the ten included here• Professional Learning<ul style="list-style-type: none">○ Unlimited number of enrollments in self-paced, asynchronous Educator Courses (currently 19 on offer, and more will be added fall 2023)○ 20% discount on facilitated, synchronous workshops for school-based teams and coached, cohort-based learning experiences for teams and school leaders○ Discounts on customized Strategic Consulting in areas that include student-centered assessment, competency-based learning, and online learning design• Continuous program support for Professional Learning and Student Programs• Invitations to online events for member schools	\$10,000
TOTAL	\$10,000



International Alliance Group

Cultural Exchange Programs in
the U.S. for Professionals

YOUR TRUSTED PARTNER

With over 20 years of experience in international recruitment and immigration and visa assistance, **International Alliance Group** (IAG) helps educational and healthcare organizations in the United States. We work with fully credentialed teachers, nurses, psychologists, speech language pathologists (SLP's), and social workers to provide a comprehensive cultural and professional exchange program unlike any other. We facilitate the placement and sponsorship of international teachers and other professionals such as nurses. Our primary goal is to provide an exceptional international program for individuals from all around the world to share their knowledge and experience in the U.S.

Chat with our
Recruiting Assistant



Our **international exchange teacher program** gives K-12 children in America a first-hand opportunity to learn more about the world from their teacher. Teachers who participate in this exchange enrich their professional skills and share cross-cultural activities in schools and communities. International exchange teachers return home after the exchange program with experience and increased knowledge of the U.S. educational system.

IAG is here for your success. Explore our site and learn more about how we can help you.


WHY WORK WITH IAG?

A blurred background image showing two women in a meeting. One woman is wearing a grey hijab and a dark patterned top, and the other is wearing a blue top. They are sitting at a table with papers and a laptop. The background is out of focus, showing office furniture and a window.

GOLD STANDARD PREPARATION & SUPPORT

IAG offers a comprehensive program designed to ensure success at every step of the employee's journey. Support includes workplace readiness, ongoing professional development, coaching, cultural competency, and wrap-around services (such as housing support).

Chat with our Recruiting Assistant 



HOW CAN WE HELP YOU?

For Employers

Is the J-1 program right for you? Learn more about the program and how IAG can help you.

Employer Information (/employers)

About Us

Curious about what powers IAG? Read our profiles and don't hesitate to reach out with questions.

About IAG (/about-us)

For Candidates

Are you qualified for employment through this program? Explore our site to learn more.

Information for Prospective Teachers (/teachers)

**Information for Prospective Healthcare Workers
(/healthcare-workers)**

Foreign Credential Review Services

Arizona International Credential Review Services (a division of International Alliance Group) evaluates education completed outside of the United States.

Chat with our
Recruiting Assistant



Start Your Education Credential Review

(<https://iceinaz.com/instructions/>)



International Alliance Group Employee Benefits

(<https://capficonsulting.com/iag-2022-2023/>)

IAG complies with all regulations as an affiliate of Educational Services, Inc. (ESI), a BridgeUSA designated sponsor.

(<https://j1visa.state.gov/participants/how-to-apply/sponsor-search/?program=Teacher>)

Career Sites by Recruiting.com (<https://www.recruiting.com>)



TRUSTEE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A TRUSTEE ELECTION BY MAIL BALLOT

BE IT RESOLVED, the Board of Trustees for Big Sky School District No. 72, Gallatin County, State of Montana, will hold the Annual Regular School Election by mail ballot on Tuesday, the 2nd day of May, 2023.

Ballots will be mailed to all eligible registered voters in the District on April 14th, 2023 and must be returned by each voter by mail to the Gallatin County Election Administrator, Gallatin County, 311 West Main Street, Bozeman, MT 59715. In the alternative, ballots may be delivered in person to the following location during the days (unless a holiday) and times noted:

Gallatin County Election Office, 311 W. Main, Room 210 Bozeman	Mon-Fri, 8am – 5pm through May 1 st On Election Day, May 2 nd , 2023 7am – 8pm
---	---

On Election Day, May 2nd, 2023, the only place for deposit of voted ballots will be in the office of the Gallatin County Election Administrator by 8:00pm in order to be counted.

The purpose of the election is voting to elect one (1) Trustee for a two-year term for the Board of Trustees of Big Sky School District #72; voting to elect one (1) Trustee for a three-year term for the Board of Trustees of Big Sky School District #72, with all qualified electors in Big Sky School District #72 participating.

The election will be held by mail ballot conducted by the Gallatin County Election Administrator.

Corky Miller, District Clerk, is instructed to notify the Gallatin County Election Administrator of the date of the election and request him to close registration and to prepare election materials as required by law. The Gallatin County Election Administrator is instructed to submit a written mail ballot plan to the office of the Montana Secretary of State in a timely manner and to publish and post notice of the election in a manner and at the times required by law. The Gallatin County Election Administrator will also appoint a sufficient number of judges and conduct the election as required by law.

No further proceedings were conducted relating to the election.

Loren Bough
Board Chair

Signature of Board Chair

Corky Miller
District Clerk

Signature of District Clerk

DATED this 14th day of February, 2023.
20-20-201, MCA

BSSD #72 - 2023 TRUSTEE ELECTION BALLOT LANGUAGE:

1. Elect one (1) trustee for a two-year term.
2. Elect one (1) trustee for a three-year term.

Approved by Board on: 14 February 2023

Loren Bough
Board Chair

Corky Miller
District Clerk

Signature of Board Chair

Signature of District Clerk

TRUSTEE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A BOND ELECTION BY MAIL BALLOT

BE IT RESOLVED, the Board of Trustees for Big Sky School District No. 72, Gallatin County, State of Montana, will hold the Annual Regular School Election by mail ballot on Tuesday, the 2nd day of May, 2023.

Ballots will be mailed to all eligible registered voters in the District on April 14th, 2023 and must be returned by each voter by mail to the Gallatin County Election Administrator, Gallatin County, 311 West Main Street, Bozeman, MT 59715. In the alternative, ballots may be delivered in person to the following location during the days (unless a holiday) and times noted:

Gallatin County Election Office, 311 W. Main, Room 210 Bozeman	Mon-Fri, 8am – 5pm through May 1 st On Election Day, May 2 nd , 2023 7am – 8pm
---	---

On Election Day, May 2nd, 2023, the only place for deposit of voted ballots will be in the office of the Gallatin County Election Administrator by 8:00pm in order to be counted.

The purpose of the election is voting on a Bond Election, with all qualified electors in Big Sky School District #72 participating.

The election will be held by mail ballot conducted by the Gallatin County Election Administrator.

Corky Miller, District Clerk, is instructed to notify the Gallatin County Election Administrator of the date of the election and request him to close registration and to prepare election materials as required by law. The Gallatin County Election Administrator is instructed to submit a written mail ballot plan to the office of the Montana Secretary of State in a timely manner and to publish and post notice of the election in a manner and at the times required by law. The Gallatin County Election Administrator will also appoint a sufficient number of judges and conduct the election as required by law.

No further proceedings were conducted relating to the election.

Loren Bough
Board Chair

Signature of Board Chair

Corky Miller
District Clerk

Signature of District Clerk

DATED this 14th day of February, 2023.
20-20-201, MCA

CERTIFICATE AS TO RESOLUTION AND ADOPTING VOTE

I, the undersigned, being the duly qualified and acting recording officer of K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky), Gallatin County, Montana (the "District"), hereby certify that the attached resolution is a true copy of a Resolution entitled: "A RESOLUTION OF K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 72 (BIG SKY), GALLATIN COUNTY, SUBMITTING TO THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF THE DISTRICT THE QUESTION OF ISSUING GENERAL OBLIGATION SCHOOL BUILDING BONDS IN ONE OR MORE SERIES IN THE AGGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF UP TO NINETEEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS (\$19,850,000.00) FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYING THE COSTS OF DESIGNING, CONSTRUCTING, FURNISHING AND EQUIPPING IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OPHIR MIDDLE SCHOOL AND LONE PEAK HIGH SCHOOL BUILDING; RELATED COSTS AND IMPROVEMENTS; AND PAYING THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SALE AND ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS" (the "Resolution"), on file in the original records of the District in my legal custody; that the Resolution was duly adopted by the Board of Trustees of the District at a meeting on February 14, 2023, and that the meeting was duly held by the Board of Trustees and was attended throughout by a quorum, pursuant to call and notice of such meeting given as required by law; and that the Resolution has not as of the date hereof been amended or repealed.

I further certify that, upon vote being taken on the Resolution at said meeting, the following Trustees voted in favor thereof: _____
_____; voted against the same: _____
_____; abstained from voting thereon: _____
_____; or were absent: _____
_____.

WITNESS my hand officially this _____ day of February, 2023.

School District Clerk

A RESOLUTION OF K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 72 (BIG SKY), GALLATIN COUNTY, SUBMITTING TO THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF THE DISTRICT THE QUESTION OF ISSUING GENERAL OBLIGATION SCHOOL BUILDING BONDS IN ONE OR MORE SERIES IN THE AGGREGATE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF UP TO NINETEEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS (\$19,850,000.00) FOR THE PURPOSE OF PAYING THE COSTS OF DESIGNING, CONSTRUCTING, FURNISHING AND EQUIPPING IMPROVEMENTS TO THE OPHIR MIDDLE SCHOOL AND LONE PEAK HIGH SCHOOL BUILDING; RELATED COSTS AND IMPROVEMENTS; AND PAYING THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SALE AND ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS

RECITALS

WHEREAS, the board of trustees of a school district may issue bonds on the credit of the school district for the purpose of building, altering, repairing, buying, furnishing, equipping, purchasing lands for, and/or obtaining a water supply for a school, teacherage, dormitory, gymnasium, other building, or combination of said buildings for school purposes, upon approval of the electorate of the district; and

WHEREAS, a board of trustees is authorized pursuant to Section 20-9-421, M.C.A., to call a bond election by adopting a resolution to that effect; and

WHEREAS, the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky), Gallatin County (the “District”), previously determined that there should be submitted to the electors of the District the question of issuing general obligation school building bonds of the District to pay the costs of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building and school grounds and caused a bond election to be conducted thereon on May 5, 2020 (the “2020 Bond Election”); and

WHEREAS, the ballot for the 2020 Bond Election set forth a variety of improvements to the middle school and high school and school grounds to be paid by the bonds (the “2020 Bond Election Improvements”); and

WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority conferred upon the Board at the 2020 Bond Election, the Board issued general obligation school building bonds of the District in the total principal amount of \$23,500,000 in 2020 (the “Series 2020 Bonds”) to pay the costs of the 2020 Bond Election Improvements and associated costs of issuance; and

WHEREAS, the Board has determined that all of the 2020 Bond Election Improvements can be built to completion with the proceeds of the Series 2020 Bonds, except for the additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; and

WHEREAS, to complete all of the 2020 Bond Election Improvements, the Board has determined that there should be submitted to the electors of the District qualified to vote at bond elections the question of whether the Board shall be authorized to sell and issue bonds of the

District in one or more series in the aggregate principal amount of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars (\$19,850,000.00) for the purpose of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building by paying the costs of designing, constructing, furnishing and equipping improvements to the building to include an additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; related costs and improvements; and paying the costs associated with the sale and issuance of the bonds; and

WHEREAS, each series of bonds shall be payable semiannually during a term of not more than seventeen (17) years, subject to redemption as required by law, and shall bear interest at a rate or rates to be determined at the time of the sale; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 13-19-104, M.C.A., such election can be conducted by a mail ballot election; and

WHEREAS, the Board has determined that a mail ballot election conducted in accordance with the provisions of Title 13, Chapter 19, Parts 1-3, M.C.A. (the "Mail Ballot Act"), is in the best interests of the District and the electors thereof, and notified the County Election Administrator of Gallatin County of its intent to cause the County Election Administrator to conduct a mail ballot election, which notification was not less than seventy days prior to the date of the proposed election; and

WHEREAS, the County Election Administrator will prepare a mail ballot election plan in accordance with the provisions of Section 13-19-205, M.C.A. (the "Mail Ballot Plan") and submit it to the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS, it is the judgment of the Board that the sum of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 dollars (\$19,850,000.00) in principal amount of bonds will be necessary to carry out the purpose set forth above; and

WHEREAS, the indebtedness to be evidenced by the proposed bonds and all other indebtedness of the District does not exceed the limitation as set forth in Section 20-9-406, M.C.A.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of the District as follows:

1. Calling of the Election. In order that all of the 2020 Bond Election Improvements may be completed, the Board of the District hereby calls and directs an election to be held on May 2, 2023 on the question of issuing bonds, which date is not less than 70 days after the date of passage of this resolution, such election to be conducted by mail ballot pursuant to the provisions of the Mail Ballot Act. The qualified electors in the District would vote on the question of whether the Board may sell and issue general obligation school building bonds of the District in one or more series in the aggregate principal amount of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars (\$19,850,000.00), for the purpose of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building by paying the costs of designing, constructing, furnishing and equipping improvements to the building to include an additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; related costs and improvements; and paying the costs associated with the sale and issuance of the bonds. Each series of the bonds shall be payable semiannually during a term of not more than seventeen (17) years, subject to

redemption as required by law, and shall bear interest at a rate or rates to be determined at the time of the sale.

2. Estimate of State Debt Service Assistance. Pursuant to Section 20-9-422, M.C.A., the District has requested from the Superintendent of Public Instruction a statement of the estimated amount of state debt service assistance that the District may receive under Sections 20-9-367 and 20-9-371, M.C.A., for debt service payments on the bonds in the first fiscal year in which a debt service payment is due. Because the District does not currently qualify for state advance or reimbursement, it is expected that the bonds will not be eligible for state advance/reimbursement.

3. Conduct of Election. All qualified electors of the District shall be entitled to vote at the bond election. Pursuant to Section 20-20-201, M.C.A., the District Clerk is hereby authorized and directed to give notice of the call and details of this election and to provide this resolution to the Gallatin County Election Administrator no later than three (3) days after this resolution is passed. The District Clerk is directed to instruct the Gallatin County Election Administrator to close registration and thereafter prepare printed lists of the electors in the District entitled to vote in the election in the District in the form and manner prescribed by law and consistent with the Mail Ballot Plan. The County Election Administrator shall prepare the ballot and arrange for the printing of the ballot and conduct the election in accordance with all legal requirements.

4. Notice of Election. The County Election Administrator is hereby authorized and requested to cause notice of the call and holding of the election to be given at least three times no earlier than 40 days and no later than 10 days before the election, in the *Bozeman Daily Chronicle*, a newspaper of general circulation in the District, and the District Clerk is hereby authorized and directed to cause the notice to be posted at three public places in the District, with at least one notice being posted in each ward or precinct in the District, and, if the District has a website, is directed to post notice on the District's website for 10 days prior to the election. The notice of election as published and posted shall read substantially as follows with such completions and additions as may be required by the Mail Ballot Plan or otherwise:

FORM OF NOTICE OF SCHOOL BOND ELECTION

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky), Gallatin County (the “District”), that pursuant to a certain resolution duly adopted at a meeting of the Board on February 14, 2023, an election of the registered voters of the District will be held by mail ballot election on May 2, 2023 for the purpose of voting on the question of whether the Board may sell and issue general obligation school building bonds of the District in one or more series in the aggregate principal amount of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars (\$19,850,000.00), for the purpose of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building by paying the costs of designing, constructing, furnishing and equipping improvements to the building to include an additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; related costs and improvements; and paying the costs associated with the sale and issuance of the bonds. Each series of the bonds shall bear interest at a rate or rates to be determined at the time of sale and be payable semiannually during a term of not more than seventeen (17) years.

The improvements to be paid with the proceeds of the bonds described above were part of a variety of improvements identified in a bond election held on May 5, 2020. The Board has determined that the proceeds of the District’s general obligation school building bonds issued in 2020 are sufficient to construct to completion all of the improvements identified in the 2020 bond election question, except for the additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space. Accordingly, the Board now seeks authorization to issue an additional series of bonds to pay for the costs of such improvements and associated costs.

The election will be conducted by the County Election Administrator solely by mail ballot. Ballots will be mailed to all eligible registered voters in the District on April 14, 2023, and must be returned by each voter by mail, to the Gallatin County Election Administrator, 311 W. Main Street, Room 210, Bozeman, Montana 59715, or ballots may be delivered in person at the following locations during regular business hours (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) weekdays (exclusive of holidays) April 17, 2023 through May 1, 2023: Gallatin County Election Office, 311 W. Main Room 210, in Bozeman; or such other ballot drop-off locations as are identified in the election instructions provided by the Gallatin County Election Administrator.

On Election Day, May 2, 2023, the only places for deposit of voted ballots will be the office of the Gallatin County Election Administrator located at 311 W. Main Room 210, in Bozeman, and such other ballot drop-off locations as are identified in the election instructions provided by the Gallatin County Election Administrator, which will be open from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. All ballots will be tabulated in accordance with Montana law with the preliminary results, if known, expected to be released after 8:00 p.m. that day.

A qualified voter who will be absent from the District during the time the election is being conducted may:

- (a) vote in person in the office of the County Election Administrator as soon as the ballots are available and until 8 p.m. on Election Day; or

(b) make a written request prior to noon on May 1, 2023, signed by the applicant and addressed to the office of the County Election Administrator requesting the ballot be mailed to an address other than that which appears on the registration records.

An elector may obtain a replacement ballot if his or her ballot is destroyed, spoiled, lost, or not received by the elector by filling out and mailing, emailing, or faxing back a completed replacement ballot request form or by personally appearing at the office of the County Election Administrator, located at 311 W. Main Room 210 in Bozeman, Montana.

Ballots may be returned in person at the places of deposit listed in the election instructions of the Gallatin County Election Administrator, or returned by mail. If returning by mail, please use the then-prevailing first-class-postage price or one Forever Stamp. Postmark date does not apply; ballots returned by mail must be received at the office of the County Election Administrator by the 8:00 p.m. Election Day deadline to be counted.

Please note, all electors, as defined in Section 20-20-301, M.C.A., are those who reside within the District and are registered to vote by the close of registration on April 3, 2023.

Electors who miss the close of registration deadline may register late and vote in the election if the County Election Administrator receives and verifies the electors' voter registration information prior to 8 p.m. on May 2, 2023.

DATED this ____ day of _____, 2023.

/s/ Eric Semerad
Gallatin County Election Administrator

Publication Dates: April 2, 2023, April 9, 2023, and April 16, 2023

5. Form of Ballot. The ballot shall be printed in substantially the following form with such completions and additions as may be required or desired:

FORM OF OFFICIAL BALLOT

K-12 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 72 (BIG SKY)
GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA
SCHOOL BOND ELECTION

TO BE CONDUCTED BY MAIL BALLOT
ON MAY 2, 2023

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS: Completely fill in the oval using a blue or black ink pen before the words “BONDS—YES” if you wish to vote for the bond issue; if you are opposed to the bond issue, completely fill in the oval using a blue or black ink pen before the words “BONDS—NO.”

Shall the Board of Trustees of K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky), Gallatin County, Montana (the “District”) be authorized to sell and issue general obligation bonds of the District in one or more series in the aggregate principal amount of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars (\$19,850,000.00), bearing interest at rates to be determined at the time of the sale, payable semiannually, during a term as to each series of bonds of not more than seventeen (17) years, for the purpose of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building by paying the costs of designing, constructing, furnishing and equipping improvements to the building to include an additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; related costs and improvements; and paying the costs associated with the sale and issuance of the bonds?

The District issued general obligation school building bonds pursuant to a bond election conducted on May 5, 2020 (the “Prior Bond Election”) to pay the costs of a variety of improvements to the Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building and school grounds and associated costs. The improvements identified in the proposition above were a part of a Prior Bond Election. The proceeds of the bonds in the principal amount of up to \$19,850,000 identified in the proposition above will allow the District to construct to completion all of the improvements identified in the Prior Bond Election.

☐ BONDS – YES

☐ BONDS – NO

Section 6. Reimbursement Expenditures.

(a) The United States Department of Treasury has promulgated final regulations governing the use of proceeds of tax-exempt bonds, all or a portion of which are to be used to reimburse the District for project expenditures paid by the District prior to the date of issuance of such bonds. Those regulations (Treasury Regulations, Section 1.150-2) (the “Regulations”) require that the District adopt a statement of official intent to reimburse an original expenditure not later than 60 days after payment of the original expenditure. The Regulations also generally require that the bonds be issued and the reimbursement allocation made from the proceeds of the bonds within 18 months (or three years, if the reimbursement bond issue qualifies for the “small issuer” exception from the arbitrage rebate requirement) after the later of (i) the date the expenditure is paid or (ii) the date the project is placed in service or abandoned, but (unless the issue qualifies for the “small issuer” exception from the arbitrage rebate requirement) in no event more than three years after the date the expenditure is paid. The Regulations generally permit reimbursement of capital expenditures and costs of issuance of the bonds.

(b) Other than (i) expenditures to be paid or reimbursed from sources other than the bonds, (ii) expenditures permitted to be reimbursed under the transitional provision contained in Section 1.150-2(j)(2) of the Regulations, (iii) expenditures constituting preliminary expenditures within the meaning of Section 1.150-2(f)(2) of the Regulations, or (iv) expenditures in a “de minimus” amount (as defined in Section 1.150-2(f)(1) of the Regulations), no expenditures for a project within the scope of this resolution have been paid by the District before the date 60 days before the date of adoption of this resolution.

(c) The District reasonably expects to reimburse the expenditures made for costs of such a project out of the proceeds of bonds in an estimated maximum aggregate principal amount of up to \$19,850,000 after the date of payment of all or a portion of the costs of such a project. All reimbursed expenditures shall be capital expenditures, a cost of issuance of the bonds or other expenditures eligible for reimbursement under Section 1.150-2(d)(3) of the Regulations.

(d) As of the date hereof, there are no District funds reserved, allocated on a long-term basis or otherwise set aside (or reasonably expected to be reserved, allocated on a long-term basis or otherwise set aside) to provide permanent financing for the expenditures related to such a project, other than pursuant to the issuance of the bonds. The statement of intent contained in this resolution, therefore, is determined to be consistent with the District’s budgetary and financial circumstances as they exist or are reasonably foreseeable on the date hereof.

(e) The District Clerk shall be responsible for making the “reimbursement allocations” described in the Regulations, being generally the transfer of the appropriate amount of proceeds of the bonds to reimburse the source of temporary financing used by the District to make prior payment of the costs of the project. Each allocation shall be evidenced by an entry on the official books and records of the District maintained for the bonds or the project and shall specifically identify the actual original expenditure being reimbursed.

Passed and approved this 14th day of February, 2023.

Chair, Board of Trustees

ATTEST:

District Clerk
K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky)

BSSD #72 - 2023 BOND ELECTION BALLOT LANGUAGE:

1. Shall the Board of Trustees of K-12 School District No. 72 (Big Sky), Gallatin County, Montana (the “District”) be authorized to sell and issue general obligation bonds of the District in one or more series in the aggregate principal amount of up to Nineteen Million Eight Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars (\$19,850,000.00), bearing interest at rates to be determined at the time of the sale, payable semiannually, during a term as to each series of bonds of not more than seventeen (17) years, for the purpose of improving the existing Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building and school grounds by paying the costs of designing, constructing, furnishing and equipping additions to the building to include an additional gym, locker rooms, and athletic support space; related costs and improvements; and paying the costs associated with the sale and issuance of the bonds?

The District issued general obligation school building bonds pursuant to a bond election conducted on May 5, 2020 (the “Prior Bond Election”) to pay the costs of a variety of improvements to the Ophir Middle School and Lone Peak High School building and school grounds and associated costs. The improvements identified in the proposition above were a part of a Prior Bond Election. The proceeds of the bonds in the principal amount of up to \$19,850,000 identified in the proposition above will allow the District to construct to completion all of the improvements identified in the Prior Bond Election.

Approved by Board on: 14 February 2023

Loren Bough
Board Chair

Signature of Board Chair

Corky Miller
District Clerk

Signature of District Clerk

Resolution of Intent to Impose an Increase in Levies (SB 307)

As an essential part of the budgeting process, the Big Sky School District #72 Board of Trustees is authorized by law to impose levies to support its budget. The Big Sky School District #72 Board of Trustees estimated the following increases/decreases in revenues and mills for the funds noted below for the next school fiscal year beginning July 1, 2023 (FY24), using certified taxable valuations from the current school fiscal year as provided to the district:

Fund Supported	Estimated Change in Revenues*	Estimated Change in Annual Mills*	Estimated Annual Impact, Home of \$100,000*	Estimated Annual Impact, Home of \$200,000*
Adult Education	\$0 increase	0 mills	\$0 increase	\$0 increase
Bus Depreciation	\$0 increase	0 mills	\$0 increase	\$0 increase
Transportation	\$0 decrease	0 mills	\$0 increase	\$0 increase
Tuition	\$0 increase	0 mills	\$0 increase	\$0 increase
Building Reserve	\$0 increase	0 mills	\$0 increase	\$0 increase
Total	\$0 increase	0 increase	\$0 increase	\$0 increase

*Impacts above are based on current certified taxable valuations from the FY23 school fiscal year.

Building Reserve Project List:

- Improve security and telecom systems across District
- Update internet and infrastructure cabling throughout school buildings
- Improve and Update fire suppression system throughout school buildings

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BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
Claims and/or Payroll Checks List For Checks from 01/07/23 to 02/09/23
For checks between: 01/07/23 - 02/09/23

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Report ID: W100X

Claims

Check		Vendor/Employee/Payee Number/Name	Check Amount	Period	Date		CL #/Payroll Notes
Check #	Type				Issued		
-99923	E	1745 BMO MASTERCARD	8701.08	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12565	8701.08
41390	SC	1 3 RIVERS COMMUNICATIONS	743.37	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12522	743.37
41391	SC	4021 ALANAH GRIFFITH	412.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12535	412.00
41392	SC	41 ALSCO	122.55	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12533	122.55
41393	SC	2853 ASHLEY JENKS	136.09	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12526	136.09
41394	SC	152 BIG SKY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	205.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12518	205.00
41395	SC	3688 BRIDGER ANALYTICAL LAB	56.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12530	56.00
41396	SC	483 ENERGY LABORATORIES INC	216.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12515	216.00
41397	SC	1377 FARSTAD OIL, INC.	316.27	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12537	316.27
41398	SC	2502 FULL CIRCLE OF BIG SKY	560.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12520	560.00
41399	SC	3668 GREAT AMERICA FINANCIAL SERVICES	757.58	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12519	757.58
41400	SC	3734 HILLYARD/ MONTANA	448.91	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12531	448.91
41401	SC	2732 INTERNATIONAL BACCALAUREATE ORGAN	12583.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12534	12583.00
41402	SC	1603 JOSTENS	268.05	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12521	268.05
41403	SC	3059 K.O.R. MECHANICAL	633.55	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12532	633.55
41404	SC	3780 MORRISON - MAIERLE, INC.	3674.86	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12517	3674.86
41405	SC	362 MT DPT JUSTICE CRIMINAL RECORDS &	85.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12516	85.00
41406	SC	1107 OLNESS & ASSOCIATES, PC, CPA'S	500.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12525	500.00
41407	SC	2145 REPUBLIC SERVICES #886	978.31	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12523	978.31
41408	SC	1422 TERRELL'S OFFICE MACHINES, INC.	726.32	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12536	726.32
41409	SC	2965 TIM SULLIVAN	85.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12529	85.00
41410	SC	525 US FOODS - BILLINGS	6899.56	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12528	6899.56
41411	SC	1773 US OMNI & TSACG COMPLIANCE SERVIC	50.00	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12524	50.00
41412	SC	3133 WESTERN MONTANA GROWERS COOPERATI	439.97	1/23	01/11/23	CL 12527	439.97
41413	C	1 3 RIVERS COMMUNICATIONS	0	1/23	01/13/23		
41414	SC	4020 HANNAH DREISBACH	31.97	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12544	31.97
41415	SC	1777 JAREN BEALL	150.56	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12538	150.56
41416	SC	2286 MICHAEL BELL	205.56	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12540	205.56
41417	SC	1017 MTSBA	321.00	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12546	321.00
41418	SC	1298 SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS OF MONTANA	350.00	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12543	350.00
41419	SC	3539 ZACH BROWN	106.56	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12539	106.56
41420	SC	4022 ZACHARY WOGAMON	150.56	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12542	150.56
41421	SC	4023 DALTON RYKAL	161.56	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12541	161.56
41422	SC	966 MONTANA ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC	6649.21	1/23	01/13/23	CL 12545	6649.21
41423	SC	346 COSTCO	311.61	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12564	311.61
41424	SC	39 ALLIED ENGINEERING SERVICES, INC.	446.50	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12557	446.50
41425	SC	41 ALSCO	34.16	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12551	34.16
41426	SC	62 AMERIGAS-BOZEMAN	1341.92	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12552	1341.92
41427	SC	4024 ARIANE COLEMAN	595.00	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12547	595.00
41428	SC	3934 FISHER'S TECHNOLOGY	556.97	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12558	556.97
41429	SC	3734 HILLYARD/ MONTANA	306.09	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12554	306.09
41430	SC	966 MONTANA ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC	7733.96	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12550	7733.96
41431	SC	3300 NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE CORPORATI	447.60	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12553	447.60
41432	SC	1088 NORTHWESTERN ENERGY	11581.67	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12548	11581.67
41433	SC	2207 TATE MANAGEMENT, INC.	30485.00	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12555	30485.00
41434	C	1506 UNIVERSAL ATHLETIC LLC	0	1/23	01/18/23		
41435	SC	525 US FOODS - BILLINGS	2151.98	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12549	2151.98
41436	SC	3903 BSN SPORTS LLC	231.02	1/23	01/18/23	CL 12556	231.02

Check Types: MC=Manual Claim, SC=System Claim, V=Void (never in system), E=ACH
P=Payroll, C=Cancelled (cancelled in system), R=Reissued, D=Deleted (deleted in system)

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BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
Claims and/or Payroll Checks List For Checks from 01/07/23 to 02/09/23
For checks between: 01/07/23 - 02/09/23

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Report ID: W100X

Claims

Check		Vendor/Employee/Payee Number/Name	Check Amount	Period	Date		CL #/Payroll Notes
Check #	Type				Issued		
41437	SC	1732 BLAKE SHAW	150.56	1/23	01/19/23	CL 12559	150.56
41438	SC	1782 DAVE LUEBBE	150.56	1/23	01/19/23	CL 12560	150.56
41439	SC	3135 SHANNON MARINKO	205.56	1/23	01/19/23	CL 12561	205.56
41440	SC	4025 TOMMY ALBRECHT	106.56	1/23	01/19/23	CL 12563	106.56
41441	SC	3175 TYD ROGERS	161.56	1/23	01/19/23	CL 12562	161.56
41442	SC	2951 BILL HILSENDEGER	161.56	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12570	161.56
41443	SC	3335 BRENTON REINHARDT	205.56	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12568	205.56
41444	SC	2716 CALE WEPPLER	150.56	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12567	150.56
41445	SC	1777 JAREN BEALL	150.56	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12566	150.56
41446	SC	751 KARST STAGE	1841.10	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12571	1841.10
41447	SC	4025 TOMMY ALBRECHT	106.56	1/23	01/26/23	CL 12569	106.56
41448	SC	3328 ATLAS BUILDING MAINTENANCE INC	460.61	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12574	460.61
41449	SC	4030 BFH COMMERCIAL WEST CONDOMINIUM O	17899.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12575	17899.00
41450	SC	3688 BRIDGER ANALYTICAL LAB	60.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12577	60.00
41451	SC	1377 FARSTAD OIL, INC.	623.31	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12592	623.31
41452	SC	2208 GALLATIN RIVERHOUSE GRILL	2010.96	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12585	2010.96
41453	SC	3668 GREAT AMERICA FINANCIAL SERVICES	109.20	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12580	109.20
41454	SC	3204 HOBART SERVICE/ ED CAISSEY, INC.	916.99	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12588	916.99
41455	SC	2732 INTERNATIONAL BACCALAUREATE ORGAN	550.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12590	550.00
41456	SC	4031 JARETT BLACKBURN	149.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12582	149.00
41457	SC	3881 JOE'S DJ SERVICE	570.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12591	570.00
41458	SC	3059 K.O.R. MECHANICAL	9185.88	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12578	9185.88
41459	SC	1820 MCM TRUCK REPAIR	10769.70	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12579	10769.70
41460	SC	1032 NAPA AUTO PARTS	69.46	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12589	69.46
41461	SC	2252 PSAT/NMSQT-COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM	1684.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12587	1684.00
41462	SC	2622 RAU DESIGNS INC.	364.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12573	364.00
41463	SC	1349 SNOW CREST CHEMICALS	1386.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12583	1386.00
41464	SC	525 US FOODS - BILLINGS	5565.92	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12572	5565.92
41465	SC	1550 WESTERN C DIVISON	150.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12586	150.00
41466	SC	3133 WESTERN MONTANA GROWERS COOPERATI	294.50	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12576	294.50
41467	SC	3390 YES COMPOST	200.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12581	200.00
41468	SC	4032 YOU SCIENCE	1612.00	1/23	01/31/23	CL 12584	1612.00
41469	SC	41 ALSCO	38.48	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12599	38.48
41470	SC	4023 DALTON RYKAL	161.56	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12594	161.56
41471	SC	3470 DHE COMPUTER SYSTEMS, LLC	2977.67	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12602	2977.67
41472	SC	3387 FLOYDS KABOTA	972.07	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12600	972.07
41473	SC	2286 MICHAEL BELL	150.56	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12595	150.56
41474	SC	3879 MID AMERICA RESEARCH CHEMICAL	158.12	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12601	158.12
41475	SC	3816 NATE MENUEZ	106.56	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12593	106.56
41476	SC	3186 SPENCER SORENSON	150.56	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12597	150.56
41477	SC	3085 TIMBERLINE PROPERTY SERVICES, LLC	630.00	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12603	630.00
41478	SC	3175 TYD ROGERS	205.56	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12596	205.56
41479	SC	525 US FOODS - BILLINGS	2190.40	2/23	02/01/23	CL 12598	2190.40
41480	SC	416 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE	10681.48	2/23	02/06/23	CL 12605	10681.48
41481	SC	3765 JACKSON CONTRACTOR GROUP, INC.	1057466.66	2/23	02/06/23	CL 12604	1057466.66
41482	SC	1 3 RIVERS COMMUNICATIONS	743.37	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12606	743.37
41483	SC	41 ALSCO	121.30	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12611	121.30
41484	SC	227 BRITTANY SHIRLEY	208.99	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12623	208.99

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BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
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Claims

Check		Vendor/Employee/Payee Number/Name	Check Amount	Period	Date		CL #/Payroll Notes
Check #	Type				Issued		
41485	SC	2581 COLLEGEBOARD	800.00	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12622	800.00
41486	SC	483 ENERGY LABORATORIES INC	2604.50	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12617	2604.50
41487	SC	1377 FARSTAD OIL, INC.	956.04	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12620	956.04
41488	SC	3934 FISHER'S TECHNOLOGY	1440.27	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12621	1440.27
41489	SC	560 GALLATIN-MADISON SPECIAL ED. COOP	3521.83	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12607	3521.83
41490	SC	3734 HILLYARD/ MONTANA	702.53	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12608	702.53
41491	SC	2866 KATE EISELE	47.36	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12618	47.36
41492	SC	2877 MARLO MITCHEM	115.12	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12610	115.12
41493	SC	966 MONTANA ENERGY ALLIANCE, LLC	6804.00	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12612	6804.00
41494	SC	2145 REPUBLIC SERVICES #886	959.88	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12615	959.88
41495	SC	3679 SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC.	150.00	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12613	150.00
41496	SC	525 US FOODS - BILLINGS	2669.07	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12609	2669.07
41497	SC	1773 US OMNI & TSACG COMPLIANCE SERVIC	50.00	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12614	50.00
41498	SC	3133 WESTERN MONTANA GROWERS COOPERATI	482.35	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12619	482.35
41499	SC	1567 WILLIAMS PLUMBING HEATING & UTIL,	1621.13	2/23	02/09/23	CL 12616	1621.13

Claims Total # of Checks: 111 Total: 1261857.58

Check Types: MC=Manual Claim, SC=System Claim, V=Void (never in system), E=ACH
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02/09/23
13:54:36

BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
Claims and/or Payroll Checks List For Checks from 01/07/23 to 02/09/23
For checks between: 01/07/23 - 02/09/23

Page: 4 of 5
Report ID: W100X

Payroll

Check		Vendor/Employee/Payee Number/Name	Check Amount	Period	Date		CL #/Payroll Notes
Check #	Type				Issued		
-78101	P	542 AGNES ADAMS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78100	P	61 CHRISTINA ALBERS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78099	P	614 AUTUMN ASH		2/23	02/03/23		
-78098	P	641 JACKSON BALLARD		2/23	02/03/23		
-78097	P	585 ROBERT BATEMAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78096	P	676 BETSY BIGGERSTAFF		2/23	02/03/23		
-78095	P	628 ERICA BIGGERT		2/23	02/03/23		
-78094	P	664 SHANNON BLACHLY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78093	P	658 JARRETT BLACKBURN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78092	P	458 ANDREW BLESSING		2/23	02/03/23		
-78091	P	653 MICHELLE BORDEN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78090	P	661 JULIE BREMER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78089	P	662 JOY BROOKE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78088	P	677 KRISTEN BROWNE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78087	P	613 KATHRYN BRUNSWICK		2/23	02/03/23		
-78086	P	639 KINSEY CARNEY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78085	P	38 BARTHOLOMEW COPPOLA		2/23	02/03/23		
-78084	P	678 MATTHEW DAUGHERTY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78083	P	582 ASHLEY DODD		2/23	02/03/23		
-78082	P	668 HANNAH DREISBACH		2/23	02/03/23		
-78081	P	659 ANA EBELING		2/23	02/03/23		
-78080	P	514 KATE EISELE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78079	P	640 MARIEL ELLEMAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78078	P	578 LINDSIE FELDNER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78077	P	665 CANDICE FIELDER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78076	P	106 ERIKA FROUNFELKER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78075	P	540 GRETCHEN FUDALLY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78074	P	570 JONATHON GANS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78073	P	647 ROSA RENATA GARRETT		2/23	02/03/23		
-78072	P	383 ELIZABETH GRABOW		2/23	02/03/23		
-78071	P	248 PATTY HAMBLIN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78070	P	438 JOHN HANNAHS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78069	P	115 JEREMY HARDER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78068	P	436 ASHLEY JENKS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78067	P	286 STEPHANIE KISSELL		2/23	02/03/23		
-78066	P	581 SUZANNE KLEIN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78065	P	2 A. BRADFORD LARTIGUE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78064	P	193 LADAWN T. LEGRANDE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78063	P	608 KARLA LONG		2/23	02/03/23		
-78062	P	384 MARGARET LUCHINI		2/23	02/03/23		
-78061	P	633 JANET MARTINEZ		2/23	02/03/23		
-78060	P	538 WHITNEY MCKENZIE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78059	P	667 SYLVIA MCMINN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78058	P	574 WAYNE MCMINN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78057	P	670 CAROL MICKLE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78056	P	519 CORKY MILLER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78055	P	511 JAMES MIRANDA		2/23	02/03/23		
-78054	P	505 MARIO MITCHEM		2/23	02/03/23		

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BIG SKY SCHOOL DISTRICT #72
Claims and/or Payroll Checks List For Checks from 01/07/23 to 02/09/23
For checks between: 01/07/23 - 02/09/23

Page: 5 of 5
Report ID: W100X

Payroll

Check		Vendor/Employee/Payee Number/Name	Check Amount	Period	Date		CL #/Payroll Notes
Check #	Type				Issued		
-78053	P	679 TIFFANY NASH		2/23	02/03/23		
-78052	P	474 LINDA NELL		2/23	02/03/23		
-78051	P	598 BRAD PACKER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78050	P	638 KARY PEMBERTON		2/23	02/03/23		
-78049	P	645 ALI PIZZA		2/23	02/03/23		
-78048	P	663 KATE RILEY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78047	P	498 HILARY ROBBINS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78046	P	626 KYANA SAIDIZAND		2/23	02/03/23		
-78045	P	666 KAREN SCHREIBER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78044	P	465 DUSTIN SHIPMAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78043	P	493 KATARZYNA SHIPMAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78042	P	44 BRITTANY E. SHIRLEY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78041	P	508 BRIAN SQUILLACE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78040	P	635 BETSEY STEWART		2/23	02/03/23		
-78039	P	621 ROSIE SULLIVAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78038	P	509 TIMOTHY SULLIVAN		2/23	02/03/23		
-78037	P	646 GRACE THOMPSON		2/23	02/03/23		
-78036	P	565 MARY JO THOMPSON-BUTLER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78035	P	601 MARIELLE WALKER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78034	P	657 CARA WILDER		2/23	02/03/23		
-78033	P	660 CADIE WILLIAMS		2/23	02/03/23		
-78032	P	311 VANESSA WILSON		2/23	02/03/23		
-78031	P	588 RIKKA WOMMACK		2/23	02/03/23		
-78030	P	159 JOHN F. ZIRKLE		2/23	02/03/23		
-78029	P	HSA FIRST SECURITY BANK	10961.13	2/23	02/03/23		
-78028	P	678 MATTHEW DAUGHERTY		2/23	02/03/23		
-78027	P	FIT FIRST INTERSTATE BANK	63273.74	2/23	02/03/23		
-78026	P	SIT DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE	11600.00	2/23	02/03/23		
-78025	P	TSA TSA CONSULTING GROUP, IN	8971.18	2/23	02/03/23		
-78024	P	TRS MONTANA TEACHERS' RETIRE	40693.06	2/23	02/03/23		
-78023	P	P.E.R.S. MPERA	11048.57	2/23	02/06/23		
3168	P	648 LAURA BARZIZZA		2/23	02/03/23		
3169	P	480 DIANE DOWD		2/23	02/03/23		
3170	P	396 KRISTINE HAMMOND		2/23	02/03/23		
3171	P	370 JULIE HODGE		2/23	02/03/23		
3172	P	673 LESLIE JORGENSEN		2/23	02/03/23		
3173	P	672 ERIN MCCORMICK		2/23	02/03/23		
3174	P	674 MARJA SORENSEN		2/23	02/03/23		
3175	P	LIFE INS PRE-TA DEARBORN LIFE INSURANCE	1368.45	2/23	02/03/23		
3176	P	DENTAL INS FLEX BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIE	26727.90	2/23	02/03/23		
3177	P	MFPE GALLATIN RURAL EDUCATION	743.13	2/23	02/03/23		

Payroll Total # of Checks: 89 Total: 386289.97

Grand Total # of Checks: 200 Total: 1648147.55

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